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Abstract
The social alignment of the human mind is omnipresent in our everyday life
and culture. Yet, what mechanisms of the brain allow humans to be social,
and how do they work and interact? Despite the apparent importance of this
question, the nexus of cognitive processes underlying social intelligence is still
largely unknown. A system of mirror neurons has been under deep, interdis-
ciplinary consideration over recent years, and farreaching contributions to so-
cial cognition have been suggested, including understanding others’ actions,
intentions, and emotions. Theories of embodied cognition emphasize that our
minds develop by processing and inferring structures given the encountered
bodily experiences. It has been suggested that also action understanding is
possible by simulating others’ actions by means of the own embodied repre-
sentations. Nonetheless, it remains largely unknown how the brain manages
to map visually perceived biological motion of others onto principally embod-
ied states like intentions and motor representations, and which processes foster
suitable simulations thereof. Seeing that our minds are generative and predic-
tive in nature, and that cognition is elementally anticipatory, also principles of
predictive coding have been suggested to be involved in action understand-
ing. This thesis puts forward a unifying hypothesis of embodied simulation,
predictive coding, and perceptual inferences, and supports it with a neural net-
work model. The model (i) learns encodings of embodied, self-centered visual
and proprioceptive, modal and submodal perceptions as well as kinematic in-
tentions in separate modules, (ii) learns temporal, recurrent predictions inside
and across these modules to foster distributed and consistent simulations of
unobservable embodied states, (iii) and applies top-down expectations to drive
perceptual inferences and imagery processes that establish the correspondence
between action observations and the unfolding, simulated self-representations.
All components of the network are evaluated separately and in complete sce-
narios on motion capture data of human subjects. In the results, I show that the
model becomes capable of simulating and reenacting observed actions based
on its embodied experience, leading to action understanding in terms of motor
preparations and inference of kinematic intentions. Furthermore, I show that
perceptual inferences by means of perspective-taking and feature binding can
establish the correspondence between self and other and might thus be deeply
anchored in action understanding and other abilities attributed to the mirror
neuron system. In conclusion, the model shows that it is indeed possible to de-
velop embodied, neurocomputational models of the alleged principles of social
cognition, providing support for the above hypotheses and opportunities for
further investigations.

vAbstract
Die soziale Orientierung des menschlichen Geistes ist in unserem Alltag
sowie unserer Kultur allgegenwärtig. Welche Vorgänge im Gehirn führen
jedoch dazu, und wie funktionieren und interagieren sie? Trotz des offen-
sichtlichen Gewichts dieser Fragestellung sind die der sozialen Intelligenz
zugrundeliegenden Zusammenhänge und kognitiven Prozesse weitestgehend
ungeklärt. Seit einigen Jahren wird ein als Spiegelneuronensystem benannter
neuronaler Komplex umfangreich und interdisziplinär betrachtet. Ihm werden
weitreichende Implikationen für die soziale Kognition zugeschrieben, so etwa
das Verstehen der Aktionen, Intentionen und Emotionen anderer. Die Theorie
der ’Embodied Cognition’ betont, dass die verarbeiteten und hergeleiteten
Strukturen in unserem Geist erst durch unser Handeln und unsere körper-
lichen Erfahrungen hervorgebracht werden. So soll auch unser Verständnis
anderer dadurch zustande kommen, dass wir ihre Handlungen mittels der
durch unseren eigenen Körper erworbenen Erfahrungen simulieren. Es bleibt
jedoch zunächst offen, wie etwa visuell wahrgenommene Bewegungen anderer
Personen auf grundsätzlich sensomotorisch koordinierte Zustände abge-
bildet werden, und welche mentalen Prozesse entsprechende Simulationen
anstoßen. In Anbetracht der antizipatorischen Natur unseres Geistes wurden
auch Prinzipien der prädiktiven Codierung (’Predictive Coding’) mit Hand-
lungsverständnis in Zusammenhang gebracht. In dieser Arbeit schlage ich eine
kombinierende Hypothese aus ’Embodied Simulation’, prädiktiven Codierun-
gen, und perzeptuellen Inferenzen vor, und untermauere diese mithilfe eines
neuronalen Modells. Das Modell lernt (i) Codierungen von körperlich kontex-
tualisierten, selbst-bezogenen, visuellen und propriozeptiven, modalen und
submodalen Reizen sowohl als auch kinematische Intentionen in separaten
Modulen, lernt (ii) zeitliche, rekurrente Vorhersagen innerhalb der Module und
modulübergreifend um konsistente Simulation teilweise nicht beobachtbarer,
verteilter Zustandssequenzen zu ermöglichen, und wendet (iii) top-down
Erwartungen an um perzeptuelle Inferenzen und perspektivische Vorstel-
lungsprozesse anzustoßen, so dass die Korrespondenz von Beobachtungen zu
den gelernten Selbstrepräsentationen hergestellt wird. Die Komponenten des
Netzwerks werden sowohl einzeln als auch in vollständigen Szenarien anhand
von Bewegungsaufzeichnungen menschlicher Versuchspersonen ausgewertet.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Modell bestimmte Handlungtypen simulieren
und unter Zuhilfenahme der eigenen körperlichen Erfahrungen beobachtete
Handlungen nachvollziehen kann, indem motorische Resonanzen und inten-
tionale Inferenzen resultieren. Desweiteren zeigen die Auswertungen, das
perzeptuelle Inferencen im Sinne von Perspektivübernahme und Merkmalsin-
tegration die Korrespondenz zwischen dem Selbst und Anderen herstellen
können, und dass diese Prozesse daher tief in unserem Handlungsverständnis
vi
und anderen den Spiegelneuronen zugeschriebenen Fähigkeiten verankert sein
können. Schlussfolgernd zeigt das neuronale Netz, dass es in der Tat möglich
ist, die vermeintlichen Prinzipien der sozialen Kognition mit einem körperlich
grundierten Ansatz zu modellieren, so dass die oben genannten Theorien
unterstützt werden und sich neue Gelegenheiten für weitere Untersuchungen
ergeben.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Humans are exceptionally socially capable creatures. We interact with and learn
from others our entire life, beginning at a very young age when we start imi-
tating others and recognize the meaning of their movements, gestures, gaze
directions, facial expressions, et cetera (Carpenter et al., 1998; Want and Harris,
2002; Elsner, 2007; Klinnert, 1984). Not so much later in life, we are able to em-
pathize with them and to slip into their shoes, we can project our experiences
onto their situations, we can figure out the reasons for, and intentions behind
their deeds and words even in very complex scenarios. Apparently, a form of
emotional intelligence (Goleman and Griese, 1996; Murphy, 2014) develops from
very basic perceptual skills which is steadily enriched by the experiences we
make in our lifetime. Human cognition is built on social cognitive skills like
these so much that a culture has co-evolved being specifically centered around
social norms, communication, interaction, and coexistence in general (Helman,
2007; Tomasello, 1999). Accepting the computational theory of mind (Rescorla,
2017) – the notion that the brain is an information processing system – how it
manages to be social on a functional level is a matter of much speculation, and
not even the involved basic perceptual mechanisms are identified and under-
stood with full certainty to this day. With good reason, the distinctive social
orientation of the human mind is a highly disputed topic among cognitive sci-
entists.
Many forms of social behavior require an understanding of others’ bodily ac-
tions. As introductory example for facets of this quality, let us assume that we
observe a man crossing a street. While this situation may appear trivial at first
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glance, in fact, it can be stated with some humor that if we completely under-
stand (our perception of) the street-crossing man, we are able to completely
understand major aspects of what makes us human, and finally shed light on
the "dark matter of social neuroscience", as social cognition was recently named
(Przyrembel et al., 2012). Let me at first elaborate on well-chosen cognitive
processes involved in this example that will help to classify this work in the
huge context of neuroscientific, developmental and behavioral studies centered
around action understanding. The mentioned aspects will resurface in more
technical terms in the course of this thesis and will be detailed and underpinned
in the following chapters.
First, when we observe the man crossing the street, we were able to recognize
the shape of the man within fractions of a second. As usually happens, we did
not have trouble to segregate them from the street, or distracting or irrelevant
elements. We rather selectively focused the man and directed attention to visual
features of the scene that are salient, where saliences are vigorously governed
by the information that our brain seeks, or in other words, the expectations that
it tries to confirm or contradict (Oliva et al., 2003). Amongst others, this infor-
mation comes in terms of grouped features – or forms – and their motion (see
e.g. Grossberg, 2007). Thus, several of visual features were aggregated to form
a stable, descriptive percept of the man, his body, and his current movement.
From this percept of bodily, biological motion, we were able to identify a type of
action – the man is presumably walking – a perception of which we are arguably
used to. We learned the appearance of such a movement from a rich amount of
similar experiences in our lives. While some of the first impressions of this kind
may certainly have been obtained by observing our parents and others (as for
example accentuated by Heyes, 2010; Nagai, Kawai, and Asada, 2011; Saby,
Marshall, and Meltzoff, 2012; Froese, Lenay, and Ikegami, 2012), much of our
actual understanding of walking comes from the perception of our own body (cf.
Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Meltzoff, 2007; Gallese, 2007; Catmur, Walsh, and
Heyes, 2007; Gallese et al., 2009). Most obviously, we cannot directly observe or
feel the muscular activations of another person. We nonetheless have a rather
precise notion of how we would have to move our muscles if we were in their
situation. Interestingly, we might even find ourselves reflexively moving in
response to the action that we see – a phenomenon which was termed ideomotor
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effect by Carpenter already in 1852 (Carpenter, 1852), emphasizing that ideas (by
means of more abstract mental representations) and motor representations are
involved in the process of observing others. Similarly, observation-triggered
motor preparations in human and nonhuman primate brains, also referred to
as motor intentions (cf. Jeannerod, 1994), have been continuously reported in
more recent neuroimaging literature (e.g. Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Fadiga et
al., 1995; Toni, Thoenissen, and Zilles, 2001), highlighting the fine line between
observation and action.
On a rather latent level, action understanding thus comes in the form of prepar-
ing motor responses that correspond to the actions that we see. On higher and
predominantly conscious levels of mental abstraction, understanding certainly
goes way beyond motor reenactment and recognition of action classes. By the
example of the walking man, we may probably ask ourselves questions like:
Where is the man going to, what is his destination? Is he aware of the car ap-
proaching from the right while he is looking to the left? Why didn’t he take
the crosswalk nearby? To answer questions like these, we evidently need to be
able to integrate the whole situational context, and to attribute intentionality
and a whole mindset to the observed person. In doing so, we need to simu-
late possible subsequent and alternative situations, mindsets, and intentions.
Simulating means activating memories of perceptions we do not currently ex-
perience, while nonetheless being somewhat triggered by and predicted from
the recent observations. These simulations are fetched for imagination more or
less consciously, and may range from concrete sensory perceptions like touch
to high-level mental concepts like words. However, high-level social reasoning
and the inclusion of context are not in the focus of this thesis (for own work on
this, see Schrodt et al., 2017; Schrodt, Röhm, and Butz, 2017; Schrodt, Lohmann,
and Butz, 2016; Ehrenfeld, Schrodt, and Butz, 2015), and respective modeling
approaches usually rely on discrete, symbol-like representations. Following the
idea of universal, subsymbolic principles of information processing in the brain
(e.g. Friston, Kilner, and Harrison, 2006; Barsalou, 2008; Clark, 2013; Butz, 2016),
I argue that the same principles that allow the basic simulation of actions in vi-
suomotor domains can be applied to more complex simulations of context and
theory of mind, which is why we have to understand the former in the first
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place. As a first step towards this understanding, this thesis considers the in-
ference of abstract, intention-like action types from observed actions and visuo-
motor simulations, and it completely relies on neurocomputational cognitive
models.
In a nutshell, our understanding of observed actions resides in modally dif-
ferent but strongly entangled cognitive domains that – at the least – represent
visual, motor and intention-like encodings, which are governed by our own em-
bodied experience, and which also respond to the observation of others. Our
expectations influence where we direct attention to, how it is integrated, and
how we interpret and understand our observations. Still, after making these
likely assumptions, candidates for functional links between them are yet to be
exposed.
First, how does the brain identify and recognize action-related visual features that
it learned from self-observation, when someone else is observed from a com-
pletely different, allocentric vantage point? I suggest that during action obser-
vation (i) top-down saliences are primarily driven by encodings known from
self-perception, such that features are selected and grouped that match em-
bodied expectations, and that (ii) visuo-spatial perspective-taking transforms
the selective perception onto an egocentric frame of reference to establish the
necessary correspondence between self and other. Both of these processes are
driven by minimizing the differences between predicted sensory inputs – gov-
erned by embodied encodings – and observed sensory inputs. Thus, embodied
encodings are generative and predictive in nature to allow for spatial percep-
tual inference of (visual) correspondences. They are synergistically activated
through perceptual adaptation and attention, and in turn drive the perceptual
adaptation and attention as an active mental ability.
Second, how does the brain infer or prepare motor representations from visu-
ally recognized features? I suggest that the brain continuously simulates vi-
sual as well as motor and intention states at distributed neural sites and strives
for overall consistency in the activated representations. Once the perspective
of another actor is taken, the visual domains are focused on this observation,
which primes motor and intention simulations (cf. Castiello et al., 2002; Ed-
wards, Humphreys, and Castiello, 2003). The three components converge to
maximally consistent, distributed state trajectories to reenact the encountered
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action by means of embodied codes. Given that motor execution is being sup-
pressed, such a distributed attractor can be defined as a fundamental under-
standing of action. Similarly, this theory can explain how the brain is able to
imagine actions without sensory stimulation, and bridge the gap to imitative
behavior: Observed actions can be imitated by not suppressing motor execu-
tion, or imitated later by activating respective episodic memories of the percep-
tion.
The theoretical approach pursued in this thesis agrees with the notion of the
direct-matching hypothesis (Gallese et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al., 1999), stating
that "an action is understood when its observation causes the motor system of the
observer to ’resonate’" (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, and Gallese, 2001). In other words,
motor cognition (Sommerville and Decety, 2006) is a (self-sustaining) mental
simulation based on the experienced, bodily spatial and temporal contingen-
cies, while being primed by visual observations when the observer is willing
to take the perspective of another actor. This formulation fits into the theory
of embodied simulation, which assumes that we simulate observed actions by
means of our own embodied codes to understand others (Gallese, Keysers, and
Rizzolatti, 2004). Equally, this theoretic model agrees with the framework of
predictive coding, which argues that the brain is a prediction machine that contin-
uously matches bottom-up sensory stimuli to top-down expectations, and that
one of its primary functions is to minimize emerging deviations on hierarchical
levels (Clark, 2013).
In sum, action understanding is seen here as an ability that is strongly related
to embodied simulation, predictive encodings, and perceptual inference. This the-
sis considers the functional origins, organization and principles of the ability
to recognize, understand, and reenact others’ bodily actions in these terms. It
specifically attends to the perceptual foundations of understanding others’ bod-
ily actions, and with it a foundation of social cognition. To do so, artificial neu-
ral network methods are applied to identify computational candidate mecha-
nisms of action understanding. The neural network model learns visual, motor,
and abstracted intention representations from self-observation, and predictively
correlates the respective encodings. It thus obtains the ability to simulate for-
ward in time different types of actions in distinct, distributed modalities that
mutually predict each other and thus synchronize over time towards consistent
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overall activations. The simulation can be pushed onto specific attractor state
sequences when observing similar actions from arbitrary perspectives, and in
potentially arbitrary scenes: Using its embodied, top-down expectations, the
network will identify the relevant features, group them correctly to whole-body
Gestalt perceptions, and take the perspective of the observed actor gradually.
Thus, the network imagines the spatial perspective of an observed actor to reen-
act their actions in terms of the own, predictive action model. In doing so, it is
able to identify the type of action, which can be seen as a preparation step for
inferring higher mental representations, in which certainly other aspects like
the integration of context are involved as well.
In Chapter 2, I will clarify the term action understanding in the light of psycholog-
ical and neuroscientific evidence as matters stand, as well as in a brief historical
context. This will reveal the emergence of big open questions over recent years,
resulting in the contemporary disputation of the topic. Chapter 3 will go into
detail on my hypothesis about action understanding from which I believe that
it can unify some of the contradicting positions on the topic, support specific
assumptions, and contribute to answering some of the open questions.
I will relate to own modeling work and the work of others in Chapter 4. The
neurocomputational model presented in this thesis as well as its assumptions
and presuppositions are detailed in Chapter 5, where I will first explain how vi-
sual and motor-related perceptions are processed, and how the model is able to
selectively group visual features and imagine different perspectives onto them.
Then, I will explain how visual, motor-related and intention codes are encoded
and mutual predictions are learned that form overall consistent attractor state
sequences.
Results of the model are presented in Chapter 6. The model will be trained on
three short motion capture trials, and validated on a variety of similar and also
dissimilar trials. After explaining the format of these stimuli, I will proceed
with explaining the network parameters. I will then show the performance of
the network in developing generative and predictive embodied encodings. In
the following experiments, I will show that the network is able (i) to identify and
bind visual features also of completely novel actions and imagine them from an
egocentric perspectives, (ii) to simulate and "understand" the corresponding ac-
tion intentions and proprioceptions based on the embodied experience, and (iii)
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
to consistently imagine whole-body actions in distributed domains also without
sensory stimulation. The perceptual characteristics of the model are compared
to studies with human subject groups.
A discussion and conclusion of the insights of the model and results follows in
Chapter 7, where prospects for future work and open questions are detailed.
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A Brief Summary on Action
Understanding
In 1992, neuroscientist di Pellegrino and colleagues published an article about
cells in the macaque inferior premotor cortex that discharge during the execu-
tion of an action – and discharge as well while passively observing an actor
performing a similar action (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992). At the time, the role of
these cells was already speculated to be to understand observed motor events.
Later, they were termed mirror neurons, pointing to the property they seem to
mirror the behavior of others (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). A mirror neuron was de-
fined by the property that it matches observation and execution of a particular
action by encoding the action visually as well as in terms of corresponding mo-
tor responses (Gallese et al., 1996). Rizzolatti et al. proceeded to characterize
the role of mirror neurons as to enable primates
"... to recognize the presence of another individual performing an action,
to differentiate the observed action from other actions, and to use this infor-
mation in order to act appropriately."
— Rizzolatti et al., 1996
Although the functional mechanisms behind this mirror neuron property and
the implications of the findings remained speculatively, these assumptions es-
tablished the term action understanding as the primary role of mirror neurons.
In 2004, Rizzolatti and Craighero concluded from other neurophysiological
findings the existence of a mirror neuron circuit (see Figure 2.1), involving two
further brain regions besides area F5 in inferior premotor cortex (Rizzolatti and
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FIGURE 2.1: The mirror neuron system. In macaques, mirror neu-
rons have been found in the premotor cortex (PMC) / inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) area F5 and area PF in inferior parietal lobule
(IPL). Together with the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the re-
gions form the mirror neuron circuit. Frontal regions are assumed
to be involved with goal states of actions, parietal regions are as-
sociated to sensorimotor integration, spatial cognition, and imita-
tion, while temporal regions are assumed to recognize views of
actions as input to the mirror neuron system. In humans, the exis-
tence of a mirror neuron system has been suggested. Figure from
Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006.
Craighero, 2004). Further mirror neurons were found in area PF of the macaque
brain, which forms the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule. About two
thirds of PF cells show the mirror neuron property described beforehand. PF
bidirectionally communicates with area F5. Moreover, the superior temporal
sulcus (STS) was designated, which was already well known for encoding
views of action types visually (Bruce, Desimone, and Gross, 1981; Oram and
Perrett, 1994; Perrett et al., 1985). Like mirror neurons, STS cells both respond
to observed and executed actions, however do not seem to encode motor
responses and thus cannot be termed actual mirror neurons. Nonetheless, STS
intercommunicates with PF and was suggested to provide the main visual
input for action understanding, thus being a crucial part of the mirror neuron
system (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Ulloa and Pineda, 2007; Pavlova, 2012;
Cook et al., 2014).
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According to the literature, the functional principle of mirror neurons in F5,
PF and STS can be briefly summarized as follows (cf. Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006)1. STS provides higher-order visual descrip-
tions of observed actions to the parietal region PF. PF mirror neurons extract the
corresponding motor descriptions and communicate them to the frontal area F5
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Chaminade, Meltzoff, and Decety, 2005). F5 mirror neu-
rons encode actions in a goal-directed manner. They seem to primarily respond
to effector actions (such as grasping) and require an interaction with an object
(such as food) to do so (see also Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). Including effer-
ence copies sent top-down from F5 to PF, and from PF to STS, the three macaque
brain areas are assumed to form an action observation network that involves
sensorimotor integration.
Regarding the tremendous extent of other parieto-frontal neural processing
pathways (see e.g. Caminiti et al., 2017) that are involved in sensorimotor
integration, the mirror neuron system was considered in a broader context than
grasping actions. Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005
postulate that the mirror neuron system is at the basis of complex abilities like
imitation learning, gestural communication, understanding others’ intentions
and emotions, and might as well have been involved in speech evolution
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Arbib, 2010). Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007
argue that understanding intentionality is firmly grounded in a fundamental
interweaving of motor and intention components of action. Taken together,
insights into a human action understanding network would have farreaching
implications. The implications and theories mentioned beforehand, however,
are anything but generally accepted or well established, which I explain in the
following.
1Note that not all of the neurons in the respective areas are mirror neurons, and that they
respond to single or multiple modal stimuli. Other neurons in the respective areas may have a
supportive function.
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2.1 The Dilemmas of Action Understanding
The existence of mirror neurons and a mirror neuron system also in humans
– which was assumed by (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) – has been substan-
tiated further by other neuroscientists (e.g. Dinstein et al., 2007; Chong et al.,
2008). However, both the existence of a mirror neuron system in humans, and
theories of its potential role for action understanding are still subject to intense
controversies. Single cell recordings in humans are practically infeasible, and
thus there is no direct evidence for mirror neurons in the human brain. Sev-
eral studies have found no indirect evidence for the inclusion of motor simula-
tion in action understanding and suggest that, instead, the inclusion of context-
sensitive inferential processes plays an essential role (Brass et al., 2007; Kilner
and Frith, 2008; Lingnau, Gesierich, and Caramazza, 2009). Moreover, studies
with apraxia patients – who can be impaired in producing particular actions de-
spite being unimpaired in understanding these actions when observed (Mahon
and Caramazza, 2005) – can be interpreted as evidence that motor simulation
is not involved in action understanding. On the other hand, the findings might
also indicate that motor simulation is not a mandatory component of action un-
derstanding, highlighting the flexibility of the human mind.
With respect to learning and mental development, the involvement of mirror
neurons in mediating imitation was already suspected by Jeannerod, 1994. Ia-
coboni et al., 1999; Heiser et al., 2003; Molenberghs, Cunnington, and Matting-
ley, 2009 verified that mirror neuron areas take part in imitation. On the other
hand, Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005 point out that mirror neurons do only map
an observed action to the motor system of the observer, if the action already be-
longs to their motor repertoire. This raises the question how and if mirror neu-
rons may help infants to imitate an action that they have never performed be-
fore, the question what facilitates learning by imitation in the first place. While
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005 argue that imi-
tation cannot be the primary function of mirror neurons from an evolutionary
perspective, it might well be that other neural circuits underlie learning by im-
itation and might thus bootstrap the development of mirror neurons early in
life (Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). Meltzoff and Moore,
1977; Meltzoff and Moore, 1983 report imitation of facial and manual gestures
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in infants as early as a few days of age and suggest an innate, genetic mecha-
nism for basic imitation abilities. In contrast, Heyes, 2016 states that newborns
do not imitate, and imitative behavior is a result of cultural rather than genetic
evolution. The contradiction of these theories and positions leads to what can
be termed an imitation dilemma, as it is still highly debated today.
Another dilemma is known as the correspondence problem (Nehaniv and Daut-
enhahn, 2002; Heyes, 2001). The core assumption of mirror neurons as cogni-
tive mechanism for action understanding, as stated above, is the existence of
a matching mechanism from sensory to motor representations. Observed and
executed actions are co-encoded in STS (cf. Molenberghs et al., 2010), which
provides visual input to the mirror neuron circuit. Yet how does a visual rep-
resentation of an observed action, which is inevitably viewed from a perspec-
tive that does not correspond to a self-perceptual perspective, activate the same
network of areas? It is conceivable that both executed and observed actions
share a common code, such that visual representations of the very same are in-
variant to differences in perspective (Prinz, 1984), and that mirror neurons im-
plement the physiological mechanism for the common coding of perception
and action (Keysers, 2011). However, neuroimaging studies strongly suggest
that visual actions are represented view-dependently in STS (see Subsection
2.2.1). Along these lines, the mirror neuron system was proposed to provide
an "automatic transformation" as "functional bridge between first-and third-person
perspectives" (Decety and Meltzoff, 2011). Another view on the matching from
observed to executed actions – or own behavior to the behavior of others – was
formulated by Heyes and Ray, 2000; Heyes, 2001; Heyes, 2010; Cook et al., 2014.
The authors assert that "mirror neurons may be a byproduct of associative learn-
ing", and that they "do not play a dominant, specialized role in action understand-
ing" (Heyes, 2010). Thus, mirror neurons primarily develop from sensorimotor
experience when interacting with others, without having a specific evolution-
ary purpose. As solution to the correspondence problem, the authors suggest
that different views of observed actions are directly associated to own motor
representations to explain the mirror neuron property (Ray and Heyes, 2011).
In preliminary conclusion, the evolutionary and developmental origins of mir-
ror neurons as well as their functional principles and cognitive roles are still far
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from being clarified to this day. In particular, there is a need for an investigation
of the following questions:
• Are mirror neurons a byproduct of mental development, or is there a ge-
netic predisposition? What is their purpose?
• Do mirror neurons facilitate imitation learning? Or is there an innate
mechanism?
• What comes first, learning by imitation, or learning how to imitate?
• Which mental processes equate action and perception? What es-
tablishes the correspondence between observations of others, and
self-representations?
• Is there even a mirror neuron system in humans?
• What is possible from a computational perspective? What functionality
can explain the observations and verify the made assumptions?
To contribute possible answers to these questions, I will first elaborate on how
actions are believed to be encoded in the substrates of the mirror neuron system
in terms of biological motion, motor encodings and action goals. The main
contribution of this work will be to investigate the computational feasibility of
specific assumptions and to suggest candidate mechanisms for perceptual and
learning processes related to the mirror neuron system.
2.2 Action Encodings in the Brain
A voluntary action can be defined as a goal-directed movement that pursuits a
particular, typically reward-directed outcome, or action effect. As such, it fol-
lows a specific intention by executing motor commands that result in visible, bodily
motion. The respective neural codes are believed to be represented at distributed
brain areas, which are linked via bottom-up, as well as top-down, generative
processes (see e.g. Clark, 2013). It is typically assumed that action goals and
intentions are encoded inferior frontally, motor codes and plans posterior pari-
etally, and biological, mainly visually-driven motion patterns in the superior
temporal sulcus (cf. Iacoboni, 2005; Kilner, 2011; Turella et al., 2013). In the
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following chapters, I will discuss how these three main components of action
and – in the context of the mirror neuron system – action understanding are
believed to be encoded in the brain. Other aspects of action, like decision mak-
ing, planning, inclusion of context, and anticipation of environmental effects
are meaningful, but not in the focus of this thesis.
2.2.1 Biological Motion
According to the two-streams hypothesis of visual perception (Goodale and
Milner, 1992), the ventral stream is primarily involved with form perception
and object recognition. The stream extracts particular information, such as ori-
entation, size, color, and shape features via the occipital regions V2 and V4 and
forwards them to the temporal lobule. In this context, theories of Gestalt per-
ception consider the question in which way, and by which characteristics (the
so-called Gestalt laws) the brain integrates visual features and recognizes them
as one object, or as dynamically connected (Hartmann, 1935; Jäkel et al., 2016).
In terms of action observation and understanding, the human body can be con-
sidered an important Gestalt percept, and fMRI studies suggest that neurons
already in visual cortex are specifically tuned to the perception of the human
body (Downing et al., 2001).
Psychological experiments that investigate visual perception related to action
observation often make use of biological motion stimuli. Biological motion pri-
marily refers to the visualization of human or animal bodily motion. In a great
number of studies, these stimuli are abstracted and reduced to contain the min-
imal amount of information that is sufficient to perceive the underlying move-
ments. As Johansson, 1973 showed, moving light points can trigger the percep-
tion of a walking person in the observer. Such biological motion stimuli became
common-use in experimental psychology and are mostly termed point-light dis-
plays (see Figure 2.2). Johansson’s results show that observed motion features
are integrated by the brain to detect and understand whole bodily motion.
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FIGURE 2.2: A point light stimulus example. The point lights (B)
typically correspond to joint coordinates (A). Without motion, ac-
tions are hard to recognize from point light stimuli. Figure from
Giese, 2013.
Giese and Poggio, 2003 summarize properties critical for the recognition of bi-
ological motion. Among others, biological motion recognition is highly invari-
ant to differences in position, scale, speed, body morphology, and exact pos-
ture control, as well as incomplete representations or variances in illumina-
tion. Thus, the recognition of biological motion is highly robust and general.
Nonetheless, studies demonstrate that humans are able to identify the gender
(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983) and the identity (Cutting and Kozlowski, 1977)
of an observed person solely from point-light displays. Humans perform better
in action recognition when observing recordings of their own actions in com-
parison to the actions of others (Beardsworth and Buckner, 1981). This indicates
the involvement of the own motor experience in action understanding. Also,
while being most general, the human perceptual system is able to extract very
specific and distinct information from few biological motion cues. At that, the
relative motion of visual key features may contain the most crucial information
(cf. Garcia and Grossman, 2008; Thurman and Grossman, 2008).
Biological motion stimuli are believed to be encoded in STS (Bruce, Desimone,
and Gross, 1981; Oram and Perrett, 1994; Perrett et al., 1985). As described
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before, action representations in STS are considered to provide visual input to
the mirror neuron system, and as such they are most important for the develop-
ment of attributes linked with it (see e.g. Cook et al., 2014; Grossman et al., 2000;
Gallese, 2001; Pavlova, 2012; Puce and Perrett, 2003; Ulloa and Pineda, 2007).
Amongst others, STS seems to integrate form and motion information into whole
body perceptions of the observed movements (Oram and Perrett, 1996). STS par-
tially encodes biological motion in a retinotopic organization (Gattass and Gross,
1981; Huk, Dougherty, and Heeger, 2002), and the major portion of neurons in
the posterior STS seems to encode viewer-centered representations of specific
movements to the effect that their activation depends on the type of movement
observed, as well as on the observer’s current vantage point (Oram and Perrett,
1994; Perrett et al., 1985; Perrett et al., 1989; Perrett et al., 1991). As well, the
recognition performance decreases with the amount of rotation an action is per-
ceived from with respect to common or canonical perspectives (Pavlova and
Sokolov, 2000).
The findings mentioned beforehand indicate that visual encodings which
are assumed to provide the main input to the mirror neuron circuit exist in
rather viewer- or eye-centered coordinate frames, which strongly underlines
the existence of functional mechanisms that map observations of others to
self-observations. They also evidence that encodings of biological motion
support the inference of action-related information based on type-specific,
whole-body form and motion cues.
2.2.2 Visuomotor Control and Spatial Perception
Motor skills are the brains coupling from intentions to goal-directed behavior.
In the context of social cognition, however, they are assumed also to be the
coupling from observing others’ behavior to understanding their intentions.
The respective areas are essentially located in parieto-frontal regions of the
brain, which share complex neural circuits for bidirectional communication
(cf. Caminiti et al., 2017). In particular, the connectivity between parietal
and frontal mirror neuron areas motivates the idea that intentionality can be
understood from motivity.
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The frontal and parietal cortices are anatomically delimited by the central sul-
cus. Adjacently in the parietal lobe, neurons in the primary somatosensory
cortex integrate and process tactile and proprioceptive sensations. Anatomically
close, the inferior parietal lobule – which blends into the mirror neuron system –
features both somatosensory properties as well as motor properties and seems
to be involved in motor planning (Andersen, 2011). Neurons adjacent to the
central sulcus in the frontal lobe are located in the primary motor cortex, which
combines motor primitives and drives the muscles via self-stabilizing mecha-
nisms in the peripheral nervous system (cf. Butz and Kutter, 2016, p. 278 ff.).
Primary motor areas encode a variety of different information, from joint mo-
tion and force to spatial goals. The variety of information processed in motor
cortical areas reflects their important role in mediating between high-level, goal-
directed behavior and concrete motor neuron control (Scott, 2003).
A substantial type of information processed by neurons in motor cortical areas
of the frontal lobe has been characterized after recording individual, specific
cell tunings to broad directions of voluntary limb motion (Georgopoulos et al.,
1982). Similarly, cells in area 5 of superior parietal lobule show selectivity for
directional limb movements (Kalaska, Caminiti, and Georgopoulos, 1983). In
consequence of the findings of Georgopoulos et al., the population vector hypoth-
esis was established, suggesting that ensembles of neurons cooperate to gener-
ate directional limb movements. Likewise, sensory input to somatosensory and
related regions (just as their visual counterparts) is processed by populations of
locally receptive cells with tunings to specific stimulus characteristics (Pouget,
Dayan, and Zemel, 2000).
Mappings between such population-encoded, afferent and efferent modalities
in parietal cortex have been suggested to be established by means of neural
gain-field structures that modulate the tuning of neural populations in a multi-
plicative manner (Andersen, Essick, and Siegel, 1985; Salinas and Abbott, 2001;
Schrodt and Butz, 2015). This accompanies the finding that the directional tun-
ings of motor cortical cells are not invariant, but rather modulated depending
on the current region of the work space (Caminiti et al., 1991). As well, the tun-
ing of cells in primary motor cortex does not represent precisely the direction of
effector movement, but is rather skewed along body-relative reference frames
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(Scott et al., 2001). When eye movements shift the retinal response to a stim-
ulus, the mappings also have to be adapted. It has been shown that posterior
parietal areas compensate for the consequences of eye movements to maintain
stable visuo-spatial perceptions (Duhamel, Colby, and Goldberg, 1992). Eye-
movements can be considered a form of attention-driven motor control, which
highlights the linkage between action, spatial perception, and attention. Taken
together, it can be concluded that motor-relevant encodings are represented in
multiple, interacting frames of reference. Spatial transformations that stem from vi-
sual, eye-centered representations modulate proprioception and motor percep-
tion as well as motor control for goal-directed actions (see also Cohen and An-
dersen, 2002).
Interestingly, superior and inferior parietal regions – which are involved in
the foregoing transformational processes and the mirror neuron circuit – are
moreover involved in imitation and perspective-taking (Jackson, Meltzoff, and
Decety, 2006), as well as mental rotation (Alivisatos and Petrides, 1997). This
substantiates the possibility of a link between spatial abilities and action under-
standing. The superior parietal cortex indirectly receives input from the dorsal
stream of visual processing via the ventral intra-parietal sulcus (Caminiti, Fer-
raina, and Johnson, 1996) which integrates visual and somatosensory informa-
tion (Duhamel, Colby, and Goldberg, 1998). Since the dorsal stream processes
spatial relationships of perceived objects (Goodale and Milner, 1992), it possibly
contributes information about spatial relations that facilitate perspective-taking.
The overall representation of the spatial configuration and location of ones body
is termed body schema (Gallagher, 2006). The body schema is believed to be rep-
resented at different regions of the brain – including the ones mentioned before-
hand – and integrates proprioceptive and visual stimuli. It is believed to also
represent the body of others for action understanding (Chaminade, Meltzoff,
and Decety, 2005). The body schema can be compared to the body image, but
differs in the sense that it is closer related to action and space, while the body
image is closer related to perception and appearance (Gallagher, 2006).
In conclusion, parietal and frontal regions integrate visual and somatosensory
information to control visual attention and motor activity in a goal-directed
manner. Multiplicative transformations are applied to translate between ref-
erence frames in population-encoded modalities, which include multiple, local
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reference frames in motor-related encodings, as well as global reference frames
in visual encodings. In a similar manner, visual correspondences of the own
body scheme to observed persons are possibly established via spatial inferen-
tial processes like perspective-taking to facilitate action understanding and im-
itation.
2.2.3 Goal-directed Action
Behavior is fundamentally reward-oriented and goal-directed. Rewards and
goals are partially generated based on bodily states. For example, the hypotha-
lamus regulates body temperature, hunger, and sleep cycles by releasing hor-
mones and neurotransmitters (i.e. leptin in case of hunger) when the respec-
tive states deviate from their normal, desired, healthy states, and by releasing
dopamine when the bodily states return to the desired level. The release of
dopamine has been linked to reward and learning (Wise, 2004). As such, the hy-
pothalamus is part of a homeostatic, motivational system that generates urges
based on bodily states and supports learning of rewarding actions and motor
skills. The urges result in drives to act in order to bring back the motivational
system towards homeostasis. These drives result in goal-directed, intentional
behavior that is believed to yield the desired rewards. Thus, the brain is a self-
regulatory system to the effect that behavior can partially be seen as active in-
ference of bodily states.
Motivational and reward-related areas such as the hypothalamus are phyloge-
netically rather old and primitive systems. Clearly, not all of our behavior (at
least directly) aims at eating, sleeping, or reproduction. Beside the basic, phys-
iological urges, more complex motivations evolved, such as a need for safety,
love, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). These urges primarily cor-
relate with the complex social alignment of the human mind. Thus, more gen-
erally, resulting behavior aims at actively producing situations associated with
rewards.
The frontal lobe of the human brain is particularly involved in high-level cogni-
tion. It has often been mentioned in connection with reasoning, consciousness,
theory of mind, personality, social behavior, but also concrete motor control.
More importantly in the context of the mirror neuron system, it is believed to
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produce all types of intentional states that result from the motivational urges
mentioned above. For instance, amongst others, the mirror neuron area F5 in
macaque inferior premotor cortex represents the execution as well as obser-
vation of grasping food with the intention of eating (Rizzolatti and Luppino,
2001). Generally, an intentional action can be decomposed into a goal or ac-
tion outcome, as well as kinematic parameters, and thus, an action intention can
be defined in both ways (Butterfill and Sinigaglia, 2014). For example, con-
densed movement complexes like walking or running can be considered a sim-
ple form of kinematic representations of intentions, or motor intentions (Jeannerod,
1994), which is assumed to be processed in the mirror neuron system (Jacob
and Jeannerod, 2005), and which also typically follow a specific action goal (i.e.
locomotion to a certain location). Some authors assume that outcome repre-
sentations of actions and thus finite goal state intentions are not processed in the
mirror neuron system itself, but inferred form its encodings (Jacob and Jean-
nerod, 2005), while others argue that mirror neuron regions also co-encode goal
states of actions (C. Hamilton and Grafton, 2007).
In the light of the scope of this thesis, I will neglect all other aspects of inten-
tionality in the following chapters, and focus on a first understanding of how
compact, kinematic intention encodings may be inferred from more complex
motor simulations, and how motor simulations may be inferred from encod-
ings of biological motion.
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Chapter 3
A Hypothesis on Action
Understanding
As a consequence of the debates and dilemmas mentioned in the last chapter,
none of the theories on action understanding has widely been accepted (see also
Dinstein et al., 2008; Hickok, 2009; Heyes, 2010). In the following, I will clarify
the theoretical approach for modeling action understanding in this thesis. It
lies in the nature of the current state of scientific knowledge on this topic that
many of the following statements are hypothetical, matter of opinion, and dis-
putable. At the same time, it is necessary to side with specific assumptions to
provide a theoretical framework. Although a plenty of side steps, abstractions,
and simplifications are adopted following these ideas, the model generally pur-
suits the approach briefly outlined in the introduction: To model and explain
action understanding in terms of embodied simulation, predictive coding, and
perceptual inferences.
3.1 Embodied Simulation
Although humans are particularly good at learning from others, many experi-
ences can only be formed by self-perception and introspection, and clearly all
of our experiences are gathered through, and shaped by our own body. Cogni-
tive science has therefore recently undergone a pragmatic turn, focusing on the
enactive roots of cognition. Today, cognition is seen as being action-oriented
and grounded in sensorimotor couplings – as generating meaning of the world
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through action. Hence, "the functioning of cognitive systems is thought to be insep-
arable from embodiment" (Engel et al., 2013).
Embodied cognitive states, according to Barsalou’s simulation hypothesis
(Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, 2008), are situated simulations that temporarily
activate – or reenact – particular events by means of a set of embodied modal
codes. This means that, when we observe an object, our embodied experiences
associated with that object are triggered. These range from sensory experiences
like touch or smell to episodic, situated memories and introspective states
that occurred during interaction with that object. According to the theory,
the brain simulates these experiences to produce perceptual inferences and
form entity categories and concepts of the world. In this process, simulation is
thought to be a "core form of computation in the brain" (Barsalou, 2008), ranging
from conscious mental imagery, to unconscious processes of motor simulation
(see also Stevens et al., 2000). Barsalou, 2008 concludes that "simulation is the
reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during experience
with the world, body, and mind".
Agreeing with this notion, action understanding is possible by simulating oth-
ers’ mental states by means of the own, embodied states. Gallese et al., 2009 also
hold that "action understanding may be primarily based on the motor cognition that
underpins one’s own capacity to act". During the observation of others, however,
neither information about their proprioceptions nor their intentions is directly
accessible. Although there is a bunch of empirical evidence for simulation pro-
cesses involved in different cognitive processes, the embodied simulation the-
ory does not answer how exactly simulation might work functionally, and how
multimodal, embodied encodings are represented and ’triggered’ upon obser-
vation. Generally agreeing with the notion of embodied simulation for action
understanding, I suggest that predictive coding presents a framework that can
answer these questions, which I explain in the following.
3.2 Predictive Coding
Chapter 2 stressed that the particular encodings that appear to be involved in
the mirror neuron system and action understanding are encoded at different
3.2. Predictive Coding 25
neural sites, and implement different cognitive functions. Although they rely
on similar neural characteristics, the types of information they represent are
distinct. To put it simply, parietal regions primarily represent visuo-spatial re-
lations that blend into proprioceptive (and other somatosensory) perceptions
and facilitate motor control, temporal regions encode visual, view-dependent
form templates of actions, and frontal regions process intention signals that
stem from self-regulatory motivational systems.
The brain processes these types of information in a hierarchical manner, locally
extracting task-relevant information. This cascading involves bottom-up pro-
cessing, as well as top-down processing. Following the idea of predictive cod-
ing (Clark, 2013), bottom-up processing activates encodings that correspond to
particular features of lower cortical levels, while top-down processing in turn
predicts – or generates expectations about – the activated encodings in lower cor-
tical levels. Emerging prediction errors are minimized by particular cognitive
adaptation processes. These adaptations refer to learning, filtering, but also to
perceptual inference and action.
Related to the framework of predictive coding, Butz, 2016 suggests that ad-
ditional learning biases and structural priors are needed to explain cognition
on a sub-symbolic level. The author proposes the existence of three different
types of top-down and bottom-up predictive encodings, which I interpret freely
as follows: Top-down predictive encodings generate expectations in the form of
perceptual templates or momentary expectations. They are matched locally to
submodal perceptions of lower cortical levels. Learning of template encodings
occurs via minimizing prediction errors that emerge with respect to these per-
ceptions. The perceptions are computed given structural neural biases and ex-
tract particular stimulus characteristics, thus being centered in particular frames
of reference, representing particular submodal features. A predictive template
might for example represent a specific object-centered bodily Gestalt image or
a postural arm configuration perceived proprioceptively. Spatial predictive en-
codings transform different reference frames onto each other. Their role is to
activate template encodings by applying spatial transformations that project
onto the respective reference frame in which they exist. These spatial transfor-
mations include dynamic perceptual inferences that minimize top-down pre-
diction errors systematically. Finally, temporal predictive encodings encode the
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changes of the activated template encodings over time, and thus represent the
respective temporal contingencies.
I assume that temporal predictive encodings learn the state progress both lo-
cally in a modal or submodal context, as well as selectively in a broader, cross-
modal context. They form bidirectional neural circuits that predict the typical
progress of their own neural activity, as well as the activity progress in other,
related neural encodings. Akin to the ideomotor theory (see Stock and Stock,
2004, for a historic review), this includes predictions given bodily actions (motor
commands) about the perceptual effects (the resulting changes in visual percep-
tion), and vice versa. For example, given the proprioception of an initial posture
of the right arm, a movement to a specific direction, with a specific magnitude ul-
timately leads to the visual perception of a new position of the arm. Conversely,
perceiving the movement of the arm in visual space will result in a specific,
corresponding new proprioception.
To encode the continuation of movements, I further assume that these bidi-
rectional predictions also cover possible subsequent movement directions
and magnitudes. Then, the manifold of sensorimotor contingencies can be
restricted by modulation to specific sub-sets by applying top-down priors.
Such priors may originate from different mental states, for example caused by
visual obstacles, physical constraints, tool use, and most importantly, intention-
related codes. As a result, different movements can be achieved via top-down
modulation, and because of the bidirectional nature of the encodings, intention
priors can be predicted given a sequence of observed movements.
Here, the term temporal predictive encoding is used somewhat synonymously
with the idea of direct matching in Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia’s statement about
mirror neurons:
"The functional properties of these neurons indicate that intentional un-
derstanding is based primarily on a mechanism that directly matches the
sensory representation of the observed actions with one’s own motor rep-
resentation of those same actions. These findings reveal how deeply motor
and intentional components of action are intertwined, suggesting that both
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can be fully comprehended only starting from a motor approach to inten-
tionality."
— Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007
I propose that the matching from observations to motor representations and in-
tentions is less ’direct’, but rather predictive, generative, multidirectional, dis-
tributed, modular, and hierarchical in nature. Complex neural circuits as well
as spatial transformations are necessary to establish the matching.
This notion agrees with the idea of embodied simulation as stated in Section 3.1.
Separate modular neural structures can partially predict their own submodal
activity progress, and partially be predicted by other neural structures. Thus,
neural activity can be seen as a self-sustaining dynamical system that simulates
gathered experiences, which are mostly embodied in nature, and converges to
overall consistent, distributed attractors. These simulations can be primed by
bottom-up sensory information via spatial transformations which are driven
by top-down expectations. This approach can explain mental imagery, where
visual encodings are driven predominantly by internal representations, as well
as motor resonance, where motor encodings are driven by visual observations.
As a result, the embodied simulation of a movement is congruent in multiple
modalities, if the sequence of postural and motion perceptions does not conflict
neither with the learned sensorimotor contingencies, nor the intentional priors.
Establishing congruent multimodal simulations from action observations relies
on spatial inference processes as described in the following chapter.
3.3 Perceptual Inference
As indicated in Chapter 2, there is presumably a cognitive mechanism that
matches self-representations and the representations of others. There is also
evidence that such a mechanism relies on spatial transformations. In the last
chapter, I have made spatial predictive encodings responsible for such a mech-
anism, and stated that these include dynamic perceptual inferences that mini-
mize prediction errors. In the following, I suggest how perceptual inferences for
self-other correspondence can be related to attention and visuo-spatial abilities.
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First, to recognize an object such as the human body of another person, the
visual system has to integrate separate visual features into a Gestalt percept (see
e.g. Koffka, 2013). This problem was described in 1998 by Treisman as follows:
"The ‘binding problem’ concerns the way in which we select and integrate
the separate features of objects in the correct combinations. Experiments
suggest that attention plays a central role in solving this problem."
— Treisman, 1998
Thus, the binding problem is related to attention, which is known to be driven
by bottom-up salience cues as well as top-down, task-dependent activity (see
e.g. Buschman and Miller, 2007). The visual system directs attention to specific
salient features and binds them in a way such that objects, object-relations, and
important scene information are recognized.
In a naive computational approach, the binding problem has a very high com-
plexity. Assume that out of N = 400 salient visual features, we attend to just
n = 40 which carry task-relevant information that is to be selected and com-
bined. The number of combinations in which we can select the 40 out of 400
features in a singular order is N !
(N−n)! ≈ 1.6 · 10103, which exceeds the number
of atoms in the universe by orders of magnitude. Clearly, what the brain does
is not comparable to a sequential or random search in a database of learned
feature constellations, thus there have to be intelligent metrics and perceptual
biases involved. Also, it cannot be assumed that these underlying perceptual
mechanisms are directly comparable to more elaborate image search algorithms
that often directly use transformation invariant features (e.g. SIFT feature based
algorithms, Lowe, 1999), but rather rely on continuous patterns of neural com-
putations, topological mappings, and expectation-driven adaptations.
Second, thinking along similar lines, how does the brain activate motor en-
codings from observed biological motion to understand actions? Following
the idea of embodied simulation and predictive couplings of visuomotor self-
representations as described before, the observer first has to match the observa-
tion to a respective self-representation in visual modalities to actively drive an
embodied simulation. Then, and possibly only then, they can infer or predict
corresponding motor perceptions, and intentions respectively. So how does ob-
served biological motion, which is inevitably viewed from a perspective that
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does not correspond to a self-perceptual perspective, activate the same areas in
the mirror neuron system? Brass and Heyes describe this correspondence problem
(see also Nehaniv and Dautenhahn, 2002; Heyes, 2001) as follows:
"When we observe another person moving we do not see the muscle ac-
tivation underlying their movement but rather the external consequences
of that activation. So how does the observer’s motor system ‘know’ which
muscle activations will lead to the observed movement?"
— Brass and Heyes, 2005
Just as in object recognition, where rich perceptions are matched onto learned,
canonical representations, the correspondence problem ultimately leads to the
question how the brain can match observed biological motion onto visual self-
representations.
The associative sequence learning hypothesis proposes that – instead of establish-
ing visual correspondence – allocentric views of actions are directly associated to
embodied motor representations. These associations are formed e.g. while be-
ing imitated, perceiving a mirrored self, as well as synchronous activities with
others – and thus mirror neurons develop by sensorimotor experience and so-
cial interaction (Catmur, Walsh, and Heyes, 2009; Heyes, 2010; Heyes, 2016).
The authors argue that the correspondence problem cannot be solved by in-
nate mechanisms, e.g. as proposed by Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; Meltzoff and
Moore, 1983.
However, considering human spatial abilities, several mechanisms have been
identified in psychometric studies (Lohman, 1979; McGee, 1979; Eliot and
Smith, 1983; Carroll, 1993; Hegarty and Waller, 2004). Amongst them, visuo-
spatial perspective-taking has been described as a progressive ability to adopt the
spatial point of view of another person (Newcombe, 1989; Jackson, Meltzoff,
and Decety, 2006, cf.). Perspective-taking is also a slightly vague term used
for a variety of cognitive phenomena: While visuo-spatial perspective-taking
refers to the ability to merely imagine different visual perspectives in the
environment – akin to mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler, 1971; Shepard
and Metzler, 1988; Hegarty and Waller, 2004) – empathetic, social, or affective
perspective-taking describes the adoption of psychological experiences and
mental states of another actor (Ashton and Fuehrer, 1993; Farrant et al., 2012).
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It has been shown that sensorimotor resonance to the observation of pain was
correlated to perspective-taking, and decreased in observers with racial bias
towards the model (Lamm, Batson, and Decety, 2007; Avenanti, Sirigu, and
Aglioti, 2010), indicating that intergroup commonality is an important factor
for empathy (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000). Interestingly, but not too sur-
prising, studies have shown a functional coherence between these two forms of
perspective-taking: Racial biases could be decreased in observers who took the
spatial perspective of an outgroup avatar in virtual reality (Peck et al., 2013).
Again, these findings indicate that visuo-spatial abilities as well as abilities
attributed to the mirror neuron system – such as empathy – are highly inter-
twined.
Perspective-taking can be thought of as a non-discrete mental transformation
process that aligns allocentric perspectives with egocentric perspectives to
make inferences based on embodied codes and self-experience. According
self-centered mental states are believed to be important for self-consciousness,
including agency and ownership (cf. Vogeley and Fink, 2003). Distinct neural
representations for first-person and third-person perspectives, as well as com-
mon processes for their transformation into each other have been suggested
(Vogeley et al., 2004), and self-localization experiments show that such ego-
centric reference frames might be located in upper face or upper torso regions
(Alsmith and Longo, 2014).
Furthermore, Kessler and Thomson, 2010 found evidence that spatial
perspective-taking is an embodied transformation in which large parts of
the body schema are mentally rotated. I support this view, linking it to action
understanding, and adding that both feature binding and perspective-taking
are two structurally biased forms of spatial perceptual inference. They are
adaptive predictive encodings that are driven by embodied top-down expecta-
tions and minimize prediction errors. Attention is responsible for the selection
and binding of visual features, whereas visuo-spatial perspective-taking is
responsible for transformations of visual observations onto self-centered views.
These adaptive mental processes are continuous in time, and support the visual
recognition of actions, such that the correspondence to other action-related
modalities can be inferred by principles of embodied simulation and predictive
coding.
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Chapter 4
Modeling Action Understanding
Cognitive models are computational approximations of mental processes. The
purpose of cognitive models is complementary to neuroscientific and psycho-
logical studies – which basically measure neural and behavioral systematics and
perceptual phenomenology – to emulate the same. Cognitive models often con-
strain themselves to specific functional paradigms that are believed to represent
building blocks of cognition – such as artificial neurons or related information
coding theorems – to investigate if these paradigms allow the approximation
of more complex cognitive phenomena. This approach allows a substantiation
and verification of hypotheses that often come from neuroscience and psychol-
ogy while conclusions about the functional concepts of cognition can be drawn.
Computational models thus offer the potential to investigate the feasibility of
specific assumptions and theoretical approaches. Unfortunately, neural net-
work models of action understanding are still rather hard to find. In the follow-
ing, I catalogue own preliminary studies on this subject that implement parts of
the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 3, before I compare this approach to
related and relevant work of others.
4.1 Preliminary Studies
Aspects of the hypothetical model of action understanding described in Chap-
ter 3 were implemented in a number of previous own studies. First, we imple-
mented a neural model that learns motion patterns from visuo-proprioceptive
perceptions of a simple, artificial 2D arm (Schrodt et al., 2014a). We showed
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that the model is able to transform the observed biological motion gradually
to one of multiple canonical reference frames seen during training by minimiz-
ing top-down expectation errors – basically taking the perspective seen during
training. Minimal information such as the constellation of motion directions of
joint positions was sufficient in this process.
Our follow-up study showed that the model also scales on a simulated full body
in 3D (Schrodt et al., 2014b). By including top-down modulations in the learn-
ing algorithm, clearly distinct, separately tuned cells developed (cf. Layher et
al., 2014) for specific canonical perspectives, including the perspective that rep-
resents an egocentric frame of reference. The study also revealed the model’s
dependency of the recognition performance on display orientation comparable
to psychometric studies (Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000).
Further investigations showed that the type of information the biological mo-
tion patterns are based on provides the model version with complete invariance
to differences in body morphology, movement speed, and scale of the observa-
tion, as well as robustness to differences in posture control. Also, the developing
encodings were found suitable for learning untimed forecasts of the sequence
of the recognized motion patterns, which further contributed to the robustness
of perspective-taking (Schrodt and Butz, 2014).
The evaluations were confirmed and expanded in a further study (Schrodt et
al., 2015), where we applied the model for learning multiple perspectives on
different types of actions which came from full body motion tracking record-
ings of human subjects. The patterns generated by the unsupervised learning
algorithm were found to be clearly classifiable with respect to their action type
based on the pre-structured neural extraction of directional motion information.
While the foregoing model variants did not show how proprioceptions could
be inferred from visual observations – although they could establish the visual
correspondence – the present study showed how this inference is possible, and
that it is strongly entangled with the ability to adopt the visual perspective of
the observed person. Furthermore, the model replicated bistable percepts when
depth information was suppressed.
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While all of the above model variants were based on winner-takes-all cells (cf.
Grossberg, 1973) with direct multimodal tunings, we extended the model to en-
code visual, proprioceptive and also abstract intention signals in separate mod-
ules (Schrodt and Butz, 2016). Although the introduced modules cannot directly
be compared to parietal, temporal and frontal regions of the mirror neuron sys-
tem, the model proposed a step towards a distributed representation of similar
encodings. In this work, we showed how separate modal modules can simu-
late sequences of action patterns while mutually predicting and synchronizing
each other. By linking the developing motion patterns to visual snapshots of
the perceived biological motion, the model obtained the capability to imagine
specific action types without sensory input. In a similar manner, the distributed
simulation allowed to infer action classes and proprioceptions from observed
stimuli.
In Chapter 5, these model variants are unified and their capabilities are ex-
panded. In particular, I add several submodal encodings to the visual and
proprioceptive modules to represent different types of information, which then
feature different types of perceptual invariance, and thus different types of pre-
dictive information. This step is crucial for solving the binding problem – which
has been side-stepped in earlier variants of the model – and helpful for solving
the correspondence problem. As in earlier model variants, the types of infor-
mation are encoded by specifically tuned populations of cells. This population
coding is extended to support learning and to enable feature binding. As well,
the encoding capacity of submodal neural modules is enhanced by learning lo-
cally distributed codes by means of cooperating cells, instead of winner-takes-
all cells. Previously, predictions of the progress of simulated or imagined mo-
tion were based on approximations of Bayesian statistics. The variant of the
network introduced in this thesis is expanded to identify more complex, multi-
conditional, spatio-temporal dependencies from distributed submodal encod-
ings for its predictions.
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4.2 Related Modeling Approaches
To the best of my knowledge, there is no model of action understanding that
integrates and tests the proposed concepts. There is also a particular lack of
learning, iterative and adaptive models of spatial perspective-taking. Hence, in
the following, I present relevant studies that relate to the approach of this work
in partial aspects.
Intention Inference Models
Many models that refer to action understanding attend to the inference of future
goal states of an observed individual – such as an effector position. As an exam-
ple, Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum, 2006; Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum, 2009 de-
scribe action understanding and intentional reasoning in a Bayesian framework
as inverting a probabilistic generative model from hidden intention states to ac-
tions under the assumption of rational behavior. The framework is validated in
a simple scenario, in which the model infers the likelihood of goal positions of
an observed agent based on movement trajectories. The results are compared to
inferences made by humans. Closer related to this thesis, Bütepage, Kjellström,
and Kragic, 2017 use a conditional variational autoencoder to simulate forward
in time multiple possible upper-body biological motion trajectories that end up
in multiple possible goal states.
However, as explained earlier, this thesis considers the inference of simplified
kinematic intention states (such as walking) instead of finite modal goal states.
The main focus here is on the embodiment, visuomotor interactions and percep-
tual inferences that could also yield inferences and simulations of more complex
hidden variables (like emotional states). Similarly, Friston, Mattout, and Kilner,
2011 propose a model of action understanding that infers compact action codes
(hidden states) and proprioceptions (joint angles) from visual trajectories (coor-
dinates) via active inference. Again, the theoretical framework was validated in
a simple case (handwriting of a simulated arm with two degrees of freedom),
in which however no modal representations of the considered kinematic trajec-
tories were learned. For a short but general overview of models that predict
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intention-like states in robotics applications and multi-agent systems, refer to
Demiris, 2007.
None of the studies mentioned here considers the perspectival differences
between executed and observed actions, which is investigated by models of
perspective-taking.
Perspective-Taking Models
Johnson and Demiris, 2005 propose a framework that demonstrates the posi-
tive effects of perspective-taking on action recognition, and that involves feed-
forward and multiple generative visual models to simulate a robot actor’s vi-
sual perception. Still, despite the availability of prediction errors in this model,
the concrete realization of perspective-taking directly applies a transformation
to the visual inputs that stems from the gaze direction of the observed actor,
which was basically made available to the model.
Similarly, Breazeal et al., 2006 propose a robot architecture that simulates the
perspective and belief system of a teacher to resolve ambiguities in the teacher’s
action demonstrations on a symbolic level. Again, perspective-taking is based
purely on pre-defined perceptual cues (a body tracking algorithm) and does
not apply learned, embodied expectations. Another cognitive architecture for
human-robot interaction that involves perspective-taking by means of simulat-
ing the field of an actor’s vision via bottom-up information was implemented
by Trafton et al., 2005.
Ehrenfeld, Herbort, and Butz, 2013 propose a model that employs a kinematic,
modular body scheme for transformations between global and local frames of
reference and fusion of sensory information. The model was successfully tested
in a visuo-spatial perspective-taking task (Ehrenfeld and Butz, 2014). It does
not learn and predict actions and body motion, but uses rather explicitly de-
fined forward and inverse kinematics and sensor fusions to this end. It is also
provided with observed feature identities, and their positions and orientations
in a number of local frames of reference, such that the perspective estimate is
again a result of direct transformations and sensor fusions.
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In fact, besides own work mentioned in the last chapter, the functional prin-
ciples of perspective-taking are strongly simplified, pre-defined, or completely
bypassed also in most models of imitation (see e.g. Billard and Mataric´, 2001;
Cabido-Lopes and Santos-Victor, 2003).
Taken together, although some algorithmic approaches on perspective-taking
and imitation exist, neither of these models considers the learning and appli-
cation of driving signals by which a mental perspective may be adopted, the
fundamental neurocomputational mechanisms, and the seemingly continuous,
gradual nature of perspective-taking and mental rotation. Computational mod-
els that reproduce perceptual characteristics of psychometric studies are hard
to find.
Pose Estimation Models
The approach of selecting and sorting visual features to estimate bodily
configurations from visual features suggested in this thesis can be compared
to algorithms of articulated pose estimation. Most approaches are based
on tree-structured graphical models that enforce spatial consistency of the
estimated pose (e.g. Felzenszwalb and Huttenlocher, 2005; Andriluka, Roth,
and Schiele, 2009; Andriluka, Roth, and Schiele, 2010; Yang and Ramanan,
2011). For example, Andriluka, Roth, and Schiele, 2010 propose a three-stage
graphical model that estimates 2D limb positions (based on Andriluka, Roth,
and Schiele, 2009), integrates them over time, and reconstructs 3D pose es-
timates from image sequences. For robustness to differences in perspective,
multiple, individual view-point specific pose estimators were trained, whose
output was then combined via a support-vector machine.
Tree-structured graphical models for pose estimation are typically confronted
with problems that result from symmetries in the appearance, or self-occlusions
of body parts. These problems can be avoided by learning strong postural pri-
ors from usual activities such as walking (Lan and Huttenlocher, 2005), or by
applying occlusion-sensitive local likelihoods (Sigal and Black, 2006). In con-
trast to graphical models, where dependencies between the variables of the
bodily configuration are typically not learned, newer approaches rely on hier-
archical, multi-scale filters or classifiers which are trained via backpropagation.
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For example, Ramakrishna et al., 2014 propose an inference machine for pose
estimation, where each of multiple classifiers on a hierarchical level generates a
confidence map for the location of each anatomical landmark. These estimates
are combined and gradually refined on the hierarchy to estimate 2D body pos-
tures from still images. Similarly, Wei et al., 2016 estimate poses using a deep
convolutional neural network. Both approaches were trained on rather large
amounts of annotated data to develop the inferential capabilities and robust-
ness to different perspectives, and they do not apply spatial transformations for
perspective invariance.
The approach presented in this thesis combines several methods also used for
pose estimation as mentioned above, although some of the problems that often
arise from raw image processing are basically skipped, such as the extraction
of visual candidate features for anatomical landmarks (although it can distin-
guish between biological and non-biological features), tracking their location
over time, or the reconstruction of depth information. The model learns strong
spatial and structural priors from bodily, self-centered actions. It uses these em-
bodied priors to gradually transform the coordinate space of observed visual
landmarks to infer a corresponding view-point of the respective action. Thus,
the model does not have to learn different views of the same actions, although it
is potentially capable of encoding multiple, canonical views to speed up conver-
gence (Schrodt et al., 2015). Furthermore, the model uses multiple types of in-
formation for pose inferences, which improves the inference abilities, the ability
to preserve the inferred feature assignments and perspective over time, as well
as robustness and generality in action recognition. Determining visual feature
identity and binding, the perspectives, and the resulting posture are separate
processes (or stages) in the model proposed here, providing further robustness.
Generative Action Models
A number of generative models capable of crossmodal inferences and simu-
lations have been proposed. For example, Lallee and Dominey, 2013 imple-
mented a model that integrates low-level sensory data of an iCub robot, encod-
ing multimodal contingencies in a single, 3D, self-organizing competitive map.
When driven by a single modal stimulus, the multimodal integration enabled
38 Chapter 4. Modeling Action Understanding
mental imagery of corresponding perceptions in other modalities. The modeled
self-organizing map is topographic with respect to its discrete multimodal cell
tunings. However, temporal dependencies and action patterns are not encoded
in this approach.
Taylor, Hinton, and Roweis, 2006 implemented a stochastic, generative neu-
ral network model based on conditional restricted Boltzmann machines. When
trained on motion capture data, the model is able to reproduce walking and
running movements as well as transitions between them in terms of sequences
of joint angular postures. However, the model does not learn and generate
sequences of other modal perceptions, and does not implement modal or per-
ceptual inferences.
In contrast to the mentioned models, the model proposed in this thesis is gen-
erative in several modalities and submodalities, which are able to produce con-
sistent simulations based on predictive crossmodal encodings. Furthermore,
the model is able to learn compressed kinematic types from the submodal en-
codings, which can be used for inference from observations or selective action
simulations.
Biological Motion Recognition Models
Although complex models of action understanding are rare, there are several
noteworthy models of biological motion and Gestalt perception, which consti-
tutes an important aspect of it. For example, Fleischer et al., 2013 modeled the
properties of STS cells during object interaction. The authors’ approach includes
the encoding of multiple viewer-centered representations of simple, schematic
actions to establish a certain degree of orientation invariance. recognition was
based on a hierarchy of feature detectors in several neurobiologically inspired
domains, like local shape detectors and motion neurons, leading to plausible
model predictions about human recognition performance. However, the model
does not infer perspectives, but uses separate networks for each encoded view-
point. Furthermore, the model uses a hard-coded wiring and parameterization
that is not trained on data.
Lange and Lappe, 2006; Lange, Georg, and Lappe, 2006 modeled biological mo-
tion recognition using viewer-centered, image-based posture templates, where
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the best matching template responses were integrated over time and decided
on the recognized movement. The authors’ model is timescale-independent to
a certain degree and can distinguish pre-defined walking directions. The ap-
proach also produced plausible results with respect to the artificial cell firing
rates. Even so, the motion information is only considered indirectly by recog-
nizing whole movements by means of adjacent posture images, and the model
was validated only on a single movement in two manually distinguished ori-
entations. Again, no learning was applied to the model’s parameters. The ap-
proaches mentioned above can be compared to models of Gestalt perception.
For a general overview of Gestalt perception models, see (Jäkel et al., 2016).
Taken together, none of the models introduced in this chapter solves the corre-
spondence and binding problems via expectation-driven, iterative, inferential
processes, and only a few assess the issue of embodiment in action understand-
ing. The model introduced in this theses combines and unifies several of the
above aspects for a neurocomputational model of the principles of action un-
derstanding, which is detailed in the following.
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Chapter 5
A Neural Network Model of Action
Understanding
This chapter proposes a model of action understanding that implements the
addressed interpretation of embodied simulation, predictive coding, perceptual
inferences, and blends into neuroscientific and psychological findings about the
mirror neuron system. The model consists of three main modules: An intention
module, a visual module, and a proprioceptive module. All modules commu-
nicate via bidirectional couplings that represent complex neural circuits with
predictive characteristics.
Note that the three modules can not directly and not exclusively be referred
to frontal, temporal and parietal regions of the mirror neuron system. Rather,
the visual module infers both spatial relations of visual features (as in parietal
cortex), as well as Gestalt templates (as in temporal cortex). It also binds vi-
sual features and performs spatial perspective-taking, which can be linked to
the parietal cortex and the dorsal stream of visual processing. Thus, the model
also reflects shared perceptual mechanisms in the respective parietal and tem-
poral regions. Similarly, the proprioceptive module does not directly relate to
inferior parietal regions which integrate sensorimotor information. Rather, this
integration can be seen in the bidirectional, predictive connectivity between the
visual and proprioceptive modules. I chose the term "proprioception" in the fol-
lowing for all motor-related encodings of the mirror neuron system because the
model is purely perceptual and does not act per se. Thus, it will infer propri-
oceptive perceptions from observations instead of corresponding motor com-
mands, which is however technically comparable. Finally, the intention module
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is somewhat related to frontal encodings and kinematic intentions, but the most
abstracted part of the model.
In the following chapters, I will first give an overview of the functionality of the
model in Section 5.1, clarify important modeling assumptions and notations in
Section 5.2, before the basic information processing of visual and proprioceptive
stimuli is explained in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, I will explain how predictive
encodings are learned from the processed modal information types, and finally,
in Section 5.5, I will explain the inference of action classes from these encodings.
5.1 Technical Model Overview
The action understanding model consists of three modules, each representing
an abstraction of action relevant modal or amodal neural activity, and inter-
actions thereof. An overview of the modules, network components and the
respective processing steps is shown in Figure 5.1.
(i) The vision module processes a number of visually observed, salient features.
Each feature is represented by a Cartesian coordinate relative to a global 6 di-
mensional frame of reference, consisting of origin and orientation. Features
may either correspond to joint locations – representing bodily landmarks – or
distractors that do not represent bodily characteristics (cf. Section 2.2.1).
As mentioned earlier, the embodied learning approach assumes that visual
information about own bodily actions is observed and learned from a self-
perceptual perspective (e.g. head centered) and then correlated to other modal
or amodal codes. Thus, when optical action patterns of another person are
observed, the model has to infer the frame of reference the action is currently
observed from to establish the visual correspondence to the learned embodied
codes, including action codes in other modalities. This operation is performed
in the perspective-taking step, which incrementally adapts to the differences
between the self-centered frame of reference, and the frame of reference the
action is perceived from, driven by top-down expectations that come from the
currently activated embodied codes. Perspective-taking thus can be compared
to mental imagery of spatial relations, which solves the correspondence
problem in the model.
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FIGURE 5.1: Overview of the modules of the model and their connectivity. Visual
global feature coordinates and proprioceptive limb orientations are processed in
two separate modules. The modules extract posture, motion direction, and motion
magnitude configurations, while visual perception is supported and adapted by
top-down driven perspective-taking and feature binding steps. The submodal con-
figurations or Gestalt percepts are then learned by separate autoencoders, which
learn spatio-temporal codes and apply them for predictive coding. The learned
codes are classified in an intention module, which is able to top-down bias the pre-
dictive encodings. The three main neural modules are able to predict their own
activated, compressed codes as well as the codes of other modules. Here, blue
boxes represent processing steps applied in the same manner to each observed fea-
ture. Green boxes represent processing steps applied in the same manner to bodily
features only. Red boxes represent processing steps where each (either observed or
bodily) feature is treated individually.
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Subsequently, submodal information of each input feature is extracted and en-
coded separately by populations of locally receptive cells, indicated by the in-
formation extraction and population coding steps. The submodalities comprise the
currently inferred (or spatially imagined) position, motion direction, and mo-
tion magnitude of the respective input stimuli. First, subdividing fundamental
types of information from the input stimuli in this systematic manner is crucial
for the perceptual adaptation processes in the model, as will be explained later
and shown in the experiments. Second, encoding the respective types of infor-
mation in locally tuned cells approximates a normalization of neural activity for
each feature, which on the one hand prepares for the subsequent identification
of relevant visual features, and on the other hand facilitates equitable learning
of compressed, submodal codes.
The feature binding submodule in the visual pathway performs the selection
of action relevant features out of the set of all observed features, as well as the
assignment of the selected features to the correct neural processing paths. This
essentially solves the binding problem in the model: I assume that – during em-
bodied training – each salient visual input stimulus corresponds to a specific
joint, and that this distinct assignment from input indices to joint indices is pro-
vided. During testing, however, the assignment is not provided, which is why
the model is to infer the correct assignment, again by applying top-down ex-
pectations. As well, there may be distracting features even with similar motion
dynamics, which do not correspond to any learned bodily landmark. Thus, the
model is to select the action relevant information as well. Summing up, selec-
tion and assignment are identical to an identification of body joints from a set of
moving visual features, which humans are capable of in experiments with point
light displays (Johansson, 1973; Pavlova, 2012).
In this model, the binding problem is tackled by considering multiple hypothet-
ical associations for each input feature, applying top-down expectations about
the observed biological motion dynamics in terms of submodal neural activity
to gradually infer and associate the relevant dynamical patterns. Technically,
this is realized by a gated connectivity from each salient feature population to
a number of bodily feature populations that are capable of representing multi-
ple, potentially matching stimuli in parallel. Each of those connections – e.g.
from all three submodal populations of a salient feature indexed by 1 to the
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three submodal populations of bodily feature 3, representing the right elbow
– is gated by an adaptive selector neuron that represents a non-linear assign-
ment strength. The network will incrementally reinforce the gates that match
the locally expected dynamics, while diminishing the connections that associate
divergent dynamics. In case there are more salient stimuli than learned bodily
features, the connectivity represents both a selection of relevant features as well
as an assignment to the correct bodily features.
Taken together, the first two submodules of the visual processing pathway con-
sist of pre-structured, bottom-up, perceptual processing, which applies specific
adaptations online to match top-down expectations – resulting in spatial pre-
dictive encodings. The expectations are generated by three temporal condi-
tional autoencoders, each combining a submodality of the transformed, selected
and ordered bodily features into a whole-body Gestalt percept. The autoencoders
first learn compressed codes without considering temporal or crossmodal de-
pendencies to cover the contingencies of submodal self-perceptions, which es-
sentially models embodied learning of submodal spatial codes. The learned
and recognized codes are then used to learn predictions of succeeding of codes.
These predictions are learned by identifying temporal features in a short loga-
rithmic history of several recently activated submodal codes, with the objective
of minimizing the divergence to the actual observed codes. The identification of
suitable temporal features is not bootstrapped by or restricted to specific depen-
dencies. In fact, the predictions may conditionally and temporally depend on
the previously activated codes in their own, submodal domain, as well as on all
codes of other autoencoders. Taking the proprioceptive codes that are learned in
a similar manner into account, this essentially models modal and crossmodal in-
ference processes. For example, the current location of a joint together with the
motion direction and magnitude – each represented by a separate, compressed
code – are in combination suitable to predict the next position of the respective
joint. Conversely, specific positions may be suitable to predict a change in the
direction of motion, for example when a specific extreme posture is reached. In
sum, the model is expected to learn multi-conditional, temporal dependencies
that develop from distributed, compressed, submodal, spatial codes.
Using autoencoders, the bottom-up activated submodal codes can be back-
projected onto the corresponding stimuli to obtain biased reconstructions of
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A B
FIGURE 5.2: A point light stimulus (A) that pushes the model’s
internal body scheme towards resonance (B), after perspective-
taking and feature-binding were successful.
Gestalt perceptions. As a consequence, when a fully trained autoencoder is
provided with an imperfect stimulus (e.g. an observed action with unknown
identity of the features, shown from an unknown perspective), it is able to infer
an expected stimulus that is biased by its embodied, or self-perceptual experi-
ence. Although the expectation is distorted as well when a distorted stimulus is
presented, it is typically closer to the actual, non-distorted stimulus given that
it was encoded during training. Then, adapting the bottom-up processing of
the stimulus given the biased reconstruction as target, the perception in terms
of perspective, feature selection and assignment is typically pushed towards
correspondence, compensating differences in self-perception and observation.
Improving the perceptual processing also improves the expectation by itself,
such that the respective perceptual parameters are adapted along a path that
typically leads to inference.
Similar to bottom-up activated codes, the autoencoders can infer the currently
expected actual Gestalt stimulus given a predicted code. In case there is no input
provided to the overall network, this can be considered a global, modality com-
prehensive imagination of learned action patterns. In case that only one of the
modalities is provided, the code prediction of the other modality is comparable
to a simulation of the expected stimulus. Notably, when proprioceptive activa-
tions are predicted from visual stimuli (see Figure 5.2), it can in fact be said that
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the motor system resonates in response to the observation: Since the simulation
of submodal encodings is determined both by local, submodal temporal depen-
dencies as well as lateral, crossmodal dependencies, the submodal simulations
are partially self-sustaining, and partially striving for global consistency. As a
result, the network is able to infer proprioceptive stimuli via (even highly dis-
torted) visual stimuli after a short period of spatial and temporal adjustment,
which enables it to ’understand’ observed actions in terms of corresponding
proprioceptive sensations, or even to simulate and imagine whole body actions
in multiple modalities.
In contrast to the visual pathway, proprioceptive stimuli are not encoded by
means of global coordinates of joints or distractors. Each proprioceptive input
represents the orientation of a specific limb, relative to the orientation of the pre-
decessor in the body structure hierarchy (cf. Section 2.2.2). As such, propriocep-
tive processing assumes knowledge about the hierarchy and length of the limbs.
Proprioceptive postural codes thus encode whole-body limb direction constella-
tions in local orientations, instead of positional constellations in a global frame
of reference as in the visual pathway. As a result, when only a single limb is
moved, no motion is perceived in the successors in the body hierarchy. Anal-
ogously to the visual processing pathway, the proprioceptive pathway extracts
submodal information from the bodily input features, encodes them separately
in populations of locally receptive cells, and develops codes and predictions
from the spatial and temporal contingencies. Proprioceptive sensations, how-
ever, do not require perceptual inference or spatial imagination by nature, be-
cause they cannot be observed from others. Hence, the perspective-taking, fea-
ture selection and assignment steps are left out.
All of the six developing modal and submodal encodings – posture, motion di-
rection and motion magnitude of both visual and proprioceptive autoencoders
– are further processed by the intention module. In the presented setup of the
model, the purpose of this module is to identify the type of action that is cur-
rently observed, which can be related to kinematic intentions such as walking
on a floor or executing a basketball dribble. Technically, the module is super-
vised to learn distinctions of movements using the constellation of developing
visuo-proprioceptive codes, applying a temporal classifier network. The out-
put of this module is an activity vector that represents a confidence value for
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each of the action classes shown during training. The class output is recurrently
connected to all visual and proprioceptive autoencoders and biases the temporal
prediction of their respective state progress. This enables the autoencoders to
converge towards different temporal attractor states during prediction, based
on the class currently presented. Thus, given a motion intention, visual and
proprioceptive code simulations are pulled into consistent temporal attractors
that represent the movement via a top-down influence, while synchronizing
each other via the lateral, crossmodal dependencies. As well, when the class is
inferred from a (visually) provided input, it allows to stabilize the simulation of
corresponding inputs (such as proprioceptions). In context of the mirror neuron
system, the model assumes that also a coupling between visual and intentional
codes exists (albeit rather indirect) and is also used to enhance inference and
embodied simulations.
In the following, all of the mentioned modules and processing steps are de-
tailed including mathematical formulations. At first, however, the modeling
paradigms are described as well as the notation of the formalization.
5.2 Methodological Subsumption and Formal
Preamble
The neural network model processes its inputs in a specific, pre-structured man-
ner. It implements learning and structural biases by means of different modules
with different purposeful processing steps, in contrast to most deep neural net-
works that have a repetitive structure. Some of the involved neural transfor-
mations and calculations are fixed, some of them are learned in a training phase,
and some of them are adapted in a testing phase. All of the processing steps in
the network are performed by artificial neurons that are locally connected and
communicate via artificial synapses or weights. Artificial neural activity models
the average firing rate of cells in terms of second generation neural networks
(Maass, 1997). Following a strictly connectionist approach (Elman, 1998), each of
the artificial neurons and weights communicates with connected components
only, through defined pathways only.
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Furthermore, all network components are differentiable with respect to multi-
ple error signals that are propagated backwards along distinct processing paths
of the network. This allows for parameter optimization by gradient descent on
convex error functions (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams, 1986). The imple-
mentation also considers time delays and recurrences in signal propagation by
backpropagation through time (Werbos, 1988; Mozer, 1989), and limits the acti-
vation functions’ minimum derivatives with respect to their input (cf. flat-
spot elimination Fahlman, 1988). Hence, the artificial neural network models
bottom-up processing by means of stimulus propagation, and top-down pro-
cessing by means of both error backpropagation as well as recurrent connec-
tivity. Backpropagated errors, however, are (with one exception) not provided,
such that the network can be considered to be unsupervised, or, more precisely,
self-supervised, because it generates its own error signals. Besides the recurrent
nature of the network, the propagation of signals involves axonic modulations as
well as multiplicative, presynaptic interactions: Each synaptic input to a neuron is
the weighted product of an arbitrary number of axonic outputs (akin to tensors
in gain-field networks, cf. Andersen, Essick, and Siegel, 1985; Salinas and Ab-
bott, 2001), while axonic outputs can be modulated by one another via weights
as well (comparable to shunting inhibition Eccles, 2013; Blomfield, 1974).
All learning and adaptation is based on the same principle, that is, by minimiz-
ing backpropagated, self-generated prediction errors via gradient descent. Learning
here means encoding specific compressed action patterns given input stimuli by
permanently changing weights, while adaptation means altering the processing
of inputs in a way such that they consistently match the encoded patterns by
temporarily changing weights. Adaptations are restricted to specific transfor-
mations, such that the network effectively cannot be subject to self-deception.
Further, all learning and adaptation is accomplished online, meaning that the
sequence of inputs is coherent in time. No batch learning, randomized input
sampling, or comparable training methods are applied. While this supports
cognitive plausibility, it also makes the network principally prone to the prob-
lem of catastrophic forgetting (McCloskey and Cohen, 1989). By selecting appro-
priate coding schemes and learning principles, this problem, also referred to as
recoding problem in the following, can be effectively avoided, as will be described
later.
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With this in mind, and with reference to the differentiability of all of the applied
components, a mathematical notation is used in the following that focuses on
the results of the respective neural processing steps rather than the neural con-
nectionism and the transfer functions chosen for the respective components.
Error signals, parameter adaptations and learning rules are highlighted specif-
ically. The connectivity, on the other hand, is indicated in distinctive figures,
and explained qualitatively. In the following, all processing steps and the cor-
responding neural network structures are visualized in connectivity diagrams.
A legend for these diagrams is presented in Figure 5.3.
Mathematical variables are notated as follows: Superscripts generally annotate
which submodality, which modality, or which adaptive, learning, or generative pro-
cess the variable refers to, and combinations thereof. When superscripts denote
exponents instead, this is emphasized explicitly. Thus, superscripts can indi-
cate that a variable exists in multiple contexts. In case that there is only a single,
obvious context for a variable, the superscript is dropped. Subscripts generally
describe indices either referring to a particular observed feature, bodily feature,
spatial dimension or neuron in a layer or population. In case there are multiple
indices that refer to the same type of component, the order of subscripts is is
equivalent to the direction of signal processing, meaning for example that the
first index describes where activity originates from, while the second index de-
scribes where the activity is directed towards. Vectors and scalars are indicated
by lower case letters, while vectors are bold. Matrices and discrete constants
are indicated by upper case letters. Related variables may have the same vari-
able character but are distinguished by an indicative, transcribed symbol. For
example, a variable transcribed with a dot may indicate a different encoding
format, while a tilde may indicate a top-down expectation referring to the vari-
able without tilde.
Thus, variables generally come in the following format:
<indicative symbol>
[variable character]
<submodality>|<modality>|<reference to process>
<observed feature>|<bodily feature>|<neuron/dimension> (5.1)
where [ ] denotes mandatory characters, < > denotes optional characters, and |
denotes non-exclusive logical disjunctions.
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FIGURE 5.3: Legend for neural connectivity diagrams. Blue and green layers, as
well as their connectivity, exist multiple times (once per observed or bodily fea-
ture), although this is typically not shown in the connectivity graphs. Red layers
exist only once for the whole (sub)modal processing path.
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For example, m˙vai denotes the a-th component of the motion magnitude (m) of
the i-th visual (v) feature, encoded by a population of neurons ( ˙ ). As another
example, gvp denotes the whole body Gestalt perception (g) of a visual (v) pos-
ture (p), while g˜vp denotes the according expectation generated by the model.
An X in a superscript denotes a set that defines in which modalities and sub-
modalities the variable exists (e.g. cX , X ∈ {vp, vd, vm, pp, pd, pm}), while triple
points in subscripts are discrete set-builder notations (e.g. a1...3 = {a1, a2, a3}).
Using this notation, the processing of input features, the extraction of submodal
features, and the adaptation of visual perception are outlined in the following.
5.3 Information Processing and Perceptual Infer-
ence: Visual and Proprioceptive Pathways
The model processes inputs in two distinct domains that represent different
modalities. First, the visual module processes a number of N v point-like, salient
visual features in a global frame of reference (cf. Section 2.2.1), and maps them
to M v bodily features. I assume that (i) these saliences are made available to
the model such that visual features potentially relevant for action understand-
ing are provided, (ii) joints provide the most significant visual features for ac-
tion understanding, and (iii) the global coordinates of these features – including
depth information – can be recognized precisely and coherently from binocular
visual streams. Indeed, in my experiments, these inputs originate from mo-
tion capture data recorded with multiple cameras, and the resulting stimuli are
closely related to experiments with point-light displays introduced by Johans-
son, 1973. The model is however not limited to the processing of biological
stimuli, and can also select subgroups of the provided input coordinates for
processing while disregarding irrelevant inputs. Taken together, the input to
the visual pathway comes in the form of an arbitrary number of 3D Cartesian
feature coordinates that may or may not correspond to specific joint coordinates
in motion capture data, relative to a global frame of reference, which consists of a
3D origin and a 3D orientation. A visual, global coordinate input at time step t
is indexed by i and denoted by xvi in the following.
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Second, the proprioceptive module processes a number of Mp bodily postural fea-
tures perceived proprioceptively (cf. Section 2.2.2). Here, the model assumes
that each of the proprioceptive sensory features (i) is descriptive for a specific
limb, (ii) represents postural information locally by means of the orientation of
the limb relative to its structural predecessor, and (iii) that such features can
be extracted reliably from streams of proprioceptive sensations. As a result, a
proprioceptive feature comes in the form of a 3D Cartesian unit vector, repre-
senting the limb orientation in the local frame of reference of the predecessor in
the body hierarchy. In contrast to the visual features, proprioceptive features
do neither encode distances between joints (i.e. limb lengths) directly or indi-
rectly, nor do they encode global coordinates of joints. Rather, proprioceptive
features depend on a particular (simplified) body model that provides struc-
tural knowledge about the body and its limb configuration. A proprioceptive,
local orientation input at time step t is denoted by xpi in the following.
5.3.1 Segregation of Distinct Submodalities
Various types of information feature various types of invariances. For example,
the position of a visual feature is not invariant to rotation or translation, while
the motion direction of a feature is invariant to translation, but not to rotation,
and the magnitude of motion is invariant to both rotation and translation. The
model will learn partially invariant codes from these distinct submodal per-
ceptions and use them for perceptual inference. For example, when biological
motion is perceived from an unknown viewing angle, it still can identify the
constellation of motion magnitudes of the observed points. This can provide
a prior expectation about which observed feature corresponds to which bodily
feature.
Figure 5.4 shows a connectivity graph for the processing of a single, visual fea-
ture. The input at time step t is represented by activity of a layer consisting
of three neurons, each directly representing a dimension of the Cartesian input
coordinate. Before all other processing steps occur, the network calculates the
velocity vvi of each visual feature coordinate:
vvi (t) = x
v
i (t)− xvi (t− 1) . (5.2)
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FIGURE 5.4: Processing cascade from the i-th visual input to the j-th visual bodily
feature. Rotation and translation are applied to each feature in the same man-
ner. The feature position, motion direction, and motion magnitude are extracted
from each individual input feature, and encoded separately by specially arranged
populations of neurons. A neural gating matrix then selects and assigns the ob-
served features to the correct populations that represent bodily information. Rota-
tion, translation, selection, and assignment are driven by top-down error signals
that stem from self-generated submodal expectations.
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From the visual input coordinate and its velocity, three types of submodal in-
formation are derived: (i) the inferred coordinate pvi of the feature (also referred
to as position of posture of a feature in the following), (ii) the inferred direction of
motion dvi , and (iii) the magnitude of motion mvi . Two transformations are raised
to determine these values: (i) the rotation matrix R and the translation bias b,
both of which are applied to the whole visual percept, that is, all features con-
sistently. The mental rotation matrix models the capability to imagine different
perspectives or vantage points on observed visual features, while the transla-
tion bias represents the center of the respective coordinate system, which is also
the center of rotation. Both of these transformations are applied to the input
coordinates, such that
pvi (t) = R(t) · xvi (t) + b(t) . (5.3)
Analogously, rotation is applied to the calculated velocity of a feature. Since
velocities are invariant to translations, the translation bias is not applied in this
step. The result of the rotated velocity is subdivided into two components that
separate the direction of motion as well as its magnitude, such that
mvi (t) = ‖R(t) · vvi (t)‖ (5.4)
dvi (t) =
R(t) · vvi (t)
max (mvi (t), o)
(5.5)
where ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. Note that in equation 5.5, there is a point at
which the direction of marginal feature motion is not normalized to unit length
anymore, defined by the motion direction recognition threshold o. This is to
account for the irrelevance of the direction of motion that could be caused by
sensor noise.
Proprioceptive features are split up into submodal features in a similar manner,
however neglecting the adaptation of perspective, as shown in Figure 5.5. An-
other difference is that the input coordinates are normalized orientation vectors,
which does however not influence the mentioned processing steps.
In sum, the foregone processing steps obtain 3D Cartesian joint coordinates,
motion directions, as well as scalar motion magnitudes of the observed features
in a specific frame of reference that is determined by the network itself in the
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FIGURE 5.5: Processing cascade for a single proprioceptive fea-
ture. The information extraction and population coding are com-
parable to visual features, but stem from limb orientations instead
of joint positions. Further, no perspective-taking or feature bind-
ing has to be applied, such that no top-down error signals are pro-
cessed.
visual domain. In the proprioceptive domain, the processing provides 3D joint
orientations as well as the motion directions and scalar motion magnitudes.
Before I continue to detail further processing steps applied to these types of in-
formation, the characteristics of the visual rotation and translation mechanisms
are described in the following section.
5.3.2 Perspective-taking for Visual Correspondence
In the model, perspective-taking consists of a translation followed by a rotation
of all salient visual features, and aims at establishing the best possible corre-
spondence between the input and top-down expectations. In this sequence of
5.3. Information Processing and Perceptual Inference: Visual and
Proprioceptive Pathways
57
transformations, the translation reflects the origin of the model’s internal, imag-
ined frame of reference and also the center of rotation, while the rotation reflects
an imagined vantage point.
The translation and center of rotation is determined by the bias neurons bwhich
can be adapted by gradient descent to minimize top-down error signals in a set
Es, which originate from submodal Gestalt autoencoders as will be described
in Section 5.4:
ba(t) = ba(t− 1)− ηs
∑
e∈Es
∂e(t)
∂ba(t)
+ γs[ba(t− 1)− ba(t− 2)], a ∈ {x, y, z} (5.6)
Es = {βvp∆vp1...Mv(t)} (5.7)
where ba is a translation on the a-axis, γs is the momentum term (Rumelhart,
Hinton, and Williams, 1986) used for the translation adaptation, and ηs is the
according adaptation rate. The translation biases are initialized at 0 without
variance. Since the motion direction of coordinates as well as their magnitude
are invariant to translations, the adaptation is influenced only by the weighted
error signals βvp∆vp1..Mv backpropagated along the processing paths that refer to
the coordinates of the M v encoded bodily features (see Figure 5.4).
The rotationR is implemented by a 3x3 neural matrix whose activity reproduces
an extrinsic z-y-x Euler rotation. It is driven by three Euler angles αx, αy, and
αz. Each of the Euler angles results in a rotation around a specific Cartheisan
axis and – similar to the translations – is represented by a bias neuron that can
be adapted online by gradient descent on a set of errors signals. The adaptation
over time follows the rule
αa(t) = αa(t− 1)− ηr
∑
e∈Er
∂e(t)
∂αa(t)
+ γr[αa(t− 1)− αa(t− 2)], a ∈ {x, y, z} (5.8)
Er = {βvp∆vp1...Mv(t), βvd∆vd1...Mv(t)} (5.9)
where γr implements the momentum term for the adaptation of the rotation,
ηr implements the adaptation rate, and Er is the set of error signals to mini-
mize. The rotation biases are initialized at 0 without variance. In accordance
with the connectivity shown in Figure 5.4, these error signals are backpropa-
gated along the neural processing paths that relate to the coordinates and motion
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directions of all observed features. The positional error signals are represented
by ∆vp1..Mv , while ∆
vd
1..Mv represents the errors signals for the motion direction fea-
tures, which are again weighted by factors βvp and βvd. The motion magnitude
is invariant to rotation by nature and thus not considered in this process.
The calculation of the gradient for the adaptation of the rotation angles depends
on the neural connectivity between the Euler angle bias neurons αx, αy, αz and
the rotation matrix layer R, which is exemplified in Figure 5.6. It consists of
three sub-modules that represent rotations Rx, Ry and Rz – each representing
an axis-specific rotation matrix – and an intermediate module. Accordingly, the
matrices of activation functions for the three sub-modules are
Rx(αx(t)) =
1 0 00 cosαx − sinαx
0 sinαx cosαx
 (5.10)
Ry(αy(t)) =
 cosαy 0 sinαy0 1 0
− sinαy 0 cosαy
 (5.11)
Rz(αz(t)) =
cosαz − sinαz 0sinαz cosαz 0
0 0 1
 (5.12)
The respective pre-synaptic connection scheme is equivalent to encap-
sulated matrix-matrix multiplications, resulting in the activation R =
Rx(αx)Ry(αy)Rz(αz). Thus, the activity of the rotation layer R is again a
rotation matrix, restricting all possible modulations of coordinates and motion
directions to rotations.
The rotation of an object centered frame of reference is comparable to the visuo-
spatial abilities of perspective-taking and mental rotation: Mental rotation is
believed to be an information-driven mental process that rotates observed ob-
jects in their environment, while visuo-spatial perspective-taking is believed to
be a mental process that rotates the observed environment onto the vantage
points of others (Hegarty and Waller, 2004). Similarly, in the model, the whole
visual percept is imagined from the perspective of another actor.
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rotation R
Ry(αy) Rz(αz)Rx(αx)
Ry(αy) 
αx, αy, αz
Rz(αz) 
FIGURE 5.6: Neural rotation matrix R for adaptation of the visual
frame of reference. The rotation matrix is determined by two gain-
field like presynaptic interaction schemes that resemble matrix-
matrix multiplications. Neurons in the axis-specific rotation mod-
ules directly represent the elements of the respective rotation ma-
trix, and are driven by bias neurons that directly represent rotation
angles accordingly.
Moreover, spatial abilities are thought to be gradual and iterative: Higher de-
grees of misorientation between observer and model or object result in higher
recognition time and lower recognition performance, which has also been ob-
served for biological motion stimuli (Shepard and Metzler, 1971; Shepard and
Metzler, 1988; Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000). In the model, gradient descent on
top-down expectation errors approximates this iterative inference by approxi-
mating a minimal path rotation to an error-optimal target.
Taken together, perspective-taking is driven by top-down, embodied expecta-
tions about submodal perceptions that originate from embodied experience.
The network utilizes partially invariant types of information that feature dif-
ferent predictive characteristics with respect to the visual perspective. This
submodal decomposition is crucial for establishing the visual correspondence.
While it has been shown that expectations that consider only the direction of
motion are sufficient for perspective-taking (Schrodt et al., 2015), positional in-
formation adds further robustness, for example when no motion is observed.
On the other hand, motion directions can already provide a suitable guess for
the adaptation of the rotation while the translation is not fully converged, which
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does not generally hold for positional signals. Motion magnitude information
is not considered for perspective-taking, but still is very crucial for establishing
correspondence by means of feature binding, as will be explained in Section
5.3.4.
After perspective-taking, the model has access to a number of submodal visual
features in an inferred frame of reference. These have to be selected and inte-
grated into Gestalt perceptions, meaning that specific, relevant features have to
be combined in an expected order. In preparation of this, the observed features
are encoded by populations of artificial neurons as described in the following.
5.3.3 Visual and Proprioceptive Population Coding
After the extraction of submodal information and inference of a visual frame
of reference, each submodal feature is encoded separately by one population of
neurons with Gaussian tunings. At his step, the coding scheme is converted
from neural activity that directly represents Cartesian vectors and scalars –
which potentially cover arbitrary ranges – to topological neural activity that
represents local responses to specific stimuli within a limited range. This ap-
proach is closer to the actual representation format of the brain and furthermore
allows to co-encode stimulus uncertainties (Pouget, Dayan, and Zemel, 2000). It
also supports subsequent computations as will be described later in this section.
Thus, also the proprioceptive submodal features are encoded by this means.
The response p˙vai of the a-th neuron in a population that encodes the position (p)
of the i-th visually (v) observed feature is described by
p˙vai(t) = (r
vp)D
vp · N (pvi (t), cvpai , σvp) (5.13)
where N(l,m, n) is the density of the multivariate normal distribution at l with
mean m and a Dvp-dimensional diagonal covariance matrix n · I . It specifies the
response of the neuron to the current Cartesian, positional stimulus pvi . Each
neuron in a submodal feature population has an individual tuning or center
cvpai as well as a response breadth or variance σ
vp. The centers are evenly dis-
tributed in the expected range of the submodal stimuli, such that neighboring
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neurons are placed at a center distance of rvp. The center distance determines
the variance by
σvp = ζvp · (rvp)2 (5.14)
where ζvp ∈ (0, 1] is the continuity factor. Scaling the density function by rvp to
the power of the dimension Dvp of the feature ensures that the sum of activ-
ity in the population is approximately 1 for stimuli in the expected range. The
continuity factor modulates the breadth of the cell tunings in a way that ap-
proximately preserves the sum of activity in the population (see Figure 5.7). It
parameterizes a trade-off between an evenly covered input space (for ζvp = 1)
and a high derivative of single cell activity with respect to local stimuli changes
(e.g. for ζvp = 0.1). A high derivative is advantageous for online learning of
generative codes, because it effectively relaxes the problem that an activated
code is continuously overfitted to the current input and thus no actual learn-
ing takes place, which can happen particularly when using high learning rates
and sequential learning in autoencoders (cf. catastrophic forgetting problem,
McCloskey and Cohen, 1989).
Analogously to the coordinate populations, directional motion features are rep-
resented by scaled Gaussian activity via
d˙vai(t) =
(
rvd
)Dvd · N (dvi (t), cvdai , σvd) (5.15)
while motion magnitude features are represented by
m˙vai(t) = (r
vm)D
vm · N (mvi (t), cvmai , σvm) (5.16)
The arrangement of the centers is set up to be in accordance with the dimen-
sion, range, and configuration space of the respective submodal stimuli. Conse-
quently, neurons that encode visual positional features (Dvp = 3) are arranged
evenly on a 3D grid in a specific range. In contrast, neurons that encode visual
directional motion (Dvd = 3) as unit vectors are arranged on the surface of a
unit sphere, while neurons that encode visual motion magnitudes (Dvm = 1)
are distributed linearly, as also indicated in Figure 5.4.
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A ζX = 1:
B ζX = 0.5:
C ζX = 0.25:
FIGURE 5.7: Influence of the continuity factor ζX on cell tunings and the resulting
sum of activity in populations. When a submodal stimulus x is within a specified
range (here x ∈ [0..10]), the resulting sum of activity (red) in a population of Gaus-
sian tuned neurons that represent the stimulus converges to about 1 in the inner
area of the range and drops at the border areas of the range. Lowering the conti-
nuity factor ζX ∈ [0, 1] results in increasingly narrow Gaussian tunings (black) of
the cells (from A to C). As a result, changes in the stimulus result in higher changes
in the resulting population activity. While the sum of activity increases in outer
regions of the covered population range, the energy in inner regions becomes in-
creasingly inconsistent.
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The principle of encoding proprioceptive features is generally comparable
(Dpp = Dpd = 3, Dpm = 1), with the exception that both proprioceptive motion
direction features as well as proprioceptive postural features are represented
by unit vectors and thus the according population neurons are arranged on
the surface of a sphere, as indicated in Figure 5.5. The uniform arrangement
of centers on a unit sphere can be approximated by distributing the centers
evenly on the surface of a cube and projecting the centers on the sphere by
normalizing their coordinates to unit length. Note that small motion signals
activate the respective Gaussian neurons tuned to directional motion rather
uniformly, since the normalization of their driving signal is limited by the
recognition threshold o (see Section 5.3.1).
Not alone because of the different nature of the six submodal stimuli types, it is
important to apply an encoding scheme that results in comparable codes. Here,
specific stimuli are not under- or over-represented by means of their level of ac-
tivity, since their representation is de-linearized by the Gaussians. This ensures
that all submodal stimuli are represented approximately by the same magni-
tude of neural activity also if a stimulus lies between the centers of two neigh-
bouring Gaussians. Given that there are predictions about the current popula-
tion encoded submodal stimulus, the deviations from the actual stimulus are
thus expected to be relatively comparable across the submodalities of a single
feature, as well as across the features. Respective predictions are generated by
higher layers of the network and used both for learning codes from the stimuli
as well as adapting the frame of reference. Thus, given that the stimulus contin-
gencies are learned with comparable precision, all error signals originating from
different bodily features have approximately the same top-down influence on
the adaptive mechanisms described before. Assuming that the variance in the
population coded submodal stimuli over the training set is comparable across
features, the speed of learning the contingencies of each individual feature is
comparable as well, resulting in overall balanced submodal Gestalt codes. To
a certain degree, the approach is similar to individual input scaling based on
variance per input dimension, which is often performed for autoencoders (cf.
Scholz and Vigário, 2002), but requires additional preprocessing of the data set.
Further, using population codes, multiple conflicting stimuli can be encoded
in parallel, which can then be disambiguated by adaptive mechanisms, which
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will be used to tackle the binding problem. Note that all observed features
must be handled equally and without prior knowledge by the network as long
as they have not been identified and assigned to bodily features. Thus, also the
ranges of the feature populations must not differ per feature, but they must be
set uniformly for each submodality.
In summary, Cartesian vectors can be encoded by populations of neurons with
Gaussian responses that satisfy specific energy constraints and thus support
the development of balanced representations and the adaptive perceptual pro-
cesses. Vice versa, population encoded activity can be decoded by means of
trilateration to obtain the corresponding Cartesian stimuli, which is used in the
model evaluations to visualize them accordingly. This procedure is explained
in the following.
Decoding Population Encoded Stimuli
A population coded stimulus can be decoded by calculating the distance of the
stimulus to the center of the respective neurons and approximating the inter-
section of spheres with the respective radii that originate from the respective
centers (see Figure 5.8). Trilaterations can usually be solved in closed form. In
case of the proposed model, however, populations contain between 8 and 64
neurons, such that the solution is over-determined. Thus, an iterative, gradient-
based optimization process is used here for the multilateration problem (cf.
Sirola, 2010). Note that the following method is generic, thus, a standard nota-
tion is used with superscripts that do not refer to (sub)modalities of the network
but represent powers.
Generally, the distance da of a stimulus s to the center of a Gaussian tuned neu-
ron with index a as described before can be derived from its activation xa by
da(t) =
√
−2σ log (xa(t)(2piσ)D/2) (5.17)
where σ is the variance and D is the dimension of the center. Deriving the
stimulus directly is not possible. However, the stimulus can be approximated
iteratively by minimizing the deviation of the given stimulus distances da∀a
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FIGURE 5.8: Example for multilateration of a stimulus (2.8, 2.6)
encoded by a population of 4x4 Gaussian tuned cells with cen-
ters/tunings ci ∈ (1...4, 1...4). The color and size of the dots rep-
resents the level of activity of a locally tuned neuron. From these,
the distances di to the stimulus can be inferred, indicating that the
stimulus is expected to be placed on a corresponding circle around
the respective center (dashed lines). Here, the actual stimulus is
approximately in the intersection of the circles (red area). Gener-
ally, the stimulus can be approximated by iterative optimization
processes.
from the distance of a guessed stimulus s˜ to the respective centers ca∀a. This
results in the objective function E(τ) for minimization over sub-steps in time τ
E(τ) =
∑
a
1/2 (da(t)− ‖s˜(τ)− ca‖)2 (5.18)
The derivative of E with respect to the stimulus guess s˜ leads to the gradient
descent based iterative update rule
s˜(τ) = s˜(τ − 1) + η ·
∑
a
wa(t) · (da(t)− ‖s˜(τ)− ca‖) · (s˜(τ − 1)− ca) (5.19)
where η specifies the adaptation rate for the iterative optimization. wa weights
the influence of each neuron in the process. Strictly following the gradient re-
sults in wa = 1∀a. However, the influence of each neuron is set relative to its
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activation, such that neurons closer to the stimulus obtain a higher weight in the
optimization process. This approach is expedient since changes in the activity
of neurons distant to the stimulus result in much greater changes in the guessed
stimulus than changes in activity of neurons close to the stimulus. If, for exam-
ple, the population activity is influenced by i.i.d. noise or other imprecisions,
weighting by
wa(t) =
xa(t)
maxb xb(t)
(5.20)
results in an improvement of the approximation. Alternatively, the distance
could be used. Since learning algorithms typically prefers to eliminate high
errors in activations (i.e. neurons with high activity close to the stimulus) over
low errors (i.e. neurons with low activity far from the stimulus), weighting is
useful.
The last coordinate guess from time step t − 1 is used as initial guess for the
minimization. The minimization is complete when the gradient length ‖s˜(τ)‖
falls below a specified value that defines the precision of convergence, or when
τ exceeds a specific iteration limit. The precision has to be defined relative to
the expected range of the stimulus, which differs across the submodal types of
information.
Decoded stimuli are used in the evaluations to visualize the submodal Gestalt
perceptions that are expected by the model and come in the form of popula-
tion coded activity. Besides perspective-taking, these expectations also drive
the binding of input features into Gestalt percepts, which is described in the
following.
5.3.4 Visual Feature Binding
As described in Section 3.3, the binding problem concerns the selection and
integration of separate visual features in the correct combinations, which is as-
sumed to be related to attention (Treisman, 1998). Thus, for solving this prob-
lem, an approach is chosen that is comparable to directing attention selectively
to observed features that match expected relative positions and motion dynam-
ics, and by integrating these local features into a global Gestalt context. The
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model assumes that each bodily feature is processed by a specific neural pro-
cessing path, such that features observed in an arbitrary order have to be put
into the correct (or expected) order. Features that do not match the Gestalt con-
text have to be neglected. To do so, the model utilizes partially invariant top-
down expectations that come from the separate submodal encodings.
Both the selection of features relevant for the recognition of biological motion
as well as the assignment to the respective neural processing paths are handled
consistently by an adaptive, gated connectivity matrix from observed features i ∈
{1...N v} to bodily features j ∈ {1...M v}, M v ≤ N v, resulting in
p¨vj (t) =
Nv∑
i=1
wij(t) · p˙vi (t) (5.21)
d¨vj (t) =
Nv∑
i=1
wij(t) · d˙vi (t) (5.22)
m¨vj (t) =
Nv∑
i=1
wij(t) · m˙vi (t) (5.23)
where p¨vj , d¨vj , and m¨vj represent the population encoded activations of the j-th
assigned – or bodily – submodal feature in the position, motion direction and
motion magnitude domains respectively, p˙vi , d˙vi , m˙vi represent the according ac-
tivity of the i-th unassigned – or observed – submodal feature, and wij repre-
sents the corresponding assignment strength ∈ (0, 1). The assignment strength
is implemented by a non-linear neuron with logistic activation function, such
that
wij(t) =
1
1 + exp
(−wbij(t)) (5.24)
wherewbij is the activity of an adaptive bias neuron. The biases are adapted with
respect to the weighted error signals that originate from all submodal bodily
features, as also indicated in Figure 5.4:
wbij(t) = w
b
ij(t− 1)− ηw
∑
e∈Ew
∂e(t)
∂wbij(t)
+ γw[wbij(t− 1)− wbij(t− 2)] (5.25)
Ew = {βvp∆vp1...Mv(t), βvd∆vd1...Mv(t), βvm∆vm1...Mv(t)} (5.26)
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where γw is the momentum and ηw is the adaptation rate for the assignments.
The assignment biases wbii that map from the i-th observed feature to the i-th
bodily feature are initialized at 1000 without variance (resulting in wii → 1),
while all other assignments are initialized at -1000 without variance (resulting
in wii → 0) during training, since the assignment is assumed to be known to
the model during self-observation. During testing, all assignment biases are
initialized at -10 without variance, resulting in an initial, subtle mixture of all
possible assignments, since the assignment is unknown and to be inferred by
the model.
Obviously, neither the selection nor assignment are restricted to specific connec-
tivity patterns in this approach: One observed feature may be assigned to mul-
tiple bodily features and vice versa. Observed features may not get assigned
at all as well. Furthermore, the assignment can adopt continuous values be-
tween 0 and 1, such that also mixtures of assignments may occur. Interestingly,
as evaluated extensively in exploratory studies, none of these eventualities do
need further attention when using the population coding scheme described be-
fore. In fact, inconsistent assignments seem rather beneficial for the process of
binding observed features to embodied representations, as I will explain in the
following.
First, observed distractor features can be neglected by the model simply by not
assigning them to any bodily feature. This results in a selection of the features
that match the expected biological motion dynamics best. Second, when mul-
tiple observed features are assigned to a single bodily feature, the activities in
the respective bodily population is summed up and the respective stimuli are
maintained in parallel. Then, there are either multiple, distinct local activations
in the bodily population or overlapping activations. When the mentioned top-
down error signals are applied to adapt the assignment, however, only a single,
local activation is expected. Furthermore, a specific overall energy is expected
in the population. Thus, there is an implicit tendency to ’decide’ for only one of
the stimuli (the best matching one) by increasing its assignment weight, while at
the same time decreasing the weights of the others. The matching furthermore
considers the different submodalities: For example, two features may have the
same motion direction, but they are nonetheless disambiguated via the postural
differences. Analogously, features may be located at ambiguous positions that
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do not clearly reveal their identity, in which case the motion dynamics can de-
cide. As a result, the network will gradually infer the single association that best
matches the expected dynamics, while neglecting features that do not match
any of the expectations. In the process, the weight of a selected feature will
converge towards 1 to match the expected energy in the population, while all
other assignment weights converge towards 0. Note that it is also not possible
that the weighted sum of two different, population coded stimuli results in an
expected stimulus (in contrast to Cartesian encodings). Thus, there is no theo-
retical possibility that the algorithm will converge towards pseudo assignments
that consist of mixtures of observed features.
While the process of selection and assignment is applied to individual input
features even in hypothetical, parallel state, it is not possible to completely min-
imize the error with respect to the expectancy on this basis only. If the observed
perspective does not correspond the learned, egocentric perspective, the global
minimum of the error can only be minimized by adaptations of the global frame
of reference, handled by the herein before mentioned perspective-taking pro-
cesses (see Section 5.3.2), adapting all observed features in the same manner.
Thus, both processes have to be applied in parallel.
Clearly, however, there is a dependency of the two processes on each other.
Assuming that the correct rotation and translation have not been inferred so far,
it is difficult to test hypothetical associations against given expectations, since
in turn, these originate from a different (egocentric vs. allocentric) perspective.
Thus, there is a strong likelihood that none of the observed features is matching.
Moreover, the expectations initially come from the codes of higher layers that
are activated by the imperfect (non-rotated, non-translated, non-selected, non-
assigned) stimuli and are thus imperfect as well. To resolve this dependency,
the segregation of the inputs into different submodal perceptions that feature
different invariances to spatial transformations is crucial. For the magnitude of
coordinate motion, both rotation and translation do not play a role in a global
frame of reference. Thus, the magnitude expectations should provide the best
initial guess to drive the assignment of the features, improving the assignment
of the position and motion direction features likewise. The magnitude error is
not suited to provide signals for rotation and translation. Given a (preliminary)
assignment, however, there is a less arbitrary error signal for the rotation that
70 Chapter 5. A Neural Network Model of Action Understanding
comes from the expected motion directions, as well as an error signal for both
rotation and translation that comes from the expected posture, which finally
lead to overall convergence of the perceptual adaptation.
Note that the proposed sequence in which information is extracted and adap-
tations are applied in the network is carefully considered: Adaptations of the
assignment and selection have no influence on the submodal information de-
termined beforehand, i.e. they do not result in false perceptions of motion.
Likewise, the adaptation of the model’s rotation does not result in a perceived
magnitude of motion, while the translation has no influence on the direction
of motion. Thus, perceptual adaptation is not confused with actual point light
motion, which would interfere in the process.
All things considered, the perceptual adaptation and extraction of information
works on several specifically pre-structured, locally and globally complemen-
tary domains. It derives an embodied representation from observed features
by transforming global perspectives and establishing the corresponendes of se-
lected, single features to Gestalt-like configurations. Thus, self-representations
can be activated independent of the perspective on observed actions. In the
process, it is crucial to segregate and facilitate submodal types of information,
and learn expectations from them with different top-down predictive character-
istics. In the following, I will describe the development of embodied, spatially
and temporally predictive codes that provide suitable error signals for the solu-
tion to the correspondence and binding problems described here.
5.4 Predictive Coding and Embodied Simulation: A
Temporal Conditional Autoencoder
This stage of the model serves the purpose (i) to learn the embodied contingen-
cies of submodal perceptions in compressed, generative codes, (ii) learn tempo-
ral predictions of the submodal codes in dependency on other submodal codes
for embodied simulation, and (iii) to generate submodal Gestalt expectations
for perceptual inference by means of perspective-taking and feature-binding.
In the following, I introduce a temporal conditional autoencoder that serves
as the building block for encoding the six described visual and proprioceptive
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submodalities, which is shown in Figure 5.9. The autoencoders basically learn
compressed, spatially predictive codes of their inputs as described in Section
5.4.1, and temporally predictive codes from the developing spatial codes as de-
scribed in Section 5.4.2, which are modulated by top-down intention codes.
5.4.1 Spatial Representation
Each set of submodal body feature populations is joined into a submodal Gestalt
vector gX . That is, both the visual and proprioceptive modules provide sep-
arate Gestalt vectors for the positional / postural, and the respective motion
direction and motion magnitude submodalities. The features within each set
are concatenated in a specified order. As described in Section 5.3.4, the order in
which the body features are assigned from the observed features can be inferred
by adaptive, error-minimizing processes. I denote these Gestalt vectors
gvp(t) = (p¨v1(t), ..., p¨
v
Mv(t)) (5.27)
gvd(t) =
(
d¨v1(t), ..., d¨
v
Mv(t)
)
(5.28)
gvm(t) = (m¨v1(t), ..., m¨
v
Mv(t)) (5.29)
gpp(t) = (p¨p1(t), ..., p¨
p
Mp(t)) (5.30)
gpd(t) =
(
d¨p1(t), ..., d¨
p
Mp(t)
)
(5.31)
gpm(t) = (m¨p1(t), ..., m¨
p
Mp(t)) (5.32)
To learn distributed, predictive encodings of actions, each submodal Gestalt
perception is encoded separately by one spatially and temporally predictive,
generative autoencoder. Each autoencoder entails a code fusion vector fX , which
can be seen as a compressed, non-linear representation of a submodal Gestalt,
and which is the result of fusing temporal code predictions f˜X with spatial code
observations f˙X , based on a submodal stimulus reliability qX ∈ [0, 1]:
fX(t) = tanh
(
qX(t)f˙X(t) + (1− qX(t))f˜X(t) + bX(t)
)
(5.33)
X ∈ {vp, vd, vm, pp, pd, pm}
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FIGURE 5.9: Connectivity scheme of a submodal temporal conditional autoencoder
(here, in the visual posture submodality). The autoencoder learns compressed spa-
tial codes of submodal Gestalt perceptions that come in the form of grouped feature
population activity. It then learns temporal predictions of the codes by extract-
ing temporal features from a logarithmic history of activated spatial codes across
modalities, and by application of a top-down kinematic intention bias. Predicted
and observed codes can be fused based on presence and reliability of sensory stim-
uli. The autoencoder generates spatial and temporal prediction errors for learning
and perceptual adaptation.
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where bX is a trainable bias. The code observation is activated by the respec-
tively observed submodal Gestalt via a weight matrix OX :
f˙X(t) = OX(t)gX(t) (5.34)
To generate submodal Gestalt expectations, a Gestalt reconstruction g˜X that de-
codes the fused code vector via the transposed transformation
(
OX
)′ is obtained
via a rectified linear function
g˜X(t) = min
(
max
((
OX(t)
)′ · fX(t), 0) , uX) (5.35)
The autoencoders thus use tied or shared weights to reduce the parameter com-
plexity of the spatial encoder/decoder (cf. LeCun, 1989; LeCun et al., 1990),
meaning that the same weights are used for activation of the code observation
as well as the generation of input reconstructions. Since the reconstruction di-
rectly reflects scaled Gaussian activity as described in Section 5.3.3, the range of
the respective neural activity is limited to reflect the codomain of the respective
Gaussians, which is realized via the activity maximum uX of the rectified linear
units:
uX = ζX
( pi
2σX
)DX/2
(5.36)
To represent sensory contingencies and form submodal encodings for action
recognition, the code biases bx and tied activating and generative weights OX
are trained to minimize the reconstruction error with respect to the Gestalt in-
put which serves as target signal. The model assumes full sensory reliability
(qX = 1) during this spatial training procedure, such that the code fusions, as
well as the Gestalt reconstructions, are driven by the current perceptions only
and not by code predictions. The difference to the Gestalt reconstruction is back-
propagated over the transposed weights to the codes, as indicated in Figure 5.9.
Then, the objective for minimization is
∆X(t) = 1/2
∥∥gX(t)− g˜X(t)∥∥2 (5.37)
= {∆X1...MY (t)} (5.38)
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where Y is the respective modality. According to that, weights in OX are up-
dated according to the rule
oXij (τ) = o
X
ij (τ − 1)− ηXc
∂∆X(t)
∂oXij (t)
+ γXc[∂oXij (τ − 1)− ∂oXij (τ − 2)] (5.39)
where oXij is an element of OX , and γXc and ηXc are the respective momentum
and learning rates for spatial learning in autoencoders. Biases bX are updated
analogously. The spatial weights and code biases are initialized by a normal
distribution with mean 0.0 and variance 0.1.
A significant difference of this formulation to the gradient update rules for
adaptive network components should be noted: Weight updates for adapta-
tion are generally applied in the current time step t, whereas weight updates
for training are applied at random time steps τ ≥ t, that is, after a random delay.
The learning time step τ is obtained by the following, algorithmic approach:
Each trained weight in the network maintains a list of future updates with size
s ≤ Θ, where Θ is the temporal horizon for the application of learning gradi-
ents. At each time step t, the current gradient based update for the weight is
appended to the list. Instead of a direct application, however, a random ele-
ment of the list is chosen with a probability of s/Θ, or else no update is chosen.
Thus, the list will eventually reach the size Θ, and a random update is applied
at each time step after an expected delay of Θ time steps. A similar practice
was applied by Mnih et al., 2013. Here, it pursues the purpose of breaking
the temporal correlation between gradients to further decrease the problem of
recoding (like population coding) without having to shuffle the order of the in-
puts, which would violate the online learning criterion (see Chapter 5.2). When
applying gradient updates at random time steps, an immediate influence of the
update on subsequently activated codes is effectively circumvented.
Taken together, each autoencoder learns compressed, non-linear, spatial codes
via gradient descent on an error signal produced by itself, and thus the learning
algorithm can be considered to be unsupervised. Except for the non-linearities,
this procedure is comparable to finding the principle components of the Gestalt
stimuli, effectively finding representative factors for the data while reducing
the input dimensionality (cf. Jolliffe, 1986). In the process, the bias vector bX
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is supposed to approximate the average code over the training set, thus indi-
rectly representing a general, perceptual bias for a submodal Gestalt. The code
bias serves as input to the fused code, and thus biases both observed and pre-
dicted codes equally. For observations, it represents the best initial guess of a
code when no salient feature is currently assigned, or grouped into a Gestalt,
such that hardly any input from the Gestalt populations is forwarded to the
code observation. The bias is thus useful to obtain an instant expectation of the
currently observed stimulus, which can help to assign features and infer the
perspective concurrently. Conversely, if no bias would be present, there also
would be no driving signal for assigning features to the Gestalt perceptions,
since there would be no expectation error. Thus, learning such perceptual bi-
ases is of utmost importance.
While the deviations between submodal Gestalt stimuli and the respective
Gestalt reconstructions are propagated over the weights of the autoencoders
to learn compressed, generative codes, the same error signal is used for adap-
tation of the rotation, translation, and binding of visual features as shown in
Figure 5.4. To accomplish this, the errors are backpropagated not via the fused
codes, but directly over the Gestalt population, weighted by the factors βX , and
along the separate visual bodily feature populations, their inherent submodal
structures, and in consequence also weighted along the assigned, visually
observed features as described in Section 5.3.4. Direct propagation avoids that
the error signal is bottle-necked or distorted by the compressed code fX of the
autoencoder. Note that here, the reconstruction can be considered the target
instead of the input to an autoencoder, however resulting in the same quadratic
error signal for minimization, such that the perception is able to adapt to the
expected stimulus.
After separate spatial representations for the submodal sensory contingencies
have been learned, the autoencoders learn to predict the temporal progress of
the respective codes, which is described in the following.
5.4.2 Temporal Representation
Besides learning compressed, generative, spatial codes from the population en-
coded Gestalt stimuli, the autoencoders also learn temporal representations that
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predict the progress of the developing codes, and – indirectly via the generative
weights – can also predict the progress of the multimodal Gestalt stimuli. To this
end, the overall network architecture develops predictive attractors in the dis-
tributed submodal encodings that also drive and incorporate action intentions
as argued in Section 2.2.3. The predictive structures are essentially established
via recurrent, bi-directional connectivity between the autoencoders and the in-
tention module: Each submodal autoencoder predicts the progress of its own
fused codes from recently activated codes within the submodality, as well as re-
cently activated codes of other submodal autoencoders, while the prediction is
being biased by the continuous inference of an action class as will be described
in Section 5.5. Biasing via the class follows the purpose to determine the acti-
vated attractor and to resolve ambiguities in the predictions such that different
action types can be simulated consistently, considering that the submodal codes
for all actions are encoded in the same structures. Simulation here refers to the
reenactment of learned embodied codes. These distributed, submodal simula-
tions are partially self-preserving, and partially influenced by the crossmodular
connectivity. As a result, simulation goes beyond a simple, static mapping from
visual to proprioceptive stimuli and vice versa. Rather, the method establishes
consistency over time between distributed modal and submodal domains that
mutually synchronize their activity until an overall consistent, learned attractor
is reached.
Furthermore, by setting the submodal stimulus reliabilities qX accordingly,
the network obtains the capability of selectively triggering modal simulations
which are constantly biased or temporarily primed by observations and rely on
the learned embodied codes. The simulation concerns several aspects: Maybe
most importantly in the context of action understanding, it enables to infer
or imagine the progress of proprioceptive sensations in terms of whole body
posture, motion directions, and motion magnitudes when observing actions
visually, while at the same time inferring the type of action as part of the
distributed simulation. The same principle of embodied simulation also results
in the networks ability to simulate consistent whole-body motion in the visual,
proprioceptive, and intention domains without any sensory stimulus. Thus, the
method shows how predictive encodings yield inference as well as simulation
capabilities that can be flexibly adapted and used in multiple directions.
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The predictive mechanism applied here assumes that a specific time window
of the recently activated spatial codes, together with a constant action bias,
is sufficient for predicting the next code in each submodality. Thus, each au-
toencoder learns a non-linear transformation from a logarithmic history of a set
of submodal fused codes (including its own codes) to identify temporal features
which are suitable for prediction. Similar to relevance of the submodal encod-
ings for perceptual inference, the submodal encodings feature different predic-
tive characteristics also with respect to the lateral inference of submodal codes.
The logarithmic code history h serves as lateral input to each autoencoder (ad-
ditional to the bottom-up input from the Gestalt populations) and is set up by
the following tuple-builder notation:
h(t) =
(∑2i−1
d=2i−1 f
X(t− d)
2i−1
| i ∈ {1, ..., θ}, X ∈ {vp, vd, vm, pp, pd, pm}
)
(5.40)
where θ parameterizes the temporal horizon for the prediction of submodal
codes. For example, θ = 3 results in the code history vector
h(t) =
(
fvp(t− 1);
∑3
d=2 f
vp(t− d)
2
;
∑7
d=4 f
vp(t− d)
4
fvd(t− 1);
∑3
d=2 f
vd(t− d)
2
;
∑7
d=4 f
vd(t− d)
4
...
fpm(t− 1);
∑3
d=2 f
pm(t− d)
2
;
∑7
d=4 f
pm(t− d)
4
)
The approach essentially averages the last codes that were activated in expo-
nentially (in this case to base 2) increasing time windows. Thus, past submodal
information can be preserved with decreasing precision without having to con-
sider each of the time steps separately (cf. Oord et al., 2016). Figure 5.10 quali-
tatively describes the information that the logarithmic history extracts from the
codes. Note that possibly not all of the submodalities carry relevant informa-
tion for the prediction of other modalities, thus the set of used submodalities
can be restricted a priori, which is however not done here. Here, a learning al-
gorithm is raised to identify the indicative temporal features within the set of all
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FIGURE 5.10: Comparison between the history of activated spatial
codes in an autoencoder (A) and their logarithmic representation
(B) that serves as lateral input to an autoencoder at each time step.
The activity is color coded, ranging from 0 (blue) to 1 (yellow). In
the logarithmic representation, exponential time windows of the
codes are averaged, such that the autoencoder receives a short his-
tory (here, six inputs for θ = 6) of the recently activated codes
(gathered over 63 time steps) with decreasing precision backwards
in time.
embodied submodal codes. Thus, the code history inputs to all autoencoders
are identical.
For learning temporal predictions, the logarithmic code history is transformed
non-linearly to a temporal feature vector kX via a transformation matrix PX .
Furthermore, the temporal features are basically biased by a top-down action
class vector i, provided by the intention module, via a transformation matrix
QX . The intention bias comes as a result of classifications of submodal codes
as described in the next chapter. The top-down influence of the action class
is stabilized by low-pass filtering. Since the (partially) predicted codes may
determine the predicted class itself in the long run, this avoids that the network
fluctuates quickly between different classes. Formally, this results in
kX(t) = tanh
(
PX(t)h(t) +QX(t)i(t)
)
(5.41)
i(t) = κi(t− 1) + (1− κ)i(t) (5.42)
X ∈ {vp, vd, vm, pp, pd, pm} (5.43)
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where κ is the intention dynamics parameter (slow dynamics for κ→ 1), and i is
the current intention inference of the model. The transformation from logarith-
mic codes to biased temporal features is expected to extract meaningful hidden
states for the code prediction f˜X in the local submodality X , while the trans-
formation from the class provides slow dynamic biases. The resulting hidden
features are transformed again via a linear transformation SX to yield the code
prediction
f˜X(t) = SX(t)kX(t) (5.44)
Altogether, the connectivity of the predictive component of each autoencoder is
comparable to a multilayer perceptron with specific input properties.
The involved transformation matrices are learned while the model is driven by
self-perceptions with full sensory certainty (qX = 1). Thus, the activated fused
codes stem from the bottom-up perceptions alone, and they are not influenced
by the current prediction. Given a predicted code f˜X and an observed code f˙X ,
an error signal ∆Xp is constructed that is backpropagated over, and used to train
the weight matrices PX , QX , and SX :
∆Xp(t) = 1/2
∥∥∥f˜X(t)− f˙X(t)∥∥∥2 (5.45)
pXij (τ) = p
X
ij (τ − 1)− ηXp
∂∆Xp(t)
∂pXij (t)
+ γXp[pXij (τ − 1)− pXij (τ − 2)] (5.46)
qXij (τ) = q
X
ij (τ − 1)− ξηXp
∂∆Xp(t)
∂qXij (t)
+ γXp[qXij (τ − 1)− qXij (τ − 2)] (5.47)
sXij (τ) = s
X
ij (τ − 1)− ηXp
∂∆Xp(t)
∂sXij (t)
+ γXp[sXij (τ − 1)− sXij (τ − 2)] (5.48)
where pXij ∈ PX , qXij ∈ QX , sXij ∈ SX , ηX is the learning rate for code predictions
and γXp is the respective momentum. Again, gradients for individual weights
are applied after random delays. All respective weights are initialized by a
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.1.
As explained, the learning rule identifies predictive temporal features from all
learned codes and the classes. Given that the codes can be predicted also with-
out considering the class, it is not guaranteed that the model will use the class
during learning, particularly considering that the class dimensionality is much
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lower than the logarithmic code history dimensionality. To avoid that the model
loses its capability to bias the prediction given a class, a multiplier ξ is applied
to the learning rate of the class biases. Given that ξ > 1, the learning algorithm
will prefer to use the class over the last codes for the minimization of code pre-
diction errors.
Predicting the codes instead of the input stimulus effectively reduces the num-
ber of free parameters, and still the corresponding input stimuli can be inferred
via the generative weights (OX)′ from the code fusion vector fX . In contrast to
Long-Short-Term-Memories (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997), which spec-
ify the temporal horizon implicitly by unfolding the network a specific number
of steps through time, this approach explicitly defines the temporal horizon.
Note that here, no recurrences or delays have to be resolved for training the pre-
diction mechanisms, since the error signals are not propagated (through time)
across the autoencoders.
However, the predictive connectivity scheme results in feed-forward recur-
rences on multiple, hierarchical levels. First, there is a submodal recurrence
inside of each autoencoder, such that the last activated codes influence the
currently predicted codes locally, offering the possibility to learn self-consistent
simulations of submodal codes. Second, there are lateral recurrences across
submodalities, for example, from the visual motion direction autoencoder
to the visual posture autoencoder. Applying crossmodal predictions in this
manner effectively reduces the problem that predictions could get stuck,
because they induce implicit causal dependencies in the predictions. Without
these intramodal recurrences, predictions could stagnate when a code is
activated for a longer period of time: As a descriptive example, a limb may
move into one direction for a longer time before it changes its direction rather
abruptly, making it hard to predict the actual turning point of the limb solely
from the history of motion direction codes. The current posture, however, is
constantly changing, and can finally indicate a change in the motion direction
at a certain position. Third, there are lateral, crossmodal recurrences from the
visual module to the proprioceptive module and vice versa, which implement
crossmodal, causal inferences in a similar manner. Fourth and last, there is
a recurrent, top-down influence of the action intention. The action intention
is activated by the (simulated or observed) codes themselves, and in turn
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FIGURE 5.11: The temporal action classifier of the model. Again,
a logarithmic time window of all submodal spatial codes is used
fro classification. The module generates recurrent top-down ac-
tion class inferences that bias the simulation of submodal codes.
Apart from the input representation, the approach is technically
equivalent to a multilayer perception.
influences the submodal code predictions in subsequent time steps. How these
motion intentions are learned is described in the following.
5.5 Action Inference and Top-down Biasing: A Tem-
poral Classifier
The submodal spatial Gestalt codes are classified by the top-most module of the
network, which in turn biases the prediction of submodal codes. Here, the task
of the module is to identify the kinematic intention from the observed or sim-
ulated codes. To some extent, this can be compared to frontal encodings of the
mirror neuron system (see Section 2.2.3). Analogously, however, the module
could also infer other properties of the observed action like for example emo-
tional states.
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The classifier network is shown in Figure 5.11. Analogously to the prediction of
codes in the autoencoders, first, non-linear temporal features are extracted from
the logarithmic history of activated submodal codes via a matrix U
kc(t) = tanh (U(t)h(t)) (5.49)
The resulting features are then again mapped non-linearly via a matrix V onto
the class or intention i:
i(t) =
1
1 + exp (V (t)kc(t))
(5.50)
The dimension of the intention vector reflects the number of classes observed
during training, and each neuron’s activity ∈ (0, 1) represents the recognition
of a class respectively. Note that the class is not low-pass filtered here (but in
the autoencoders), such that a precise momentary error signal can be obtained
for training. The parameters of the classifier are learned in analogy to the code
predictions:
∆c(t) = 1/2
∥∥∥˜i(t)− i(t)∥∥∥2 (5.51)
uij(τ) = uij(τ − 1)− ηi∂∆
c(t)
∂uij(t)
+ γi[uij(τ − 1)− uij(τ − 2)] (5.52)
vij(τ) = vij(τ − 1)− ηi∂∆
c(t)
∂vij(t)
+ γi[vij(τ − 1)− vij(τ − 2)] (5.53)
where uij ∈ U , vij ∈ V , ηi is the learning rate and γi is the momentum. In con-
trast to all other learning and adapting parameters, the classes are supervised
by a teaching signal i˜ which provides the currently observed motion class to the
model during training.
When the classifier has been completely trained, it can for example detect postu-
ral features, or sequences of directional motion indirectly via the Gestalt codes
to infer the type of action. Depending on which stimulus modalities are avail-
able, this class can also help to infer one modality from another by biasing the
predictions in the respective autoencoders, or it can be used bias all predictions
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for simulation of a particular action when no stimulus is available. Thus, the in-
tention module can be seen as providing the driving signal that activates mul-
timodal, embodied, intention-specific simulations. Amongst others, the top-
down influence of the classes on the code predictions is evaluated in the exper-
iments, which are introduced in the following.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Results
In the following chapters, I will evaluate the proposed action understanding
model in several respects. First, I will introduce the properties and format of
the motion capture stimuli used for the model evaluations in Section 6.1. I will
continue with explaining the topological parameters of the network in Section
6.2. The subsequent chapters concern the learning performance of the different
network components, as well as the validation of the learned encodings and
adaptive components in several scenarios. In this approach, learning and ac-
tion observation are consecutive, assuming complete information during learn-
ing, and incomplete as well as imperfect information during observation. The
procedure for training the network is set forth in Section 6.3. I evaluate how
spatial generative submodal codes are learned from self-perceptions in Section
6.3.1, how temporal code predictions are learned subsequently in Section 6.3.2,
and how in parallel the classification of action types develops from the codes in
Section 6.3.3. In the following action understanding experiments, first I will sys-
tematically evaluate the visuo-spatial and perceptual inference abilities of the
network in Section 6.4. Then, I will show how the model is able to selectively
infer and simulate submodal perceptions and intention codes to understand
observed actions in 6.5. Section 6.6 demonstrates the embodied simulation ca-
pabilities of the network and shows how self-sustaining, multimodal simula-
tions can be primed by observations or imagined selectively without sensory
stimulation given a constant top-down bias. Finally, in Section 6.7, the model is
evaluated when facing completely new actions, and in tracking their orientation
over time.
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Walking: Running: Basketball:
FIGURE 6.1: Example snapshots of the stimuli used for training
and testing the model. Three short and idealized motion captures
are used for training, while altogether 15 long and more complex
captures are used for testing.
6.1 Experiment Stimuli
The model is evaluated on the basis of motion captures of the Carnegie Mellon
University (CMU) Graphics Lab Motion Capture (MoCap) Database1. The CMU
database was chosen since it is one of the most prominent public motion capture
databases, and thus a number of tools is available and the results of this thesis
may potentially be compared to other approaches. Furthermore, most other
databases are less comprehensive, or focus on the emotional properties of an
actor, social interactions, or similar.
The CMU motion tracking data was recorded with 12 high-resolution infra-red
cameras at 120 Hz using 41 tracking markers attached to human subjects. Each
of the tracking markers provided a 3D bodily landmark position, which was
then mapped to a skeleton template that defines limb lengths and a limb hierar-
chy. For the evaluations in this thesis, the recorded 3D landmark positions of all
subjects were matched to a simplified version (several bones were manually re-
moved) of the skeleton of subject 9, such that limb lengths of all motion capture
recordings were normalized. However, skeletal normalization is not strictly
necessary for the model since it partially applies information that is invariant
1see http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/ as of 08.01.2018
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to variances in body morphology (cf. Schrodt and Butz, 2014). The implemen-
tation for reading out, processing, and displaying the motion capture data was
based on AMC-Viewer by Jim McCann2.
TABLE 6.1: CMU MoCap database trials chosen for training and
testing the action understanding model.
Subject Trial Length (time steps) Description
Training
35 7 reduced to 260 walking
9 3 reduced to 92 running
6 2 reduced to 115 basketball dribble, right-handed
Testing 1 (similar)
5 1 598 walking
6 1 494 walking
10 4 549 walking
12 1 523 walking
2 3 173 running
16 46 136 running
35 19 160 running
35 22 167 running
6 2 721 basketball dribble, right-handed
6 3 527 basketball dribble, right-handed
6 4 396 basketball dribble, left-handed
6 5 385 basketball dribble, right-handed
Testing 2 (dissimilar)
55 2 2180 Lambada dance
49 3 1504 Jumping up and down
40 11 6020 Waiting for the bus
Recordings from subjects performing three different movements (walking, run-
ning and basketball dribbling) were utilized for training, as exemplified in Fig-
ure 6.1. These types of movements have been selected for training and most
of the evaluations for several reasons: As explained before, this thesis does not
consider action goals or modal end states, but rather continuous, kinematic ac-
tions, and consequently, continuous, cyclic motion captures were used. Only a
handful of the motion captures in the CMU database are loopable straightfor-
ward, including the selected ones. Furthermore, although the CMU database
provides numerous different actions and respective descriptions for them, there
are only a few, cyclic actions classes for which multiple comparable examples,
2see http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jmccann/ as of 08.01.2018
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performed by multiple actors exist. There is also no annotation but only descrip-
tions of the trials themselves, and variances across trials with similar descrip-
tion are partially substantial. Nonetheless, the choice of data allowed to train
the model on a single, presumably typical trial per action class, and to validate
the learned encodings given a number of trials obtained from other subjects.
The exact selection of all trials and subjects from the CMU database can be seen
in Table 6.1. As shown, 467 frames (3.9 seconds) of training data faced 4829
frames (40.2 seconds) of test data in the same classes, and beyond that, 9704
frames (80.9 seconds) of test data in other classes in the experiments, resulting
in a ratio of 1:31.12. While typically, neural networks are trained on relatively
extensive training sets, and validated on smaller test sets, the idea behind the
approach pursued here is to replicate the typically greater variance of poten-
tially observable movements in comparison to the personally executable move-
ments in real world situations.
The type description of a movement trial provides the target signal i˜ for learn-
ing the classification. For training, a short episode of each trial was selected and
manually edited to form a continuous cycle. Thus, the model was able to learn
cyclic action attractors without terminal state. Four other trials of each class re-
mained untouched and served as similar (same class) testing and validation set
for the model. Where possible, the test trials were performed by other subjects
than the training trials. For basketball trials, only one subject was available in
the database. However, the trials of the same subject differ significantly in this
case. For example, one of the basketball dribblings was performed left-handed,
while the others were performed right-handed. Additionally, a lambada danc-
ing trial, a jumping trial, as well as a waiting-for-the-bus trial were selected for
evaluation of the model during the observation of dissimilar movements. These
trials are used exclusively in the last experiment in Section 6.7 to evaluate the
model’s capability to understand unknown actions.
Every second frame of a trial was used as input to the model while starting
with a random (odd or even) frame number, effectively splitting up and dou-
bling the data by parity. From the 30 limbs provided by the skeleton template,
M v = 15 starting- or end-point positions were selected as visual inputs, while
Mp = 16 limb orientations were selected as proprioceptive inputs, as shown in
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Visual input: 
15 landmark positions
 head
 left / right shoulder
 neck
 lower thorax
 left / right hand
 left / right elbow
 left / right hip joint
 left / right knee joint
 left / right ankle
   global reference frame
Proprioceptive input: 
16 limb orientations
lower neck, upper neck,   
head   
left / right clavicle   
left / right upper arm   
thorax   
left / right lower arm   
left / right hip bone   
left / right upper leg   
left / rigt lower leg   
local reference frames   
FIGURE 6.2: An overview of visual and proprioceptive inputs to
the model. Visual inputs represent 3D bodily landmark positions
(and possibly distractor coordinates) in a global frame of reference
provided by the lower thorax. Proprioceptive inputs correspond
to 3D orientations of limbs in a local frame of reference provided by
the predecessor in the body hierarchy. In the experiments, 15 vi-
sual inputs as well as 16 proprioceptive inputs have been selected
manually from the data.
Figure 6.2. In the selected data and its interpretation, subjects move on the x-z-
plane (ground) into z direction, while y is directed upwards and x is directed to
the right of the actor’s movement direction. Visual inputs to the model were
adjusted for the per-frame x-z-coordinate, as well as the average y-coordinate
of the skeleton’s root (i.e. lower thorax). As a consequence, the model did
not observe locomotion on the floor, but it did observe ground-relative up-
wards/downwards dynamics of all bodily landmarks. The orientation of the
visual inputs remained untouched. Proprioceptive inputs are relative to their
local predecessor in the body hierarchy and thus their coordinates were not al-
tered altogether. Finally, all inputs to the network were exponentially smoothed
(with a smoothing factor of 0.9) to account for noise in the recorded positions,
and to extrapolate transitions between movement trials presented in succession.
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The visual inputs can potentially be transformed globally via a rotation offset
matrix Adata, and a translation offset vector bdata. Furthermore, the visual fea-
tures can potentially be provided in arbitrary order to test the adaptive feature
binding capabilities of the network. As well, an arbitrary number of distractors
can be added to the inputs. Proprioceptive features are not transformed, per-
muted, or filled up with distractors. They are either fully available (e.g. during
training), or completely absent to test the simulation capabilities of the model.
In the following, I will specify the topological parameters of the network chosen
for the experiments.
6.2 Topological Network Parameters
All of the results in this thesis were obtained using networks with the same ar-
chitectural parameters, which are shown in Table 6.2, and which are explained
in the following. Parameters that refer to the adaptive perceptual and learning
components, the sensation of specific modalities, or teacher signals are men-
tioned separately. If not stated otherwise, evaluations are generic and refer to a
single network instance that highlights the learning and perceptual character-
istics of the network in an appropriate way. The replicability of these results
was confirmed using multiple networks. Furthermore, statistics of multiple,
independently trained network instances are raised.
The visual pathway of the network is configured to process up to 30 global 3D
input coordinates, thus consisting of 30 of the visual processing paths shown
in Figure 5.4 from Section 5.3. 15 of the input features come from the selected
bodily features defined above. The others are either disabled or filled up with
distractor features, depending on the experiment. The neural information ex-
traction of each visual feature path results in three populations for the position,
motion direction and motion magnitude of the respective coordinate. Follow-
ing the specification of the motion capture inputs, the proprioceptive pathway
is configured to receive 16 local 3D orientations of body limbs as defined in the
last section.
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5.3.3, methods are applied to avoid catas-
trophic forgetting of motion encodings during training. Discontinuities are
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TABLE 6.2: Architectural parameters chosen for the experiments.
Parameter Description
N v = 30 Maximum number of visual inputs
M v = 15 Number of visual bodily features
Np = 16 Number of proprioceptive features
64 Dimension of visual coordinate populations
27 Dimension of visual motion direction populations
8 Dimension of visual motion magn. populations
27 Dimension of proprioceptive posture populations
27 Dimension of proprioceptive motion direction populations
8 Dimension of proprioceptive motion magn. populations
ζvp = 0.2 Continuity of visual coordinate populations
ζvd = 1 Continuity of visual motion direction populations
ζvm = 0.3 Continuity of visual motion magn. populations
ζpp = 0.5 Continuity of proprioceptive posture populations
ζpd = 1 Continuity of proprioceptive motion direction populations
ζpm = 0.3 Continuity of proprioceptive motion magn. populations
[−103.6, 71.4] Stimuli range of visual coordinate population (cm)
[−1, 1] Stimuli range of visual motion direction population
[0, 6.16] Stimuli range of visual motion magn. population (cm)
[−1, 1] Stimuli range of proprioceptive posture population
[−1, 1] Stimuli range of proprioceptive motion direction population
[0, 0.29] Stimuli range of proprioceptive motion magn. population
40 Dimension of spatial codes
40 Dimension of temporal code features
θ = 6 Temporal horizon for logarithmic code history
o = 0.01 Motion direction recognition threshold
induced in the autoencoders’ inputs by specifically parameterized population
coding. Particularly in the domain of visual positional inputs, the difference be-
tween coordinates of two consecutive time steps is rather marginal, and the con-
figuration space of each single feature is typically limited to a small subspace of
the range covered by the representing population, resulting in even less discon-
tinuity. By contrast, the motion direction and magnitude entail some intrinsic
discontinuities (e.g. the direction of arm and leg motion is changing suddenly
at extreme postures). Accordingly, the resolutions and continuity factors of sub-
modal populations are set up to support discontinuity and nonetheless main-
tain the precision of the encoded information: Visual coordinate populations
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are configured to contain 64 neurons (4 centers on each dimension) with a con-
tinuity factor of 0.2, while proprioceptive limb orientation populations contain
27 neurons (3 per dimension) with a continuity of 0.5. All directional motion
populations are configured to contain 27 neurons and a continuity factor of 1.
The centers of all populations representing limb orientations or motion direc-
tions were projected to unit spheres to cover the input space optimally. One
dimensional magnitude populations are configured to contain 8 neurons with a
continuity factor of 0.3.
The ranges over which the centers of the respective submodal and feature spe-
cific population neurons were distributed were determined heuristically ac-
cording to the motion capture data and the applied skeleton. In particular,
the visual receptive field was set to cover just about the height of the modi-
fied skeleton in arbitrary orientations, resulting in 175 cm3, and the perceived
motion magnitude of visual features was limited to 6.16 cm per time step, which
equals about 3.7 m/s.
The precision with which spatial codes and temporal code predictions can be
learned also depends on the dimensionality of the representing layers. For all
experiments in this thesis, all spatial codes as well as the temporal features ex-
tracted from them (in the autoencoders as well as the classifier network) were
configured to be 40 dimensional. The temporal features were extracted from a
logarithmic code history with θ = 6, taking into account the last 63 time steps.
How networks that use these topological parameters are trained is detailed in
the following.
6.3 Training Evaluations
The goal of the training procedure is (i) to develop generative spatial encodings
of embodied, visual and proprioceptive self-representations of actions, (ii) to
learn distinctions in the identity of the actions, and (iii) to form stable, predictive
attractors of multimodal state sequences for the encountered actions that allow
for inferences and embodied simulations.
Training is embodied in the sense that the model has unobstructed access to
visual and proprioceptive information, meaning that proprioceptive stimuli are
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TABLE 6.3: Setup of the network components during embodied
training.
Parameter Description
ηs = 0 Adaptation rate of the origin of the visual FOR
γs = 0 Momentum of the adaptation of the origin
ηr = 0 Adaptation rate of the orientation of the visual FOR
γr = 0 Momentum of the adaptation of the orientation
ηw = 0 Adaptation rate of the feature selection and assignment
γw = 0 Momentum of the feature selection and assignment
bdata = egocentric Data translation offset
Adata = egocentric Data rotation offset
wij = provided Feature binding weights
i˜ = provided Classification target
κ = 0.9 Intention dynamics parameter
qvp/d/m = 1 Visual stimulus reliabilities
qpp/d/m = 1 Proprioceptive stimulus reliabilities
Θ = 1500 Horizon for applying learning weight updates
available, and that visual stimuli are perceived from an egocentric view point
(i.e. bdata and Adata are neutral elements with respect to the reference frame of
the motion capture data). Consequently, the adaptation of the model’s internal
visual frame of reference is disabled during training. Analogously, the model
has full access to the identity and grouping of the visually perceived features
(represented by the feature binding weights wij). Thus, the adaptive feature
binding is disabled as well. The training procedure furthermore assumes that
intention states are available during self-observation and learning. The relevant
model parameters for the overall training procedure are shown in Table 6.3.
As explained in Chapter 5.4.2, the classification of actions as well as the predic-
tion of their progress is based on the learned spatial Gestalt codes. That is, if
the weights that represent Gestalt codes are modified during training, also the
weights that represent predictions and classifications would have to be modi-
fied, since their target mapping is changing. To avoid that these aspects inter-
fere, training is subdivided into two phases: In the first training phase, spatial
codes are learned from visual and proprioceptive inputs. This phase is eval-
uated in Chapter 6.3.1. In the second phase, the network learns attractor state
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sequences as well as classifications from the learned spatial codes, which is eval-
uated in Chapters 6.3.2 and 6.3.3, respectively. Specific parameters for these
phases of training are detailed separately in the following evaluations.
6.3.1 Embodied Learning of Submodal Spatial Codes
TABLE 6.4: Parameters for learning and adaptation chosen for spa-
tial training.
Parameter Description
ηvpc = 0.0005 Learning rate of visual posture codes
ηvdc = 0.001 Learning rate of visual motion direction codes
ηvmc = 0.01 Learning rate of visual motion magnitude codes
ηppc = 0.0005 Learning rate of proprioceptive posture codes
ηpdc = 0.0005 Learning rate of proprioceptive motion direction codes
ηpmc = 0.0005 Learning rate of proprioceptive motion magnitude codes
γXc = 0.9 Momentum of learning spatial codes
ηXp = 0 Learning rate of temporal code predictions
γXp = 0 Momentum of learning temporal code predictions
ξ = 5 Learning rate multiplier for class biasing
ηi = 0 Learning rate of spatial code classifications
γi = 0 Momentum of learning spatial code classifications
In this experiment phase, spatial Gestalt codes in the six submodalities are
learned by adapting the weight matrices OX (see Figure 5.9 from Section 5.4.1)
based on the reconstruction errors in the respective autoencoder modules. No
error signals are propagated between the autoencoders, such that the codes de-
velop independently from each other, yet representing different aspects of the
same data. Table 6.4 shows an overview of the parameters chosen for this phase
of training. Learning rates and momentum were determined heuristically, tak-
ing into account the different continuities of the submodal encodings. As shown
in the table, the learning of temporal predictions and motion classes is disabled.
Each of the three training trials is presented to the model for 500 consecutive
time steps, starting at a random time step of the respective trial. The move-
ments are presented in fixed order, and including random, approximated tran-
sitions between them. Altogether, each of the 3 training movements is shown
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100 times, resulting in 150000 time steps of spatial training. After the train-
ing procedures, all training and test trials are presented to the model without
weight updates to test for generalization and recoding.
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show that the Gestalt reconstruction errors ∆X for all
submodal autoencoders (X ∈ {vp,vd,vm,pp,pd,pm}) gradually decreased
during spatial training. As also shown in the figures, the network did not tend
to recoding, as the average error of a trial during training was comparable to the
average error of the same trial when learning was disabled. Similarly, the net-
work did not tend to strong overfitting to the training set, as the errors between
training and test trials were sufficiently comparable. Furthermore, the error
signals were comparable across the different types of movements and differ-
ent network instances. However, the reconstruction errors of the autoencoders
converged to somewhat different absolute levels in comparison across the sub-
modalities. Nonetheless, the developing encodings seem sufficiently balanced,
and, for perceptual adaptations, differences in error levels can be compensated
by error weighting, as described in Section 5.3.
Figure 6.5 shows a qualitative evaluation of the learning progress: Each sub-
modal autoencoder first quickly learns to reconstruct an average over time of
its population encoded inputs. In this early phase of training, changes in the
reconstructed population activity mostly represent adaptations of this average,
rather than different parts of the observed actions. Thus, it can be said that each
autoencoder first learns only a single code. For a clearer and more comprehen-
sive visualization of the model’s expectations, a body display can be decoded
from the proprioceptive submodal population activity reconstructions, and a
point light display can be decoded from the visual reconstructions (see Section
5.3.3), which was done for Figure 6.6. Consistently, using the underdeveloped
model expectations, hardly any rhythmic motion can be seen in the body and
point light displays. In fact, motion is again predominantly the result of changes
in the learned average of visual and proprioceptive body postures, motion di-
rections, and motion magnitudes for the three movement classes trained on.
Interestingly, as exploratory evaluations revealed, these average expectations
are already sufficient to bootstrap perspective-taking to a certain degree. They
are approximately represented by the code layers’ biases bX , which represent
submodal, general action templates.
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Visual posture submodality:
Visual motion direction submodality:
Visual motion magnitude submodality:
FIGURE 6.3: Visual spatial reconstruction errors of posture, direction, and magni-
tude Gestalt perceptions for the three different actions during training. The results
were obtained by averaging over four independently trained network instances.
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Proprioceptive posture submodality:
Proprioceptive motion direction submodality:
Proprioceptive motion magnitude submodality:
FIGURE 6.4: Proprioceptive spatial reconstruction errors of posture, direction, and
magnitude Gestalt perceptions for the three different actions during training. The
results were obtained by averaging over four independently trained network in-
stances.
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FIGURE 6.5: Qualitative comparison between a population encoded stimulus, a
rudimentarily trained stimulus reconstruction, and a fully trained stimulus recon-
struction. The plots show an example of the color coded activity of a single, pro-
prioceptive, postural feature population over 200 time steps.
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Training stimuli:
V P V P V P
Underdeveloped model expectations:
V P V P V P
Fully developed model expectations:
V P V P V P
FIGURE 6.6: Qualitative comparison between visual (V) and proprioceptive (P)
stimulus displays (first row), rudimentarily trained reconstruction displays (sec-
ond row), and fully trained reconstruction displays (third row). The plot shows
the average stimulus/expectation of body postures (point-lights for V and stick
figures for P) and feature motion (indicated by lines and their length). The pro-
vided/inferred motion class is color coded in the stick figures (red for walking,
green for running, and blue for basketball). No classes have been learned for the
underdeveloped expectations (thus gray stick figures), which represent average
submodal perceptions. Fully developed expectations encode the class as well as
cyclic body motion.
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Later during training, deviations from the average input push the model to-
wards developing distinct codes for the segments of the movements. This is
particularly hard for the model in the postural modalities, where deviations
from the average are relatively marginal in terms of population encoded activ-
ity. Since the code layer of an autoencoder learns codes for all of the features
jointly, discontinuities in a single feature input have an influence on learning the
reconstruction of other features. This mutual influence can be seen as a positive
effect for several reasons. For example, when the (cyclic) movement of multi-
ple bodily features is correlated, but only one of them deviates strongly from the
average, learning distinct codes is driven mainly by this feature. However, once
distinct codes are developed, they can more easily incorporate the slight vari-
abilities of correlated features. In a similar manner, the above effect applies also
to learning multiple movement classes in the same code layer. In exploratory
experiments, spatial training on three movements was more accurate than train-
ing on a single movement, given the same training time per class. Thus, corre-
lations between features and action classes result in accelerated training.
Furthermore, learning whole-body Gestalt codes has advantages for robust
recognition: Given that for example the observed upper body is recognized
precisely, but the observed lower body is not represented in the code manifold,
the best matching code is activated nonetheless, effectively interpreting or
complementing (in the case of missing features) the observation by means
of the embodied experiences. However, since codes are activated by a linear
combination of weight vectors that stem from the individual features, the
codes can also potentially recognize (and generate) actions not seen during
training to a certain degree by combining the weight vectors accordingly. Taken
together, the linear combination and dimensionality reduction of submodal
feature vectors into non-linear, whole-body Gestalt codes provides recognition
robustness, as well as generalization to a certain extent.
In conclusion, the network was able to learn balanced spatial encodings for
three complex, cyclic, whole body movements in multiple distributed, modal
and submodal domains. Typical problems in online training of autoencoders
are circumvented by the proposed training mechanisms. The learned spatial
codes provide suitable perceptual biases for action recognition. Furthermore,
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the codes are generative in that they can be used to construct momentary ex-
pectations that cover the complete input manifold seen during training. The
codes, however, do not incorporate temporal dependencies, nor are they suit-
able for crossmodal inference and synchronization of the separate submodali-
ties to infer or simulate consistent, multimodal expectations over time. In the
following chapter, the learning of temporally predictive codes will be described
and evaluated.
6.3.2 Embodied Learning of Temporal Predictive Encodings
TABLE 6.5: Parameters for learning and adaptation chosen for
temporal training.
Parameter Description
ηXc = 0 Learning rate of visual/proprioceptive Gestalt codes
γXc = 0 Momentum of learning spatial codes
ηvpp = 0.0001 Learning rate of visual posture code predictions
ηvdp = 0.0001 Learning rate of visual motion dir. code predictions
ηvmp = 0.00005 Learning rate of visual motion magn. code predictions
ηppp = 0.0001 Learning rate of propr. posture code predictions
ηpdp = 0.0001 Learning rate of propr. motion dir. code predictions
ηpmp = 0.00005 Learning rate of propr. motion magn. code predictions
γXp = 0.9 Momentum of learning temporal code predictions
ξ = 5 Learning rate multiplier for class biasing
i = teacher forcing Class bias in autoencoders
In this experiment, the training of temporal Gestalt code predictions that enable
crossmodal inference and lead to distributed simulation abilities are trained and
evaluated. The input sequence is the same as during spatial training. The pa-
rameters chosen for this experiment are shown in Table 6.5. Spatial training
is disabled, and the learning rates and momentum for the autoencoder weight
matrices PX , QX , SX were determined heuristically. The learning rate for class
biasing is multiplied by ξ = 5 to reinforce the influence of classifications on the
prediction. To ensure that the predicted codes are constantly biased by the cor-
rect classes instead of the inferred classes, which are developed in parallel (see
Section 6.3.3), the top-down classification input of the autoencoders is overrid-
den with the correct classes (cf. teacher forcing, Williams and Zipser, 1989).
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Even if a sufficiently trained model classification could be used during tempo-
ral training, teacher forcing is preferable since is avoids that the autoencoders
utilize the imperfections / dynamics in the classification.
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show the code prediction errors ∆Xp in this phase
of training. They show that in all submodalities, temporally predictive fea-
tures were successfully extracted from the logarithmic history of spatial codes
as well as the provided action classes to predict subsequent codes. Qualitatively,
the results are mostly comparable to those during spatial training. There was,
however, partially more imbalance in the error levels in comparison across the
classes, partially indications of slight recoding, and again, the errors of different
submodal encoders ended up at slightly different levels. Compensation is not
necessary in this case, since the prediction errors are not used during testing.
During temporal training, the fused Gestalt codes were activated solely from
the visual and proprioceptive input data (see qvp/d/m and qpp/d/m in Table 6.3).
The error signal for learning was then generated by comparing the activated
spatial code to the predicted code that uses the logarithmic history of preceded
codes. As shown in the Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8, the error converged to a
specific level. However, successful convergence during temporal training does
not ensure that the developed code predictions form stable and self-preserving
attractors when the model is driven only by its own predictions.
Several problems can occur. First, the sequence of predicted codes may come
to a standstill, given that the current predicted codes converge to the last pre-
dicted codes. Acquiring the predictions from multiple sources of information
circumvents this problem as far as possible: For example, any significant motion
magnitude necessarily determines that the posture (code) in the next time step
differs from the last. The training data does contain bodies in motion only, thus,
given that the posture code prediction uses the magnitude codes, this problem
is effectively avoided. Although it is not explicitly declared which informa-
tion the autoencoders use and extract their predictions from, it can be expected
that they facilitate the most explanatory codes on average, thus identifying the
conditional multimodal dependencies of biological motion. Second, the code
prediction may diverge over time from the submodal codes encountered dur-
ing spatial training due to an accumulation of prediction errors. For this reason,
the autoencoders predict the absolute values of codes, instead of the difference to
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Visual posture submodality:
Visual motion direction submodality:
Visual motion magnitude submodality:
FIGURE 6.7: Visual temporal code prediction errors of the posture, direction, and
magnitude Gestalt encoders for the three trained actions. The results were obtained
by averaging over four independently trained network instances.
104 Chapter 6. Experimental Results
Proprioceptive posture submodality:
Proprioceptive motion direction submodality:
Proprioceptive motion magnitude submodality:
FIGURE 6.8: Proprioceptive temporal code prediction errors of the posture, direc-
tion, and magnitude Gestalt encoders for the three trained actions. The results were
obtained by averaging over four independently trained network instances.
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the last code. Thus, each code prediction does not assume the correctness of the
previous, submodal prediction, but relies on all previous predictions and their
logarithmic history. In the logarithmic history, prediction errors are smoothed
out to a certain degree, further decreasing the chances of divergence. Finally,
and thirdly, the non-linearities in the fused codes limit the predictions to a spe-
cific codomain by themselves, and tolerate also larger prediction errors in the
outer ranges (i.e. -1 or 1). As a result, stable, precise, and self-preserving, mul-
timodal attractor states can be learned.
Taken together, the spatial submodal encodings developed in the last chapter
were successfully linked via temporal predictive encodings that extract short-
term, potentially multiconditional dependencies. As will be evaluated later, the
model is now able to selectively and consistently simulate submodal Gestalt
perceptions.
6.3.3 Embodied Learning of Kinematic Intentions
TABLE 6.6: Parameters for learning and adaptation chosen for
classifier training.
Parameter Description
ηi = 0.0004 Learning rate of spatial code classifications
γi = 0.9 Momentum of learning spatial code classifications
In parallel to the identification of temporal features for code predictions, the
action classifier is trained. The learning rates and momentum for training the
classifier weight matrices U and V were determined heuristically as shown in
Table 6.6.
Figure 6.9 shows the unnormalized, analogous output of the classifier during
training. Starting from a prior classification of about (0.5, 0.5, 0.5), the maxi-
mum based classification for the walking and running training trials was cor-
rect after training 35 trials (about 12 per action class). However, the basketball
movement was constantly confused with the walking movement before about
80 repetitions (20 per class). This learning behavior is allegeable seeing that the
basketball and the walking trial are very similar except for the right arm move-
ment (the data does not contain context by means of a ball). Eventually, the
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FIGURE 6.9: The classifier output during training. The color of
crosses indicates which class was currently presented to the net-
work. Dashed lines denote the output of a false classifier, while
straight lines denote the output of the correct classifier. The re-
spective class is color coded. While the true-positive classifica-
tions (crossed straight lines) improve for the walking and run-
ning classes, the basketball trial is initially interpreted as walk-
ing (dashed red line with blue crosses). The correct classification
for basketball develops later during training. The results were ob-
tained by averaging over four independently trained network in-
stances.
network managed to figure out the discriminative features in the multimodal
codes also for basketball dribbling, such that the final performance of the clas-
sifier was acceptable for all movement classes. Recoding was not present in the
classifier, as the classification performance on the training trials was about equal
when training was disabled.
For these results, the dimension of the Gestalt codes was most crucial. As also
acknowledged in previous work (Schrodt et al., 2015), distinct classifications are
substantially facilitated by the development of distinct Gestalt codes for each of
the classes, which again, is facilitated by the capacity of the encoders. Since the
spatial Gestalt codes were trained without supervision, the intrinsic variances
in the activated spatial codes had to reveal (also non-linearly separable) class-
distinct features. Consequently, an important factor was the use of the logarith-
mic code history. It allowed to consider the short-term progress of motion for
classification, as was implicitly also applied in previous work, where separate
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motion patterns represented short sections of each movement (Schrodt et al.,
2015).
Taken together, the intention module was able to extract the motion class from
the developed, multimodal Gestalt codes in a supervised manner. Further eval-
uations will show that the classification is robust to variances in postural con-
trol, and that it extracts meaningful, submodal features for classification.
6.4 Test Evaluations 1: Visuo-Spatial Abilities and
Perceptual Inference
TABLE 6.7: Parameters for learning, perception, and adaptation
chosen for all perceptual inference experiments.
Parameter Description
ηXc = 0 Learning rate of visual Gestalt codes
ηXc = 0 Learning rate of proprioceptive Gestalt codes
γXc = 0 Momentum of learning spatial codes
ηvX = 0 Learning rate of visual posture code predictions
ηpX = 0 Learning rate of propr. posture code predictions
γXp = 0 Momentum of learning temporal code predictions
ηi = 0 Learning rate of spatial code classifications
γi = 0 Momentum of learning spatial code classifications
i = inferred by model Class bias in autoencoders
i˜ = not provided Classification target
qvp/d/m = 1 Visual stimulus reliabilities
qpp/d/m = 0 Proprioceptive stimulus reliabilities
In the following experiments, the goal is to reproduce various situations in
which the model observes a person’s actions visually, recognizes their bodily
features and binds them together in the correct order, takes the perspective of
the observed actor, and understands their action both by simulating respective
proprioceptions and by inferring the corresponding action class. Consequently,
visual stimuli are assumed to be available (qvp/d/m = 1), while proprioceptive
stimuli are unavailable (qpp/d/m = 0), as shown in Table 6.7. In contrast to the
training phases, all learning is disabled, in that the relevant learning rates (and
momentum) are set to 0. Also, the action class is not provided in all of the
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following experiments neither via teacher forcing nor as target signal for back-
propagation, such that the model runs completely unsupervised, and classes or
kinematic intentions are inferred by the model.
Seeing the complexity of the task and the architecture, interdependencies be-
tween the involved perceptual adaptation, inference, and simulation processes
are to be expected. All of the modeled components are thus evaluated both
separately and in parallel in the following sections and chapters. The first eval-
uation of the model’s functionality on data from the first test set, consisting of
trials of walking, running, and basketball similar to the training trials, evalu-
ates the spatial visualization abilities in terms of perspective-taking and feature
binding via the implemented perceptual adaptation mechanisms.
6.4.1 Perspective-Taking
TABLE 6.8: Parameters for perception and adaptation chosen for
the isolated evaluation of perspective-taking.
Parameter Description
ηs = 0.01 Adaptation rate of the origin of the visual FOR
γs = 0.85 Momentum of the adaptation of the origin
ηr = 0.01 Adaptation rate of the orientation of the visual FOR
γr = 0.85 Momentum of the adaptation of the orientation
ηw = 0 Adaptation rate of the feature selection and assignment
γw = 0 Momentum of the feature selection and assignment
bdata = allocentric Data translation offset
Adata = allocentric Data rotation offset
wij = provided Feature binding weights
In this task, a fully trained model is visually presented with all 12 trials of the
first test set, while the correct feature assignment is provided, and the perspec-
tive in terms of spatial orientation and translation is to be inferred by the model
(see Table 6.8 for the parameters). Each motion capture trial is first transformed
by a random, three-dimensional, constant rotation offset, followed by a transla-
tion offset, before serving as input to the model. Thus, in other terms, the model
perceives the data from an unknown, allocentric view-point, and is to transfer
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it into its known, egocentric frame of reference. As qualitative measure for this
transformation progress, I define the Orientation Difference (OD) by
OD(t) = 180/2pi · acos (tr(Adata(t)Amodel(t))− 1) [°] (6.1)
Amodel(t) =
αx(t) 0 00 αy(t) 0
0 0 αz(t)
 (6.2)
where Adata is a constant per trial, global rotation matrix applied to all visual
inputs, Amodel is the dynamic, currently inferred rotation matrix of the model
(see Section 5.3.2), and tr(...) is the trace of the resulting matrix multiplication.
The OD describes the minimal amount of rotation about an arbitrary 3D axis
to transform the currently derived orientation AdataAmodel to the encoded, ego-
centric orientation in degree. An OD of 180° might for example be caused by a
top-down inversion of the walker, or by inverting the walking direction of the
walker, when the model has not adapted so far. For measuring the translation
with respect to the learned egocentric view – the translation difference (TD) –
the Euclidean distance is used:
TD(t) =
∥∥bdata(t)− bmodel(t)∥∥ [cm] (6.3)
bmodel(t) =
bx(t)by(t)
bz(t)
 (6.4)
where bdata is the constant per trial offset applied to the data, and bmodel is the
momentary adaptation of the model. All TD measures are provided in cm.
For the following evaluations, data orientation offsets are sampled equally dis-
tributed in the whole OD space (OD ∈ [0, 180]°). Sampling equally distributed
orientations instead of orientation differences would result in a considerably
higher probability that orientations with about 90° OD are shown, which is
avoided to allow a systematic evaluation of the relation between the initial OD
and the performance of the model (see Section 6.4.4). Translations offsets are
sampled equally distributed in a specified range (TD ∈ [0, 56] cm, that is, within
a 48.5 cm3 volume). Since the receptive field volume of 175 cm3 is just as large
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as the actual stimuli, the TD range is configured to be smaller to ensure that
most of the observed features lie within the receptive field.
Figure 6.10 A shows a typical example of the development of the OD and TD
over time when a walking movement is presented after training, given the
above parameterization, an initial (and maximum) OD of about 48°, and an
initial TD of about 42 cm. As shown, both the TD and the OD quickly con-
verge in roughly 40 time steps, or in terms of the frame rate of the data, in 0.66
seconds. The remaining OD of about 5° and TD of about 4 cm is largely the
result of the differences between the training and the testing data: The model
constantly minimizes the error between the input and its own expectations via
global rotations and translations, and thus, also subject-specific differences in
postural control lead to errors that are minimized to a certain degree, resulting
in imprecisions in the perceptual adaptation.
Note that the model has no information about the OD nor the TD. The spa-
tial reconstruction error ∆vp in the visual postural submodality (see Figure 5.9
in Section 5.4) is minimized by the model via the self-supervised, concurrent
adaptation of the rotation matrix Amodel and the translation bias bmodel, while
the spatial reconstruction error ∆vd in the visual motion direction submodality
is minimized by the adaptation of the rotation matrix Amodel only (see Figure
5.4 in Section 5.3). Figure 6.10 B shows the relative descent of these error sig-
nals in the example trial. First, it shows that – in relation to the initial (and
maximum) value before adaptation – the postural error decreases the most, as
can be expected, since the posture submodality is the only one that strongly
responds to both changes in orientation and translation, while the motion di-
rection submodality is invariant to changes in the translation. Motion magni-
tudes are completely invariant to both rotation and translation. Consequently,
the motion magnitude error is not, and cannot be regressed by the model via
perspective-taking. Second, variances in the error signals are predominantly
prevalent in the motion direction and magnitude submodalities, and they are
typically higher than in the postural submodality because of the more volatile
nature of the types of information they encode. Different variances result from
the different test trials, which is largely determined by the similarity to the train-
ing trials.
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A Perceptual inference:
B Visual submodal
expectation errors:
FIGURE 6.10: Comparison of the progress of perceptual inference and submodal
expectation errors. The derived orientation and translation difference measures (A)
decrease simultaneously with the visual motion direction and posture expectation
errors (B). Different submodal types of information have different characteristics of
inveriance to spatial transformations. Motion directions are influenced by rotations
only, and thus the error decreases less significantly than the posture error, which
is influenced both by rotation and translation adaptations. The motion magnitude
submodality is invariant to both translation and rotation and thus does not change
on average in the process. The graphs are normalized with regard to the respective
maximum defined in the legend.
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The progress of perspective-taking in this example run is furthermore visual-
ized in Figure 6.11, showing, besides the point-light stimulus, the convergence
of the model’s internal frame of reference – driven by adaptations of origin
and orientation of the visual module – to the frame of reference of the data.
In the process, when the origin is not yet completely inferred, the orientation
is slightly overshooting the actual target orientation, as shown in the figure at
time step t = 10. This is because a rather harsh momentum and learning rate
was selected for the experiments, which however pays off in later experiments
when the feature binding is not provided.
In systematic evaluations of all trials and multiple networks, the model showed
comparable performance and succeeded in 100% of all trials of the test set. Table
6.9 shows the mean and variance of the OD and TD for all tested trials after con-
vergence. These values were very stable across independently trained network
instances. The reason for the comparatively high final OD and its variance in
the first walking trial was – besides a less upright posture in comparison to the
training trial – that the walker turns to the right at the end of the trial, which the
model was able to track, while the reference frame of the data was not compen-
sated for the body orientation, as stated earlier. Similarly, the first basketball
trial repeatedly shows rather high deviations from the normal forward direc-
tion, which explains the high variance in the remaining OD. Interestingly, the
model was also capable of taking the perspective of the left-handed basketball
player, highlighting its robustness and generalization. In this case, the distract-
ing features of the left arm may be accountable for the variance in the OD after
convergence.
Furthermore, a dependency of the time of convergence on the initial degree of
OD was noticed, which coincides with findings about mental rotation (Shep-
ard and Metzler, 1971; Shepard and Metzler, 1988). This dependency will be
evaluated in more elaborate tasks in Section 6.4.4. In previous versions, the
model did rely on motion direction information only, and often converged to
mirrored perspectives in the perspective-taking task when the initial OD was
above 90° (Schrodt et al., 2015). In comparison to these results, the addition of
postural submodalities speeds up the convergence significantly, and provides
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t=0: t=1..5:
t=6..10: t=11..20:
t=21..30: t=31..40:
t=41..50: t=51..60:
FIGURE 6.11: Progress of perspective-taking given a point-light stimulus. Orienta-
tion and translation are inferred in parallel. The model’s inferred frame of reference
(red) converges to the frame of reference of the data (blue). Each subplot shows the
linearly weighted moving average of 10 time steps of the stimulus presented to the
network, where green dots represent visual coordinate inputs to the network.
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TABLE 6.9: The derived measures for perspective-taking perfor-
mance after convergence in the isolated perspective-taking task.
Shown are the mean and variance of OD (in degree) and TD (in
cm) for the respective trials of the test set, as well as on average
over all test trials. The results were obtained by averaging over
four independently trained network instances.
Subject Trial Class Mean OD Var. OD Mean TD Var. TD
5 1 walking 11.8 2.79 4.74 0.051
6 1 walking 3.75 0.53 2.49 0.18
10 4 walking 6.51 0.351 3.27 0.132
12 1 walking 5.87 0.49 4.52 0.0497
2 3 running 4.1 0.811 1.54 0.199
16 46 running 4.4 1.95 1.03 0.00682
35 19 running 9.61 1.02 1.15 0.0349
35 22 running 6.7 0.725 1.61 0.0553
6 2 basketball (r) 7.22 5.84 1.38 0.167
6 3 basketball (r) 4.97 2.06 1.78 0.0945
6 4 basketball (l) 6.4 5.96 1.72 0.0928
6 5 basketball (r) 4.16 0.659 1.72 0.176
average 6.29 1.93 2.25 0.103
the model with the necessary information to also infer the orientation of top-
down inverted walkers robustly, given that knowledge about the feature iden-
tity is provided.
Taken together, the evaluation shows that the model was able to smoothly and
robustly take the perspective of an observed actor, given that knowledge about
the identity and collocation of bodily features was available. The precision of
perspective-taking depended on the similarity in postural control between the
embodied actions and the observed actions.
6.4.2 Feature Binding
In this task, the model’s feature binding capabilities are evaluated separatedly
from the adaptive perspective-taking components. The parameters for this ex-
periment are shown in Table 6.10. Perspective-taking is disabled, and the test
trials are presented to the model without an offset in rotation or translation with
respect to the egocentric frame of reference. The feature binding biases wbij are
reset to -10 for each tested trial, resulting in assignment strengths of wij → 0,
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TABLE 6.10: Parameters for perception and adaptation chosen for
the isolated evaluation of feature-binding.
Parameter Description
ηs = 0 Adaptation rate of the origin of the visual FOR
γs = 0 Momentum of the adaptation of the origin
ηr = 0 Adaptation rate of the orientation of the visual FOR
γr = 0 Momentum of the adaptation of the orientation
ηw = 1 Adaptation rate of the feature selection and assignment
γw = 0.9 Momentum of the feature selection and assignment
bdata = egocentric Data translation offset
Adata = egocentric Data rotation offset
wij = not provided Feature binding weights
βvp = 1 Posture expectation error top-down weighting
βvd = 4 Motion dir. expectation error top-down weighting
βvm = 0.125 Motion magn. expectation error top-down weighting
such that effectively all observed visual features are initially unassigned. Note
that it is not necessary to permute the order of the inputs for the evaluation,
since the model loses its knowledge about the correct assignment at this point.
Using a very low initial assignment strength means that almost no activity is
forwarded from the submodal populations to the respective submodal code lay-
ers in the autoencoders. The codes are then activated almost exclusively by the
learned biases that should represent an average submodal perception of the
training set. Thus, a prior expectation of the model is present and guides the fea-
ture assignments initially. The initial assignment strength furthermore decides
on the initial speed of feature binding, since it marginally activates the codes by
mixtures of all possible feature constellations, producing rather chaotic initial
error signals with magnitudes proportional to the prior assignment strength.
Increasing the initial strength can lead to exceptionally fast but less robust infer-
ence (more incorrectly assigned features), since the binding weights are quickly
adapted to an initial guess, focusing more on momentary perceptions. The same
holds when both feature binding and perspective-taking run in parallel. In this
case, the model more often converges to local optima by means of inverted per-
spectives and mirrored feature assignments. Thus, by parameterizing the initial
assignment strength accordingly, the network can be tuned to adapt its percep-
tion more or less aggressively. Here, the initial assignment strength is set rela-
tively low such that the model does not react to the resulting perceptual error
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signals immediately, but integrates them for a short period of time before deci-
sively assigning features.
The prior expectation activated by the code biases alone does typically not lead
to the same scale of activity (i.e. length of the code fusion vector fX) as seen
during training. Therefore, the reconstruction error signal (in this case the mis-
match between almost no feature input and a marginal prior expectation) can
be lower before binding visual features than after. However, not selecting any
feature did not form an attractor for the gradient descent based feature binding
using the above parameterization.
Also to bootstrap the convergence of the feature weights – represented by neu-
rons with logistic activation function – it is crucial to limit the minimum ab-
solute derivative with respect to their bias (cf. flat-spot elimination Fahlman,
1988), in this case, to 0.1. Thus, when a feature weight is saturated (i.e. 1 or
0), the assignment is still flexible and able to respond to submodal errors. Fur-
thermore, the adaptation rate for feature binding has to be exceptionally high
to obtain optimal results.
As also shown in the parameters, and as indicated before, the submodal error
signals which are minimized for feature binding are individually weighted by
the parameters βvp, βvd, and βvm. The weightings were determined heuristically
according to their relevance for feature binding, but they are also used in all
other experiments. In particular, they also influenced the perspective-taking
results, but did not turn out to be crucial or interfere with them, such that they
are mentioned just here. Exploratory studies revealed that the magnitude error
signal can be very useful for feature binding in the short term after presenting
a new action, but less helpful or even obstructive in the long run. The motion
direction signals are useful in a short to medium term, and still support the
correct assignment slightly in the long run. The postural errors are helpful in
the long run and the most crucial component for feature binding and Gestalt
recognition.
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To measure the progress of feature binding in these experiments, I define the
Feature Binding Error (FBE) as the sum of Euclidean distances between the
model’s assignment of a bodily feature and the correct assignment:
FBE(t) =
Mv∑
j=1
√√√√(wjj(t)− 1)2 + Nv∑
i=1,i 6=j
wij(t)2 (6.5)
resulting in FBE ∈ (0, N v ·M v), while the initial FBE is close to the number of
bodily features M v before binding. A more discrete measure for the correct-
ness of feature binding is provided by counting the number bodily features for
which the maximum feature weight is not the correct weight, termed Incorrect
Assignments (IA), and defined by the function
IA(t) =
Mv∑
j=1
min
(|(argmaxNvi=1wij(t))− j|, 1) (6.6)
Figure 6.12 A shows an example of how these measures typically develop dur-
ing the observation of a trial of the test data set. First, it can be seen that the FBE
slowly but continuously starts to decrease in the beginning (the FBE is theoret-
ically able to drastically increase given that incorrect features are assigned). At
the same time, the IA already quickly drops. This result indicates that the model
very early obtains information about the correct direction in which to adapt the
weights for some but not all of the observed features.
The early information is likely provided by the motion direction autoencoder,
as suggested by Figure 6.12 B, showing the development of the visual submodal
reconstruction errors ∆X , X ∈ {vp, vd, vm} to be minimized in the same exam-
ple trial. Initially, the motion direction error is dominant, while the posture and
magnitude errors are relatively low. This suggests that the motion direction
autoencoder provides a rather strong perceptual bias. As soon as the model
starts to minimize the motion direction error, that is, the first features are as-
signed, the posture and magnitude errors increase both to a relatively high level,
since the still incomplete assignments activate severely distorted perceptions,
leading to error signals that override the errors provided by the code biases as
explained before. In the further progress of feature binding, also the posture
and magnitude errors decrease to the expected level (cf. Figure 6.10 B in the
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A Perceptual inference:
B Visual submodal
expectation errors:
FIGURE 6.12: Comparison of the progress of feature binding with the submodal
expectation errors. The feature binding errors (A) decrease simultaneously with all
submodal expectation errors (B). Initially, the driving signal is the motion direction
error, which helps the posture and motion magnitude errors to overcome a local
minimum. The graphs are normalized with regard to the respective maximum
defined in the legend.
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perspective-taking experiment). The model identifies all features correctly after
about 120 time steps (2 seconds), after which the model is able to stabilize its
selection further by minimizing all three reconstruction errors.
Note that the probability to guess the correct assignment by chance in a single
shot would be 1.3·1012 in this scenario, and that the model cannot independently
keep up and test assignments in parallel, but only iteratively optimizes them
using the described heuristics, using parallel and also conflicting population
activity. Again, the model has no information about the derived error measures
FBE and IA. Nonetheless, these errors very steadily and robustly decrease in
the progress of feature binding by means of gradient descent on the submodal
reconstruction errors of the autoencoders, although the submodal errors do not
continuously decrease.
The progress of this feature binding example is also qualitatively illustrated
in Figure 6.13, showing the momentary input to the model, the inferred body
Gestalt perception, as well the current body Gestalt expectations in the three
visual submodalities. The illustration shows that in the beginning, the model
expectation (mainly generated by the code biases) is rather vague and spread
over the receptive field, while the inferred perception begins to expand from
the origin of the visual frame of reference (which is a result of decoding the
perceived feature positions from the Gestalt populations that do not get a rel-
evant amount of input yet). At 50 to 149 time steps, the expectation clearly
represents a walker-shaped figure, and also slight feature motion can be ob-
served. Still, the inferred perception is rather skewed and imprecise, but more
related to the guiding expectation than before. Finally, after convergence, all
features are assigned correctly and with sufficient strengths. Thus, both the in-
ferred perception as well as the expectation resemble the embodied experiences
(of walking in this case). As interpreted by the population decoder, the inferred
perception is still slightly skewed, which results from the remaining expectation
errors given the test trial.
Thus, in a nutshell, feature binding continuously improves the inferred percep-
tion in the autoencoders. The inferred perception activates the submodal code
and in turn generates the submodal expectation as driving signal for feature
binding. In the progress, both the inferred perception, as well as the expecta-
tions steadily improve towards the learned stimulus, while the expectation is
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A Visual stimulus B Perception C Expectation
t=0...49:
t=50...149:
t=2500...3000:
FIGURE 6.13: Comparison of a visual stimulus, the model’s perception and its
expectation over time during feature binding. Feature binding results both in a
concretization of the submodal perceptions after perceptual inference (column B)
as well as the expectations generated from the embodied codes (column C). The
difference between the perception and the expectation is in turn used to drive per-
ceptual inference. In column A, the feature binding error is color coded for each
visual input coordinate (black for unassigned, red for incorrectly assigned, green
for correctly assigned). However, color coding in column B and C represents the
identity of the assigned, bodily features.
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TABLE 6.11: The derived measures for feature binding perfor-
mance after convergence in the isolated feature binding task.
The results were obtained by averaging over four independently
trained network instances.
Subject Trial Class Mean FBE Var. FBE Mean IA Var. IA
5 1 walking 6.93 0.0439 0.773 0.0331
6 1 walking 3.34 0.00153 0 0
10 4 walking 4.89 0.027 0.299 0.0332
12 1 walking 4.54 0.000997 0.658 0.0145
2 3 running 3.85 0.00056 0 0
16 46 running 4.37 0.00098 0 0
35 19 running 4.11 0.00199 1.1 0.0151
35 22 running 3.94 0.0016 0.36 0.0282
6 2 basketball (r) 4.79 0.0182 0.189 0.0223
6 3 basketball (r) 5.07 0.224 0.031 0.0068
6 4 basketball (l) 5.68 0.0124 0.185 0.0478
6 5 basketball (r) 3.82 0.00496 0 0
average 4.61 0.0282 0.3 0.0168
always ahead, providing a suitable heuristic for optimization. The model gen-
erates expectations strongly biased towards its embodied training, and neglects
the differences of the observed test trials for its expectations, which is an effect
of the non-linear code compression.
Table 6.11 shows the results of feature binding for all test trials after conver-
gence, averaged over different network instances. Again, 100% of the trials
were successful within short time, as no more than two visual features were
assigned incorrectly. Again, incorrect assignments were predominantly caused
by differences in postural control of the tested subjects to the subjects that pro-
vided the training samples. The trials for which incorrect assignments were
measured varied slightly across different, independently trained networks, and
typically concerned the arm features, as they show the most variability across
the subjects in the data set.
Although it would be possible to enforce that all features are assigned, in partic-
ular when only a single assignment is left, this would prevent the model from
not assigning irrelevant features, such as distractors that do not represent bod-
ily features. In this experiment, the model did sometimes consider features that
122 Chapter 6. Experimental Results
were too far off the expectations as irrelevant. Up to a certain degree, how-
ever, missing assignments are recomplemented by the model when activating
the whole-body Gestalt codes, and thus not missing in the generated Gestalt ex-
pectations, such that the model’s performance was not compromised.
Taken together, the model was able to systematically, quickly, and robustly infer
the identity of observed visual features that correspond to its embodied experi-
ence, and assign them to the correct processing paths, given that the perspective
was already taken. In the following, possible interactions between feature bind-
ing and perspective-taking are investigated.
6.4.3 Interactions of Feature Binding and Perspective-Taking
TABLE 6.12: Parameters for perception and adaptation chosen
for the simultaneous evaluation of perspective-taking and feature
binding.
Parameter Description
ηs = 0.01 Adaptation rate of the origin of the visual FOR
γs = 0.85 Momentum of the adaptation of the origin
ηr = 0.01 Adaptation rate of the orientation of the visual FOR
γr = 0.85 Momentum of the adaptation of the orientation
ηw = 1 Adaptation rate of the feature selection and assignment
γw = 0.9 Momentum of the feature selection and assignment
bdata = allocentric Data translation offset
Adata = allocentric Data rotation offset
wij = not provided Feature binding weights
In this experiment, translation and rotation offsets are added to the tested trials
as in Section 6.4.1, and the feature assignments are reset at the beginning of each
test as in Section 6.4.2. Consequently, both adaptive components are enabled,
as shown in the parameters in Table 6.12.
Table 6.13 shows the error remainders for successful trials in this combined ex-
periment. The model was able to infer the orientation of the previously unseen
test data with an average accuracy of 5.55 ± 2.44°, and it inferred their origin
with an average accuracy of 3.87 ± 0.185 cm. Comparing these numbers with
the individual evaluations of perspective-taking and feature binding reveals no
significant differences.
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TABLE 6.13: The derived measures for perceptual inference per-
formance after convergence in the combined perspective-taking
and feature binding task. The results were obtained by averaging
over four independently trained network instances.
Subject Trial Class Mean OD Var. OD Mean TD Var. TD
Mean FBE Var. FBE Mean IA Var. IA
5 1 walking 10.6 5.01 4.6 0.0912
6.46 0.0413 0.415 0.0188
6 1 walking 5.07 0.348 3.79 0.0735
3.55 0.00145 0 0
10 4 walking 5.6 0.425 5.17 0.106
4.31 0.0154 0.0415 0.00867
12 1 walking 5.79 0.976 5.52 0.0438
4.43 0.00307 0.496 0.0224
2 3 running 2.91 0.313 2.5 0.573
4.18 0.00108 0 0
16 46 running 4.27 0.377 3.05 0.0166
4.47 0.000798 0.5 0
35 19 running 4.99 0.157 4.31 0.0152
4.39 0.0005 1 0
35 22 running 3.67 0.517 3.31 0.134
4.08 0.00262 0.414 0.0141
6 2 basketball (r) 7.3 13.3 2.35 0.284
4.68 0.0142 0.211 0.031
6 3 basketball (r) 5.82 0.734 3.15 0.0683
5.36 0.0103 0.152 0.0292
6 4 basketball (l) 6.32 4.97 5.71 0.33
6.17 0.00585 0.681 0.18
6 5 basketball (r) 4.2 2.24 3.01 0.482
4 0.0304 0 0
average 5.55 2.44 3.87 0.185
4.68 0.0106 0.326 0.0254
As indicated in the experiment example in Figure 6.14, the orientation system-
atically began being inferred after some features were correctly recognized. The
typical convergence time was significantly longer, since the model sometimes
temporarily adapted its internal orientation and translation biases into wrong
directions, because it selected the wrong features for a short time, or because
it deselected already correctly assigned features. Given that the initial OD was
below 90°, these ambiguities in the perceptual inference processes nonetheless
were overcome in all evaluated cases. Unlike earlier, however, there were also
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FIGURE 6.14: Simultaneous inference of feature binding and per-
spective. The inference is more volatile and takes more time. The
orientation difference starts to decrease as soon as some of the fea-
tures are derived. Note that the TD was initially relatively low in
this trial, and thus is not decreased much. The graph is normalized
with regard to the respective maximum defined in the legend.
unsuccessful trials when the initial OD was above 90°. The model sometimes
converged to approximately inverted views of the movement (i.e. top-down
an front-back inverted). Thus, under unfavorable circumstances, the model can
converge towards locally optimal perceptual attractors.
Taken together, the combined adaptive perceptual processes did not obstruct
each other, potentially leading to similarly precise convergence as when tested
individually. However, the combination lead to longer convergence times as
well as perceptual ambiguities, the systematics of which is evaluated in the next
section.
6.4.4 Spatial Systematics in Perceptual Inference
When feature binding and perspective taking are simultaneously applied, thus
simultaneously minimize embodied multimodal expectation errors, ambiguous
perceptions may occur, which is systematically correlated with the view point
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A B C
FIGURE 6.15: Segments of visual point light stimuli without dis-
tractor points (A), with artificial distractor points (B), and with bi-
ological distractor points (C).
the action is shown from. This systematics is evaluated in the following, using
the same setup as described in the last section.
Furthermore, also the influence of distractor inputs is evaluated. Figure 6.15
shows an average stimulus display over 100 time steps while an arbitrary bio-
logical motion input is presented from an arbitrary view point. In Figures 6.15 A
to 6.15 C, 15 of the point trajectories correspond to the visual bodily features of
the subject, while in 6.15 B and 6.15 C, additional 15 points correspond to dis-
tractor features. The distractors follow either artificial or biological dynamics:
In 6.15 B, each distractor moves into a random direction with random velocity
in a specified 3D area (corresponding to the volume of the visual receptive field)
around the walker. The distractors rebound at the borders of the area, and their
trajectories are smoothed, such that also the resulting motion direction and mo-
tion magnitude perceptions cover the whole range of the modeled perceptual
system. Furthermore, the motion directions and velocities of the distractors are
reset randomly at specific time steps, inducing further complexity in the overall
perception.
In 6.15 C, the motion dynamics of the distractors are correlated with the bodily
features of the currently shown point light display. Each distractor replicates
the motion trajectory of a distinct bodily feature, and its trajectory is in tempo-
ral synchronization with it. The distractors are independently and randomly
rotated and translated in space, in addition to their intrinsic translation with re-
spect to the origin of the frame of reference. Thus, unlike the artificial distractors
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A B
FIGURE 6.16: Number of combined perspective-taking and fea-
ture binding experiments. Each evaluated model test was assigned
to the nearest of 49 defined initial orientation difference / transla-
tion difference configurations. The histograms are marginalized
over different initial TDs (A) or ODs (B), respectively. On average,
each OD or TD configuration was evaluated about 300 times per
distractor type (red dashed lines).
in Figure 6.15 B, the biological distractors in 6.15 C typically only move locally
and permanently close to other input features. Biological distractors thus gen-
erate perceptual ambiguities, mimicking motion dynamics as well as relative
proximities of bodily features.
The influence of the distractor type (none, artificial, biological), initial orien-
tation difference, and initial translation difference on the perceptual character-
istics of the model was evaluated in 6336 experiments, performed by 88 sep-
arately trained networks, that is 2112 experiments per distractor type. Each
experiment consisted of the presentation of 120 seconds (7200 time steps) of bi-
ological motion in addition to the respective distractor points. Again, the initial
orientation and translation of the presented biological motion was selected ran-
domly and uniformly distributed with respect to the orientation difference and
translation difference measures, such that all constellations appeared approx-
imately equally often, as validated in Figure 6.16. As also shown in the fig-
ure, each initial OD and initial TD was assigned to one of 7 equally distributed
ranges, resulting in combined 49 evaluated subconfigurations.
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The recognition of a point-light stimulus was considered successful when all of
the following criteria were appropriate for at least 50 time steps after repeatedly
presenting a single motion capture trial for 120 seconds:
• The low-pass filtered orientation difference was less than 15°.
• The low-pass filtered translation difference was less than 7 cm.
• The low-pass filtered number of incorrect assignments was less than 2.
Furthermore, the time until the following criteria were met first in successful
trials was determined to evaluate the speed of recognition:
• The low-pass filtered orientation difference was less than 15°.
• The low-pass filtered translation difference was less than 7 cm.
• The low-pass filtered number of incorrect assignments was less than 7.5.
Thus, the latter criteria define that an action is already recognized as soon as the
perspective is derived, even when only half of the bodily features are identified
correctly. Whereas success in the recognition is identified by stable convergence
also of the incorrect assignments. All low-pass filtered measures were deter-
mined by calculating a moving average over 20 time steps. The recognition rate
and time in dependency on perspective and distractors are evaluated in the fol-
lowing.
Recognition Rate
Figure 6.17 shows the median recognition success rate of the model for each
initial OD / TD configuration as well as different distractor types. Without
distractors, as shown in Figure 6.17 A, the percentage of correctly established
visual correspondences depended on the shown orientation, while translation
had no or no significant influence in the investigated range. Overall, over 69.1%
of the trials were successful. For orientations below 74°, even 100% of the trials
were successful. The performance began to decrease as the initial orientation
exceeds 90° with respect to the egocentric frame of reference. Between 154 and
180° of initial orientation, only about 6% of the trials were successful. In the
unsuccessful trials, the network typically converged to inverted perspectives
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A No distractors:
B Artificial distractors:
C Biological distractors:
FIGURE 6.17: Influence of the distractor type, orientation and translation on the
recognition rate in inferring the observed frame of reference and feature binding.
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within the provided time span. This result clearly shows the orientation speci-
ficity of the implemented perspective-taking mechanism.
The addition of 15 distractors with artificial motion dynamics and trajectories
did not significantly influence these results, as Figure 6.17 B indicates. The
model was equally able to detect the bodily features and assign them correctly
while taking the perspective. The orientation dependency characteristics re-
mained the same, and the overall recognition rate was only slightly lower with
68.4%. This result strongly substantiates that the model learned encodings that
particularly focus on features of biological motion, resulting in robustness to a
number of non-biological distractors.
Consequently, given 15 biological distractors (Figure 6.17 C), the overall success
rate decreased significantly to 33.9%. While the negative correlation between
the recognition rate and the orientation mismatch increased, the initial trans-
lation now had a negative influence on the performance as well. This can be
explained by the fact that, given the relatively stationary and systematic bio-
logical distractors, more potential candidates are available for the model that
approximately match the multimodal expectations in the long run, resulting in
additional perceptual ambiguities. On the contrary, none of the artificial dis-
tractors is constantly at an expected position and shows the expected motion
dynamics.
Interestingly, the above findings with biological distractors are strongly reminis-
cent of the results of psychometric studies. For example, Pavlova and Sokolov,
2000, measured the rate of success of human subjects in reporting the presence
of a point light walker – which was shown to the subjects beforehand – in a
point light display with biological distractor points. The display was shown
for 1 second, and the walker was either absent, or present and shown in one of
seven fixed orientations on the picture plane. As far as apparent from the article
and the referenced work, the walkers were not translated on the plane, and the
distractor features were distributed rather uniformly.
The authors noted a non-linear dependency of the recognition rate on the ori-
entation of the walker. Figure 6.18 shows the overlay of the results obtained
by Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000 and the results obtained with the model. The
model results used for this comparison are equivalent to the lowest TD-column
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FIGURE 6.18: The orientation specificity of the perspective-taking
and feature binding model in comparison to human subjects (*
comparison figure from Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000). The model
(blue bars) shows a non-linear slope in the successful recognition
trials with respect to display orientation similar to human perfor-
mance as reported by Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000 (thick red over-
lay). The dashed red line indicates the average number of success-
ful trials.
in Figure 6.17 C, thus the comparison was obtained with an initial translation
between 0 and 7 cm, random orientation in 3D, biological distractors, and for
the purpose of comparability, slightly adapted configuration ranges for the OD
histogram. For most initial orientations, the model qualitatively performs pre-
cisely as human subjects. It overperforms at around 90° of initial orientation,
and underperforms slightly at about 60°. Although the respective task in the
compared experiments are admittedly not exactly identical, the model results
clearly replicate the non-linear slope of the orientation specificity measured for
human subjects.
Taken together, the results show that the adaptive perceptual mechanisms
were clearly tuned to biological motion perceptions and typically ignore other
dynamics. The perceptual characteristics were realistic, which underlines the
plausibility of the hypothesis and implementation.
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Recognition Time
Without distractor features, the median time until the perspective was inferred
and half of the features were identified and assigned correctly linearly depends
both on the initial orientation and the initial translation, as shown in Figure
6.19 A. The minimum convergence time (for an initial OD around 13° and an ini-
tial TD around 3.5 cm, which already fulfills two of the three criteria for recogni-
tion) was about 2 seconds, which is determined mainly by the average time the
model needs to bind half of the features, and partly by situations in which the
model may have spuriously moved away from the already correct perspective
in the meantime. When initial orientations or translations were tested sepa-
rately, the median recognition time varied linearly between 2 to 11 seconds for
different orientations up to 154°, and linearly between 2 to 6 seconds for differ-
ent translations in the tested range. Given that both orientation and translation
were applied simultaneously, the recognition time was below the sum of sep-
arate recognition times, substantiating that both inferences ran in parallel and
did not obstruct each other.
When the initial orientation exceeded a certain level, as also shown in Figure
6.17, only a few trials were successful, and the variance in the recognition time
of these few trials increased drastically. Some of the trials converged only in
the long run, taking almost the whole time span provided for the recognition
task (120 seconds). Because of this, and because of the lack of more data, the
measured median recognition times for these configurations are unreliable, and
these are indicated by grayed out bars in the figures.
The addition of artificial distractor points did not influence the rate of conver-
gence in the last section. It did, however, have a negative influence on the speed
of convergence with respect to the presented orientation, as Figure 6.19 B con-
firms: The average recognition time with artificial distractors again varied from
about 2 to 6 seconds with translation offsets only, but it varied from 2 to 16
seconds for different orientations. Thus, although the rate of success in recog-
nizing biological motion was not compromised by artificial distractor points, it
very well influenced the recognition time when increasing the orientation mis-
match.
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A No distractors:
B Artificial distractors:
C Biological distractors:
FIGURE 6.19: Influence of the distractor type, orientation and translation on the
model’s recognition time when inferring the observed frame of reference and bind-
ing visual features.
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FIGURE 6.20: The recognition time of the perspective-taking and
feature binding model in comparison to human subjects (* com-
parison figure from Shepard and Metzler, 1988). For orientations
below 150° , the model (blue bars) shows a linear recognition time
with respect to display orientation similar to human performance
as determined by Shepard and Metzler, 1988 (thick red overlay).
The dashed red line indicates the average recognition time. Statis-
tically inaccurate values are grayed out.
The addition of biological distractors compromised the recognition time more
severely, as shown in Figure 6.19 C. The figure suggests a rather exponential
influence of initial orientations and translations on the recognition time. Again,
because of the low number of successful trials for some of the higher initial OD
and TD configurations, the respective unreliable values are grayed out in the
figure.
As in the last chapter, the linear dependency of recognition time on display
orientation observed in Figure 6.19 A and Figure 6.19 B is in accordance with
psychometric studies on mental rotation. It is generally accepted that mental ro-
tation is a continuous process in which the time for transforming one view into
another linearly depends on the magnitude of rotation between the views. In
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Shepard and Metzler, 1971, the authors investigated the reaction time for com-
paring two either identical or different static objects with different orientations
in 3D space (which is assumed to involve mental rotation). In comparison to the
task of recognizing biological motion from a point light display, in both cases,
visual features have to be identified and compared (to embodied expectations
in the model), and mentally transformed into each other by rotations if possible.
Figure 6.20 shows a direct comparison between data collected by Shepard and
Metzler, 1971 and the model results. The model results correspond to the low-
est TD-column in Figure 6.19 B, and the OD configuration ranges were adapted
to match the comparison. The experiment with artificial distractors was chosen
for this comparison since in the task evaluated by Shepard and Metzler, 1971,
also disparate objects were presented to the subjects, resulting in visual features
that could not be assigned. Again, the offset and slope of the real and the mod-
eled results are virtually identical for orientations up to 140°. The recognition
time of the model increased linearly from roughly above 1.2 seconds at around
5° (mostly due to feature binding) to 15 seconds at around 140°, while the hu-
man results chosen for comparison increased linearly from 1 second for 0° to
about 4 seconds for 140° of display orientation.
Again, the comparison underlines the plausibility of the model. The scales in
this comparison differ to a certain extent, which however does not harm its sig-
nificance. Amongst other reasons, although both experiments investigate tasks
that involve mental rotation, the respective task itself is again rather different.
Computations in the model most likely work on a different time scale than in
the human brain. The model can as well be parameterized to converge more or
less quickly, depending on the task. Nonetheless, the notion of seconds is used
here to reveal how much of the real world data the model has already seen
before inference is complete. Moreover, the recognition criterion is a matter
of definition. Instead of the chosen criterion, recognition could be determined
by the time the model has successfully identified the class of the observed ac-
tion, or when the proprioceptive codes begin to resonate, which typically hap-
pens about half-way of the perceptual inference process. However, this section
only considers the dependency of the implemented visual perceptual inference
methods on visuo-spatial properties, while inferences from visual stimuli are
investigated in the following sections.
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6.4.5 Conclusion
Taken together, the model was able to perform perspective-taking and feature
binding given stimuli of the classes it was trained on. Individually, the two
adaptive perceptual components are consistently robust. Applying both adap-
tive processes in parallel resulted in reasonably increased convergence times, as
well as in perceptual ambiguities. A clear dependency of the model’s perfor-
mance on the stimulus orientation was determined, and the perceptual charac-
teristics of the model replicated findings from psychological studies on biolog-
ical motion recognition and mental rotation. It was provided empirically that
the model learned specific features of biological motion, in that its performance
was most significantly more robust to the presence of non-biological distractor
stimuli, than to biological distractor stimuli.
6.5 Test Evaluations 2: Action Understanding by
Embodied Predictive Codes
The last chapter evaluated the characteristics of perceptual inferences and their
interactions in the model. As mentioned in the model hypothesis (see Chap-
ter 3), I assume that similar inference processes – especially perspective-taking
– take an important part in human action understanding. In the model, ac-
tion understanding encompasses two synergistic aspects: First, the action class
is inferred from the recently perceived visual submodal codes, as well as the
recently simulated proprioceptive submodal codes. Second, proprioceptive sub-
modal simulations are recurrently biased by the inferred class, previously sim-
ulated proprioceptive codes, as well as previously observed visual codes. Be-
cause of the recurrent, predictive, bidirectional connectivity between the mod-
ules and the continuous influence of observations, it can be said that the pro-
prioceptive system begins to resonate to, and to synchronize with the visual
observations in the sense that all activities become increasingly consistent, and
converge to the learned, embodied states sequences over time.
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A Perceptual inference:
B Proprioceptive simulation
and intention inference:
FIGURE 6.21: Perceptual inference simultaneously leads to resonance in the pro-
prioceptive module and inference of the type of observed action. The model is
presented with a running movement, while it is internally in a proprioception and
intention state that corresponds to walking. While the model infers the perspective
and binds the visual features (A), also the classification error and proprioceptive
code prediction errors with respect to the ground truth decrease (B). Note that none
of the errors and measures shown here are known to the model. In fact, they are
reduced implicitly by predictive coding and by minimizing embodied expectation
errors. The graphs are normalized with regard to the respective maximum defined
in the legend.
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The consistency of the visual modality with the overall action understanding
circuit is predominantly determined by the validity of the made perceptual in-
ferences, that is, perspective-taking and feature binding. Thus, in the model,
action understanding particularly relies on perceptual inferences, which is il-
lustrated in the following example. The model observes a running trial from
the test data set and is, again, not provided with knowledge about the feature
identity or frame of reference, nor proprioceptions, just as in Section 6.4.3. Also
as before, the Feature Binding Error decreases in the process and the orientation
is inferred as soon as some of the features are rudimentarily assigned, while
the models translation is continuously dragged into a valid direction, as Figure
6.21 A shows. When concurrently taking a look at the classification error ∆c in
the intention module, and the code prediction errors ∆ppp, ∆pdp and ∆pmp in the
proprioceptive module, as shown in Figure 6.21 B, the dependency of action
understanding on the perceptual modulations becomes explicit. Note that here,
because of the lack of a proprioceptive stimulus and knowledge about the ob-
served class, all error signals are artificial measures with respect to the ground
truth, that is, they compare the code that the model predicts with the code that
would have been activated by the proprioceptive sensation of the test trial, as
they compare the inferred class with the actual target class. With that said, all
submodal proprioceptive prediction errors decline at about the same time the
perspective and features are inferred in the visual pathway, indicating that the
recurrent, proprioceptive simulations begin to synchronize with the observa-
tion and approximately represent the correct sensations. In its simulation, the
model is for the most part restricted to it embodied encodings, thus the remain-
ing error is majorly caused by differences between the trained (embodied) trial
and the (observed) test trial (besides the code prediction error remainder from
training).
Analogously to the code prediction errors, the classification error (with respect
to running in this case) declines, indicating that the classification of the visual
and proprioceptive codes becomes possible after perceptual inference, which in
turn improves the proprioceptive simulation via top-down biasing. Here, the
slightly earlier decrease in the classification error in comparison to the code pre-
diction errors (i.e. before the orientation is beginning to be inferred), can pos-
sibly be attributed to the transformation invariant motion magnitude features
that rely on feature binding only, and do not require perspective-taking.
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Taken together, the error measures derived here for action understanding coin-
cide with the error measures derived for perceptual inference in Section 6.4. The
model ’understands’ the observed action in terms of its type and corresponding
proprioceptive simulations. Again, none of the shown error measures is known
to the model. They are implicitly and synergistically minimized through prin-
ciples of predictive coding, perceptual inference, and embodied simulations.
Typically, the resonance of codes in the proprioceptive and intention modules
works already part-way of the perceptual inference just as in this example. The
resonance is flexible to changes in the observed class, and simulations are typi-
cally in temporal synchronization with the observation (i.e. the same gait cycle).
The actual resonance of the proprioceptive system (comparable to motor reso-
nance) the and intention module (comparable to kinematic intention inference)
is qualitatively illustrated in Figure 6.22: It compares the average display of (i)
the input stimuli, showing the inferred frame of reference and the assignment
errors of individual features, (ii) the model’s currently expected visual stim-
ulus, as well as (iii) the simulated proprioceptive body model, showing also
the inferred class in color coding. The model initially infers the walking class
(represented by the red body), which is mostly learned as a default class by
the model, and simulates a constant posture, motion direction, and (negligi-
ble) magnitude. No relevant changes are visible in the first 50 time steps. The
classification then slowly changes from walking to running (green) as the per-
spective and features are derived and the visual expectations that influence the
classification and simulation are enhanced. The simulation then transits to an
average running posture, and eventually gets into synchronized resonance with
the visual observation.
This is possible because for each action classes the model was trained on, an
attractor state sequence was established in the distributed submodal and cross-
modal predictive structures. All three attractors reside in the same structures,
and thus, there are implicit transitions between the attractors, which are how-
ever typically instable. They can be activated by incomplete or jammed visual
perceptions, but they are pushed onto the nearest attractor afterwards. Thus,
once again, perceptual inference is the decisive component for action under-
standing in the model, while action understanding itself goes beyond a static
mapping from visual to proprioceptive sensations, and can rather be seen as a
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Visual input stimulus Vis. model expectation Propr. model simulation
t=1...50:
t=51...100:
t=101...150:
t=151...200:
FIGURE 6.22: Illustration of how perceptual inference concretizes model expecta-
tions and results in proprioceptive resonance over time. Shown is a visual input
stimulus (a running trial) and perceptual inferences on it (left column), the devel-
opment of the model’s visual expectations during perceptual inference (center col-
umn), and the beginning resonance in the proprioceptive module (right column)
over time (from top to bottom). The expectations begin to concretize while the
frame of reference and feature binding is inferred, and at the same time, the pro-
prioceptive module is caused to resonate, and the action class is inferred (motion
and color coding in right column).
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dynamical system with multiple stable attractors distributed over multiple state
spaces. The systematics of these action understanding attractors is evaluated in
the following.
6.5.1 Systematics in Action Understanding
TABLE 6.14: Parameters for perception and adaptation chosen for
the evaluation of action understanding.
Parameter Description
ηs = ηr = ηw = 0 Adaptation rates for perceptual inferences
γs = γr = γw = 0 Momentum for perceptual inferences
bdata = egocentric Data translation offset
Adata = egocentric Data rotation offset
wij = provided Feature binding weights
i = inferred by model Class bias in autoencoders
i˜ = not provided Classification target
qvp/d/m = 1 Visual stimulus reliabilities
qpp/d/m = 0 Proprioceptive stimulus reliabilities
Here, the model’s action understanding capabilities are evaluated using all mo-
tion capture trials of the first test set. Although action understanding does work
in the model also when feature binding and perspective-taking are enabled,
perceptual inference is disabled in these experiments to exclude mutual inter-
ferences. Thus, visual inputs as well as their feature assignment and frame of
reference are provided, while the classification and proprioceptive correspon-
dences are to be inferred by the model. The respective parameters for this eval-
uation are shown in table 6.14.
Table 6.15 shows an quantitative evaluation of this experiment. For each trial
of the test set, statistics were calculated over tmax − t0 = 950 time steps after the
overall system was allowed to converge to an attractor for t0 = 50 time steps,
which typically happens within 20 time steps given that visual perceptual in-
ference is not needed. First, the statistical evaluation shows the mean and vari-
ance of the classification error ∆c (Mean Classification Error, M. CE; Variance of
Classification Error, Var. CE), as well as the percentage of time steps the model
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TABLE 6.15: The classifier results and mean code prediction errors
in the visual and proprioceptive autoencoders when visual stim-
uli are provided. Shown are the mean of the classification error
(M. CE) and its variance (Var. CE) per trial, as well as the mean
of the sum of code prediction errors in the visual (M. VPE) and
proprioceptive (M. PPE) modalities. The results were obtained by
averaging over four independently trained network instances.
Subj. Trial Class M. CE Var. CE % Corr. M. VPE M. PPE
5 1 walking 0.0406 0.0253 97.9 0.184 0.197
6 1 walking 0.00946 5.37e-06 100 0.169 0.154
10 4 walking 0.00933 8.84e-06 100 0.178 0.172
12 1 walking 0.0152 0.000133 100 0.189 0.171
2 3 running 0.0797 0.00157 100 0.2 0.231
16 46 running 0.0581 0.00188 100 0.228 0.245
35 19 running 0.0688 0.00301 100 0.197 0.207
35 22 running 0.0955 0.00887 99.4 0.199 0.212
6 2 basket. (r) 0.933 0.279 36.6 0.214 0.221
6 3 basket. (r) 0.842 0.246 45.5 0.197 0.216
6 4 basket. (l) 1.31 0.0329 3.54 0.173 0.199
6 5 basket. (r) 0.745 0.118 48.8 0.165 0.193
average 0.35 0.0598 77.6 0.191 0.201
predicted the correct class with the maximum of its classifier output (% Corr.).
These measures are provided by
M. CE =
tmax∑
t=t0
∆c(t)
tmax − t0 (6.7)
Var. CE = var(∆c(t0), ...,∆c(tmax)) (6.8)
% Corr. = 100 ·
tmax∑
t=t0
max(1− |argmax3n=1(in(t))− argmax3n=1(˜in(t))|, 0)
tmax − t0 (6.9)
where in is the n-th element of the model classification i, and i˜n is the respective
target. Furthermore, Table 6.15 shows the normalized average of all three code
prediction errors in the visual (Mean Visual Prediction Error, M. VPE) and pro-
prioceptive (Mean Proprioceptive Prediction Error, M. PPE) modules for each
of the test trials:
M. VPE =
tmax∑
t=t0
3.23 ·∆vpp(t) + 1.43 ·∆vdp(t) + 0.91 ·∆vmp(t)
16.71 · (tmax − t0) (6.10)
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M. PPE =
tmax∑
t=t0
3.03 ·∆ppp(t) + 1.64 ·∆pdp(t) + 0.81 ·∆pmp(t)
16.44 · (tmax − t0) (6.11)
The normalization is based on the different training set validation errors for the
submodal code predictions shown in Section 6.3.2 and accounts for the differ-
ences in the magnitude of the code prediction errors across different submodali-
ties. Again, all modal prediction errors were obtained by comparing the ground
truth codes (either actually observed or hypothetically observed) to the codes
predicted by the model.
The predicted visual codes were not used for future predictions (stimulus reli-
ability qvp/d/m = 1). Seeing that all autoencoders predict codes using the same
logarithmic code history, the prediction of both visual and proprioceptive codes
was therefore partially based on observed and thus correct codes, and partially
based on predicted and thus typically imperfect codes. Nonetheless, the results
in Table 6.15 show that the visual prediction error M. VPE was slightly lower
than the proprioceptive prediction error, suggesting that the visual intramodal
recurrences are more involved in, and seemingly more suitable for predictions
inside the modality than the crossmodal recurrences.
Furthermore, it can be noticed in the results is that the model consistently clas-
sified all walking and running trials correctly with high certainty and low vari-
ance. The basketball trials, however, are only partially classified correctly, and
partially classified incorrectly. This is mainly due to the nature of the training
data and the features that the networks learned from it: The basketball trials in
the test set contained some segments were the subject stands relatively still, or
walks without dribbling while simply holding the basketball (which is not visi-
ble to the model) in the right hand. Furthermore, dribblings were partially not
synchronously with the gait. In contrast, the training trial included only con-
tinuous dribbling, consistent with the gait (i.e. the ball is pushed towards the
ground with the right hand at the same time the left foot touches the ground).
As a result, the basketball test trials were alternatingly classified as either walk-
ing or basketball dribbling: The subject standing still or walking without drib-
bling was consistently classified as walking. The transitions to the basketball
class were specifically triggered by an upwards movement, followed by quick
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A
Proprioceptive simulation and class
t=35...84: t=85...134: t=135...184:
Ground truth
t=35...84: t=85...134: t=135...184:
B
FIGURE 6.23: Classification ambiguity of the basketball and walking trials. A: The
basketball actions are classified as walking while the subject does not dribble (left
column). A downwards hand movement (center column) followed by an upwards
hand movement (right column) is recognized by the model as basketball-specific
gesture, such that the correct classification is triggered. B: The classifier output in
this example.
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downwards movement of the right arm, as shown in Figure 6.23. This find-
ing shows that the model learned a discriminative right-hand gesture from the
multimodal logarithmic code history to identify the basketball trial. The third
basketball test trial with left-handed dribbling was rather consistently classified
as walking, since the model ignored left-hand gestures. After this gesture, the
classifier typically remained in the basketball class for a short time also without
dribbling or walking, or with asynchronous dribbling, because of the partially
self-preserving / recurrent submodal simulations.
As also indicated in Figure 6.23, the models’ proprioceptive simulation does
not accurately match the ground truth of proprioceptive stimuli from the test
set. This is due to the fact that the learned code manifolds are strongly biased
towards the sensory contingencies experienced during the embodied training
phase, such that observations rather activate the nearest of these submodal
codes. Thus, visual expectations and simulated proprioceptions are always
close to the training trials, which is shown for all movement classes in Figure
6.24, Figure 6.25, and Figure 6.26, respectively. As illustrated, the model does
not learn general movement patterns, but rather learns self-specific, individual
action contingencies, which are activated akin to nearest-neighbour matching,
and which ultimately improves the consistency of the proprioceptive simula-
tions and the performance of the kinematic intention classifier.
Because of the bi-directional, predictive connectivity between the modules,
and because of the selective usage of either predictions or observations for
the model’s inferences, it is possible to cross-validate the above results in
scenarios where only proprioceptive stimuli are provided, or both visual and
proprioceptive stimuli are provided, as shown in the following.
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A Visual stimuli: (from test trial i)
i=1 2 3 4
B Visual model expectation:
i=1 2 3 4
C Proprioceptive model simulation:
i=1 2 3 4
D Proprioceptive ground truth:
i=1 2 3 4
E Visually
encoded trial:
F Proprioceptively
encoded trial:
FIGURE 6.24: Comparison of the model’s expectations and simulations for all
tested walking trials. Although the visual input stimuli (A) and also their theoreti-
cal proprioceptive counterparts (D) vary in this class, the model’s visual embodied
expectations (B) and proprioceptive simulations (C) are strongly biased towards
the learned trials (E and F). This shows that action understanding is possible by
means of embodied encodings that can be triggered by perceptual inferences and
predictive encodings.
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A Visual stimuli: (from test trial i)
i=1 2 3 4
B Visual model expectation:
i=1 2 3 4
C Proprioceptive model simulation:
i=1 2 3 4
D Proprioceptive ground truth:
i=1 2 3 4
E Visually encoded
trial:
F Proprioceptively
encoded trial:
FIGURE 6.25: Comparison of the model’s expectations and simulations for all
tested running trials (annotation as in Figure 6.24).
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A Visual stimuli: (from test trial i)
i=1 2 3 4
B Visual model expectation:
i=1 2 3 4
C Proprioceptive model simulation:
i=1 2 3 4
D Proprioceptive ground truth:
i=1 2 3 4
E Visually encoded
trial:
F Proprioceptively
encoded trial:
FIGURE 6.26: Comparison of the model’s expectations and simulations for all
tested basketball trials (annotation as in Figure 6.24).
148 Chapter 6. Experimental Results
6.5.2 Cross-validation
First, the results obtained in the last chapter are cross-validated with the results
obtained when proprioceptions are provided, and visual codes are to be sim-
ulated by the model, the results of which are shown in Table 6.16. The model
performance in both evaluations is basically comparable, here, however, the
model was able to achieve slightly better classification results for the basket-
ball trials. This might indicate that the model simulates visual codes more alike
to the training set using the observed proprioceptive codes, than vice versa,
which would explain the relatively higher visual prediction error with respect
to the ground truth. The proprioceptive code prediction error is rather consis-
tently below the visual code prediction error. This furthermore suggests that
also the proprioceptive intramodal recurrences are more involved in the pre-
dictions than the crossmodal recurrences.
TABLE 6.16: The classifier results and mean code prediction errors
in the visual and proprioceptive autoencoders when propriocep-
tive stimuli are provided (qvp/d/m = 0 and qpp/d/m = 1). The re-
sults were obtained by averaging over four independently trained
network instances.
Subj. Trial Class M. CE Var. CE % Corr. M. VPE M. PPE
5 1 walking 0.0106 5.38e-06 100 0.214 0.188
6 1 walking 0.00909 2.45e-06 100 0.195 0.153
10 4 walking 0.00917 4.01e-06 100 0.198 0.164
12 1 walking 0.0155 0.000108 100 0.233 0.179
2 3 running 0.06 0.000449 100 0.227 0.22
16 46 running 0.0374 3.75e-05 100 0.259 0.231
35 19 running 0.0449 0.00054 100 0.237 0.205
35 22 running 0.0426 0.000107 100 0.228 0.205
6 2 basket. (r) 0.875 0.316 40.4 0.248 0.219
6 3 basket. (r) 0.736 0.288 52 0.218 0.206
6 4 basket. (l) 1.28 0.0343 2.98 0.19 0.188
6 5 basket. (r) 0.376 0.0703 80.6 0.17 0.174
average 0.291 0.0591 81.3 0.218 0.194
When both visual and proprioceptive stimuli are provided, the results of which
are shown in Table 6.17, the average classification performance improves only
slightly, substantiating that visual or proprioceptive simulations were indeed
suitable for classifications. As pointed out above, modal predictions seem to
6.5. Test Evaluations 2: Action Understanding by Embodied Predictive
Codes
149
be established mostly by activity in the same modality. However, if no cross-
modal activity was used at all, the two modalities were dependent on each other
only via the top-down class bias, such that crossmodal influences weren’t possi-
ble, and the two modalities could run asynchronously. However, in the results
shown here – where predictions and classifications are purely driven by sen-
sations – both the visual and proprioceptive prediction errors decrease below
the errors observed when only one modality was provided. This suggests that
modal predictions and simulations are not solely established by the respective
modal information, but also apply crossmodal information, which is also con-
firmed by the fact that actions are typically simulated synchronously with the
other modal stimulus.
TABLE 6.17: The classifier results and mean code prediction er-
rors in the visual and proprioceptive autoencoders when both vi-
sual and proprioceptive stimuli are provided (qvp/d/m = 1 and
qpp/d/m = 1). The results were obtained by averaging over four
independently trained network instances.
Subj. Trial Class M. CE Var. CE % Corr. M. VPE M. PPE
5 1 walking 0.0218 0.0059 99.8 0.177 0.176
6 1 walking 0.00923 7.94e-06 100 0.161 0.139
10 4 walking 0.00902 5.88e-06 100 0.164 0.151
12 1 walking 0.0236 0.00114 100 0.182 0.156
2 3 running 0.0826 0.00114 100 0.19 0.202
16 46 running 0.051 0.00076 100 0.201 0.2
35 19 running 0.0721 0.00465 100 0.182 0.18
35 22 running 0.0802 0.00571 100 0.189 0.187
6 2 basket. (r) 0.783 0.347 46.4 0.198 0.19
6 3 basket. (r) 0.678 0.352 58.1 0.181 0.184
6 4 basket. (l) 1.22 0.0786 6.88 0.164 0.178
6 5 basket. (r) 0.446 0.137 77.1 0.147 0.16
average 0.289 0.0778 82.4 0.178 0.175
6.5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was shown that the model’s proprioceptive system resonates
to visual point-light stimuli, and that this resonance is contingent upon percep-
tual inferences by means of perspective-taking and feature binding. Further
evaluations revealed that the model identifies general, predictive key features
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for action understanding inside and across visual and proprioceptive domains,
as well as an abstract, slow-dynamical intention state space that drives dis-
tributed simulations. For classification, these key features can be as specific
as right-hand gestures that span several time steps. The embodied simulation
clearly relies on embodied, predictive encodings, and nonetheless the model is
able to activate the nearest, best-matching action patterns for a respective obser-
vation, resulting in synchronized, multimodal simulations and inferences. The
problems in classifying basketball actions were ascribed to the specificity of the
training trial, which contained considerably less variance in postural control
than the test trials.
6.6 Test Evaluations 3: From Action Understanding
to Imagery
This section investigates the linkage between action understanding by means
of embodied simulation, and mental imagery of actions according to the model
and its hypothesis. Because of the bidirectional predictive connectivity, the
model can preserve internal activity sequences and submodal simulations also
without external stimuli, and thus imagine encoded actions both in visual and
proprioceptive domains. Two experiments that show the model’s imagination
abilities are performed in the following: In the first experiment, simulations are
primed by driving the model by a visual stimulus for a short time, after which
the internal predictions and classifications run freely. In the second experiment,
no stimulus is provided. Instead, the classification is provided, such that the
modal simulations are constantly biased and pushed towards converge to the
respective, class-specific attractor.
6.6.1 Primed Simulation
In this experiment, the model is driven by a visual stimulus from the test set
for 300 time steps, followed by 2700 time steps without stimulus in which the
model simulates actions without any driving signal. The respective parameters
for the experiment are shown in Table 6.18. While the stimulus is present, the
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TABLE 6.18: Parameters for perception chosen for the evaluation
of simulation priming.
Parameter Description
i = inferred by model Class bias in autoencoders
qvp/d/m = 1 for 300 time steps, then 0 Visual stimulus reliabilities
qpp/d/m = 0 Proprioceptive stimulus reliabilities
model infers the class of the action it observes, and the proprioceptive module
resonates to the visual perception, as shown in the last section. After the stim-
ulus offset, the model continues to simulate activity in the modules, or rather,
imagine the progress of the action it observed. The overall, recurrent, predic-
tive system is then pushed towards a self-sustaining activity attractor formed
during embodied training. Here, we investigate if the learned action attractors
are stable, generate continuous, cyclic actions, and in particular, if a presented
stimulus primes the imagination to the effect that the network converges to a
corresponding action attractor.
Figure 6.27 shows the classifier output of a network that was primed by all tri-
als of the test set successively. The figure shows that the classification of the
imagined visual and proprioceptive codes indeed converges to a specific class
in each case, and that it remains there relatively stable. This confirms that the
network successfully and robustly generates visual and proprioceptive, class-
specific imaginations when running freely. The speed of convergence depends
on the class (quickly for walking, and rather slowly for running and basketball),
and after convergence, there are different magnitudes of variance for each class
(low variance for walking, comparatively high variance for running and bas-
ketball). A visual display of the class specific, visual and proprioceptive imagi-
nations of the network is shown in Figure 6.28. In all cases, the model simulates
prototypical, cyclic actions in multiple modalities and sustains the simulation
for an arbitrary time span.
The above observations are quantified in Table 6.19 on average over multi-
ple, independently trained networks. The calculation of prediction errors was
skipped here, since there is no driving signal to compare with, and since the
simulation may not run synchronously with, or not on the exact same time scale
as a hypothetical driving stimulus, which to compensate is nontrivial.
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A Walking prime:
...
B Running prime:
... ...
C Basketball prime:
...
FIGURE 6.27: Classifier output during the simulation priming experiment. For
each of the test trials (4 of each type in A, B, and C), the model is driven by a
random segment of the trial for 300 time steps, and is then configured to simulate
activity in all three modules without stimulus. The classifier output converges to
the shown class, respectively, except for the last two basketball segments because
of the ambiguity of the basketball classification.
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A Visual model imaginations:
Walking Running Basketball
B Proprioceptive model imaginations:
Walking Running Basketball
FIGURE 6.28: Multimodal imaginations after simulation priming. Depending on
the internal attractor the model converged to, the model expectations form three
different cycles that represent walking, running, or basketball dribbling. Con-
verged attractors are generally stable and self-preserving, and the visual (A) and
proprioceptive (B) imaginations are temporally synchronous and consistent. Sim-
ilar results appear without priming when only a constant class bias is provided to
the model.
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A Subj. 6, Trial 2, Basketball (r):
B Subj. 6, Trial 4, Basketball (l):
C Subj. 6, Trial 3, Basketball (r):
FIGURE 6.29: Case differentiation for the convergence of the model’s simulation
after priming by a basketball stimulus. The model typically settles to the attractor
that corresponds to the classifier that was recently most active (A and B). Interme-
diate classifications do not determine the convergence to the respective class (C).
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TABLE 6.19: The results of classification after convergence in the
simulation priming experiment. As shown, the variance is very
low and the convergence is stable. The results were obtained by
averaging over four independently trained network instances.
Subj. Trial Class M. CE Var. CE % Corr.
5 1 walking 0.337 0.00703 75.7
6 1 walking 0.331 0.0127 76.2
10 4 walking 0.31 0.0312 78.1
12 1 walking 0.339 0.00599 75.5
2 3 running 0.0429 0.000188 100
16 46 running 0.0411 0.000109 100
35 19 running 0.0411 0.00011 100
35 22 running 0.0412 0.000112 100
6 2 basketball (r) 0.735 0.000512 50
6 3 basket. (r) 0.738 0.000377 50
6 4 basket. (l) 1.07 0.000575 25
6 5 basket. (r) 1.07 3.09e-06 25
average 0.424 0.0049 71.3
Despite the successful formation of consistent, distributed, basically pre-
determinable simulation attractors in the network, the percentage of trials that
converged to the class of the respective prime (% Corr.) in Table 6.19 reveals
two more phenomena: Firstly, in three out of four tested networks, some of
the basketball primes did not lead to convergence to the basketball attractor
in the long run. In these cases, the network converged to the walking class
after the stimulus offset. Seeing that the classification of the basketball test
trials was already ambiguous in the previous experiments, it is coherent that
also the convergence to an internal attractor, primed by these basketball trials,
is ambiguous. This is exemplified in Figure 6.29, showing multiple, possible
scenarios: In Figure 6.29 A, the network classifies the observed stimulus as
basketball at the stimulus offset. The classification (which is driven solely by
the internal modal simulations from then on) then converges to the basketball
class. Figure 6.29 B shows the opposite case, when the basketball stimulus is
currently classified as walking at the stimulus offset, such that the network
converges to the walking attractor. Thus, the ambiguity of the basketball test
trials results in ambiguities in the imagination of the network after priming.
In Figure 6.29 C, the network converges to the basketball attractor although
the network momentarily classified the observation as walking at the stimulus
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offset. This shows that not only the current classification, but rather the recent
average of classifications determines the convergence, since both the classifi-
cation and the autoencoders’ predictions follow from the history of activated
submodal codes. Taken together, the classifier performance is typically the
most crucial factor for simulation priming in the model. When the stimulus is
a randomly selected snipped out of the whole test trial, then the success rate
for simulating ahead in the correct action class is typically about equal to the
classifier correctness when showing the whole trial (which corresponds to the
performance shown in Table 6.15 in Section 6.5.1).
Secondly, however, the model was not trained in particular to converge to the
nearest attractor in terms of the classification error during imagery tasks. In
fact, there is no objective reason for the network not to converge to a different,
stable attractor. Based on the random initialization of weights, and based the
random application of error gradients during training, also network instances
with a more or less distinct simulation bias towards specific classes resulted.
One of the tested networks was biased towards simulating the basketball action,
such that it converged to the basketball attractor whenever a walking trial was
shown, which condenses in the lower overall percentage of class correctness for
walking in Table 6.19. To avoid networks with biased imagination character-
istics, it might be helpful to introduce mechanisms that stabilize the classifica-
tion after priming, which in turn stabilizes the modal simulations. This can be
thought of as deciding on a class to provide a constant, top-down bias for the
subsequently imagined action, which is evaluated in the following.
6.6.2 Top-down Biased Simulation
TABLE 6.20: Parameters for perception chosen for the evaluation
of simulation biasing.
Parameter Description
i = teacher forcing Class bias in autoencoders
qvp/d/m = 0 Visual stimulus reliabilities
qpp/d/m = 0 Proprioceptive stimulus reliabilities
This evaluation shows that the self-preserving imaginations of the network can
be determined solely by providing a constant, top-down class signal. The class
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FIGURE 6.30: Classifier output during the simulation biasing ex-
periment. The same (model driven) classifications and simulation
attractors are reached when the top-down class biasing in the sub-
modal autoencoders is provided.
signal biases the distributed predictions, such that they will step out of their
current attractor and converge to the provided class attractor. For this experi-
ment, each of the three classes is tested for 3000 time steps, in which no sensory
stimulus is provided, while the intention biases in the autoencoders are over-
ridden with the desired class respectively (teacher forcing). The parameters for
this evaluation are shown in Table 6.20.
TABLE 6.21: The results of classification after convergence in the
simulation biasing experiment. The results were obtained by av-
eraging over four independently trained network instances.
Class M. CE Var. CE % Corr.
walking 0.0177 0.000164 100
running 0.0387 7.84e-05 100
basketball 0.0905 0.000328 100
average 0.049 0.00019 100
Again, the stability of the converged (model generated) classification (see Figure
6.30 and Var. CE in Table 6.21) was similar to results of the simulation priming
experiment. This further substantiates that the model uses the top-down clas-
sification biases for all modal predictions consistently, and that changing only
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FIGURE 6.31: An imagined transition from a running to a basket-
ball movement. When the top-down bias changes (color coded),
the overall network transits to the respective class. Implicit inter-
classes are encoded in the learned predictive encodings.
a single, binary, constant input is sufficient to enforce transitions between the
learned attractors. The tested network instances were identical to the instances
used in the last experiment where one of the networks showed a convergence
tendency towards the basketball attractor. Here, however, all desired attrac-
tors were reached correctly given the constant top-down bias, confirming that a
simulation bias can be prevented by stabilizing the intention inference.
The imagination of inter-class actions can be observed when transitioning from
one top-down bias to another, as shown in Figure 6.31. Coming from the run-
ning class, the network transits to the basketball class. In the meantime, while
the imagined locomotion and step cycle remain intact and slow down a lit-
tle, the arm postures smoothly transit from typical poses for running to typical
poses for basketball dribbling.
6.6.3 Conclusion
In the above sections, it was confirmed that the model is able to generate self-
sustaining, continuous, multimodal and multi-submodal simulations also with-
out sensory stimulation. In separate modules, predictive encodings and tempo-
ral representations enabled consistent imaginations that corresponded to kine-
matic intentions, and all of the evaluated simulation attractors were stable in
themselves. When the simulation was primed by the presentation of a biologi-
cal motion stimulus, the network typically converged to the nearest simulation
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attractor in terms of the classified action class afterwards. It was found that
the model can have a simulation tendency towards a specific class after prim-
ing, which can however be compensated by stabilizing the top-down intention
biases. Taken together, the results provide further support for the theories of
embodied simulation via predictive coding, by showing how it is possible to
prime embodied simulations via bottom-up stimuli, or bias them via top-down,
higher level representations. The results furthermore suggest a functional link
between action understanding and mental imagery.
6.7 Test Evaluations 4: Tracking Perspectives and
Understanding Novel Movements
TABLE 6.22: Parameters for perception and adaptation chosen for
the evaluation of tracking and understanding novel movements.
Parameter Description
ηs = 0.01 Adaptation rate of the origin of the visual FOR
γs = 0.85 Momentum of the adaptation of the origin
ηr = 0.05 Adaptation rate of the orientation of the visual FOR
γr = 0.85 Momentum of the adaptation of the orientation
ηw = 0 Adaptation rate of the feature selection and assignment
γw = 0 Momentum of the feature selection and assignment
bdata = allocentric Data translation offset
Adata = allocentric Data rotation offset
wij = not provided Feature binding weights
i = inferred by model Class bias in autoencoders
qvp/d/m = 1 Visual stimulus reliabilities
qpp/d/m = 0 Proprioceptive stimulus reliabilities
This experiment evaluates if and how the model can understand actions that do
not belong to the learned action repertoire. To do so, the model’s performance
is analyzed while being stimulated with three movements of the second test set
as described in Section 6.1. All adaptive and predictive model components are
activated in this action understanding task. That is, the model is to infer the
perspective, feature binding, the type of the observed action with respect to the
learned action repertoire, and to simulate proprioceptions that correspond to
the observations.
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Furthermore, in contrast to the previous experiments where the model inferred
a constant offset of rotation and translation on the data, here, additionally a dy-
namic, intrinsic orientation of the data has to be compensated by the model on the
fly. In the selected test trials, the body orientation of the subjects is partially not
constantly aligned to a specified orientation in the visual frame of reference as
is was approximately the case during training and in the previous experiments.
Thus, the experiment investigates whether the model is able to also track per-
spectives dynamically, although the observed action is unknown to the model.
To this end, the adaptation rate ηr for the model’s rotation matrix was slightly
increased. The respective parameters for this experiment are shown in Table
6.22.
The tested trials of the second test set involve three different types of actions: A
lambada dance trial, a jumping trial, and a waiting-for-the-bus trial. In the lam-
bada dance trial3, a single subject (without dancing partner in the data) performs
short forward steps, alternating, unilateral sidesteps, and is swinging the hips
while the arms occupy a partner dance pose (left arm holding the dancing part-
ner at the torso, right arm holding the dancing partner’s hand up high). The
global upper body orientation is relatively constant in this trial, though relative
to the hips, the orientation varies greatly. In the jumping trial4, the subject stands
on the ground in the beginning, then jumps up on both feet four times. They
proceed jumping on the left foot four times, then on the right foot three times.
Subsequently, the subject jumps on both feet again two times and crosses or
touches the feet in mid air. The upper body orientation remains relatively con-
stant. In the waiting trial5, the subject rests their hands on the hips, briefly looks
at the clock, leans forward, and scratches their head while (seemingly impa-
tiently) stepping forwards and backwards, constantly changing the movement
direction. In contrast to the other trials, here, the orientation of the whole body
changes quickly and multiple times, covering a range of about 180° around the
vertical axis.
Table 6.23 summarizes the results of perceptual inference given these stimuli
after the model was trained on walking, running, and basketball dribbling. The
3see video at http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/subjects/55/55_02.avi as of 08.01.2018
4see video at http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/subjects/49/49_03.avi as of 08.01.2018
5see video at http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/subjects/40/40_11.avi as of 08.01.2018
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TABLE 6.23: The derived perceptual inference measures after con-
vergence in the combined perspective-taking and feature binding
task with novel movements.
Subject Trial Class Mean OD Var. OD Mean TD Var. TD
Mean FBE Var. FBE Mean IA Var. IA
55 2 Lambada 18.0 58.0 8.524 0.0602
9.53 0.148 4.23 1.94
49 3 Jumping 15.0 17.12 15.05 0.518
10.9 0.298 7.14 0.934
40 11 Waiting 10.7 45.9 7.182 0.0882
7.82 0.202 2.15 1.07
average orientation difference (here, with respect to the actual upper body di-
rection) was relatively low for all trials after perceptual inference (about 10 to
18°). The average translation difference was between 7 and 15 cm, which is
considerable more than for the known trials, but still not critical. As well, most
of the features were identified and grouped correctly: About 2 to 7 out of the
15 visual features were assigned incorrectly. The feature assignment error was
nonetheless considerably higher than observed in previous experiments, speak-
ing for the increased uncertainty in the assignments. Looking at the numbers,
perceptual inference can be considered successful, despite the fact that the net-
work had never seen similar actions before. Thus, the introduced information
coding and learning schemas provide general templates for perspective-taking,
and seem to be suitable for bootstrapping general action recognition.
To that end, the network infers an error-optimal interpretation of its sensations
with respect to its embodied encodings. As shown in Figure 6.32, this leads to
a minimization of the derived error measures towards a relatively stable local
minimum also for novel movement stimuli. For the lambada trial, as illustrated
in Figure 6.32 A, all derived measures are relatively constant after the minimiza-
tion of expectation errors, except for the assignments. The model identifies most
features correctly, but loses some of the assignments for a short time while ob-
serving the sidesteps, and recovers while observing the forward steps. In com-
parison to the forward steps, whose motion dynamics are somewhat known
from walking, the sidesteps result in unknown motion dynamics, especially
due to the simultaneous hip swing. Thus, the hip joint assignments are par-
tially lost. The sidesteps also result in a high variance in the body orientation,
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A Lambada dance:
B Jumping up and down:
C Waiting for the bus:
FIGURE 6.32: The performance of the perceptual inference model when novel
movements are observed. All tested trials have stable perceptual attractors, and
thus the perspectives can be inferred. Because of the wide postural differences the
learned trials, not all of the features are correctly recognized, depending on the
specific type of action. The graphs are normalized with regard to the respective
absolute maximum defined in the legend.
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FIGURE 6.33: The classifier output while observing a jumping
trial. As observed before, the subject standing around is classi-
fied as walking in the beginning. When they start jumping, this is
classified as running because of the whole body upwards/down
dynamics. At the transition from falling downwards to jumping
upwards (every second green local maximum), the model briefly
classifies basketball, triggered by the learned, basketball specific
right hand gesture.
which is compensated by the model nonetheless. Other features that are not
assigned correctly or lose the assignment temporarily are the right arm and left
hand because of the unknown posture. The lambada dance trial is classified as
walking by the network, which is the typical default class learned by the net-
work. The proprioceptive system is set into a less articulated walking resonance
every time the subject steps forwards or sidewards.
In the jumping trial, as seen in Figure 6.32 B, the orientation is constantly in-
ferred with relatively high precision, since the subjects body orientation does
not drastically change while jumping. Only about half of the features are as-
signed correctly, since all of the perceived motion features represent strict up-
wards or downwards movements, which are primarily known to the model
from the shoulders, thorax, neck, head, and hips while running. The other fea-
tures are partially and temporarily inferred by the model. It obtains the correct
assignments of the legs while jumping up on either of the legs likely because
of the similarity to the running posture, and loses the assignment again while
jumping on both legs and and crossing the feet in the air, which, again, implies
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FIGURE 6.34: Tracking the perspective and binding the features
in the waiting-for-the-bus trial. Shown are the consecutive linear
moving averages of screenshots, each averaged over 50 time steps.
a sideways leg dynamics unknown to the model. Figure 6.33 confirms that the
model uses motion features known from running for its perceptual inferences:
The classifier outputs walking in the beginning while the subject stands and
does not move. While the subject is moving upwards or downwards, the model
classifies this as running, because of the similarity of the motion features. Inter-
estingly, in the moment the subject jumps up again, this is classified as basketball
for a short time, since the discriminative feature for the basketball classifier is
triggered by the right hand downwards-upwards movement. As a result, in
Figure 6.33, the basketball classifier is activated every second time the running
classifier is at a local maximum. At every other second time, the network does
not interpret the opposite case, the upwards-downwards dynamic, such that
the classifier output is unnormalized for a short time. Consequently, also the
proprioceptive system is set into resonance related to the running movement:
The simulated posture occupies an average walking posture, the arms move
up and down, and the model predicts motion of the legs, while however, no
postural changes of the legs can be observed.
Interestingly, the waiting-for-the-bus trial shows the lowest of all average ori-
entation differences in this experiment, although it shows the most variance in
the body orientation. Figure 6.34 shows that the model is able to track the ori-
entations of the subject with relatively high precision even while they change
their orientation. As shown in Figure 6.32 C, even all features are identified
correctly for short periods of time. This is due to the similarity to the postures
and motion dynamics known to the model from walking. Consequently, the
waiting trial is classified as walking by the network (just as the lambada dance).
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The proprioceptive module starts to resonate when the subject is sporadically
stepping forwards, mimicking a minorly pronounced walking movement.
6.7.1 Conclusion
The foregoing results show that the model is able to infer and track the perspec-
tive of an actor robustly, and bind features to a degree that depends on several
factors, when the observed action is rather dissimilar to the actions encoded
during training. Thus, the embodied action priors are suitable for generalized
perceptual inferences. Resonance in the proprioceptive system can be deter-
mined when the observed action contains similar action patterns to those seen
during training – akin to neuroscientific findings that substantiate that mirror
neurons only respond to observed actions that belong to the motor repertoire
of the observer. Furthermore, the results clarify that the network learned sensi-
ble (e.g. gestural) features from the training data for the inference of kinematic
intentions.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Discussion
In this thesis, I reviewed neuroscientific and psychological studies on action
understanding that led to dilemmas and open questions which are still highly
disputed today. Subsequently, I raised and combined fundamental theories and
findings to establish a general hypothesis on action understanding. After relat-
ing to own previous work and the work of others, a neurocomputational model
was implemented that aimed at investigating the tenability of the hypothesis
and its partial aspects, while identifying functional principles and candidate
mechanisms for action understanding. The model shows how different types of
self-experiences can be learned and linked in distributed, generative and pre-
dictive encodings. This essentially led to the ability to consistently imagine and
simulate the experienced self-perceptions. Moreover, the model was able to
reenact observed actions in the learned, embodied terms, activating the same
simulations, and inferring the kinematic intentions of the observed actions. The
correspondence from observations to self-representations was actively estab-
lished by top-down expectation driven visuo-spatial adaptations that refer to
perspective-taking and feature binding. The model thus provides support for
the direct matching and embodied simulation hypotheses within a framework
of predictive coding and multiple types of structural biases and perceptual in-
ferences. Based on the results and evaluations, several insights are gained, and
statements can be made, which I conclude in Section 7.1.
Despite these successes, the neural network model is by far not a complete
model of action understanding and its cognitive development. Several sim-
plifications were applied, and problems were sidestepped, such that not all of
the open questions on this topic have been tackled to the last detail. Both – new
168 Chapter 7. Conclusion and Discussion
insights as well as simplifications – however offer potential and opportunities
for further investigations, which I put forward in Section 7.2.
7.1 Insights and Statements
The proposed neural network model was able to learn compressed action pat-
terns from submodal self-perceptions. The developing spatial codes covered the
contingencies in their respective domain independently. To link the encodings,
the model learned bidirectional, temporally predictive encodings within and
across the modalities. As well, the modal encodings were successfully linked
to abstract, kinematic intention classes, which then were utilized to learn biases
for the submodal code predictions. For learning spatial codes, their temporal
correlations, and classifications robustly, several aspects turned out to be cru-
cial. Submodal contingencies by means of spatial Gestalt patterns had to be
learned first, followed by the biased temporal predictions and classifications of
the Gestalt codes, to avoid that the target mapping for the latter is constantly
changing. Furthermore, autoencoders are prune to recoding of already learned
codes during online training on continuous inputs, particularly when the in-
puts are very smooth such as the biological motion stimuli utilized here. Rep-
resenting the inputs by specifically parameterized Gaussian neural populations
reduced the problem of recoding significantly. As well, a clear distinction be-
tween learning and adaptation was raised: While adaptations gradually alter
the model’s momentary perceptual processing to match top-down expectations,
learning alters the encoded expectations and their correlations in longer terms.
During training, a direct influence of expectation errors on the model’s tempo-
rary perception was explicitly avoided by applying error gradients at random
time steps, while in contrast it was explicitly urged during adaptation. With
the use of these methods, codes were learned to optimize expectations perma-
nently, effectively reducing recoding and catastrophic forgetting to a minimum,
while adapting the perception to match expectations momentarily.
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In evaluating the trained model, I have shown that the correspondence and
binding problems can be solved by top-down driven perceptual online adap-
tations. The learned expectations focused on specific features of biological mo-
tion. Moreover, the evaluation reveals a functional dependency between the
orientation a movement is observed from, as well as recognition rate and time.
These results qualitatively match the results of psychometric studies on biologi-
cal motion perception and mental rotation. Thus, mental transformations of the
own body scheme onto an observed person (as also assumed by Kessler and
Thomson, 2010) can indeed be considered a "functional bridge between first-and
third-person perspectives" (Decety and Meltzoff, 2011) that explains the activation
of mirror neurons. For solving the binding problem, the introduced population
coding was yet again substantial for resolving perceptual ambiguities and con-
flicts, which was not possible using Cartesian coordinates in exploratory stud-
ies. Another vitally important component was the segregation of input stimuli
into their submodal components, and the weighting of the respective submodal
expectation error signals. The submodal components provided specific spatio-
temporal invariances and inference properties such that they established con-
structive information priors for binding observed features into Gestalt percepts
and establishing the correspondence between reference frames.
The second evaluation of the trained model revealed how action observations
can activate simulations of learned embodied states. It was cross-validated that
the modules of the network can predict each other’s modal activity selectively,
and that the predictive components utilize local as well as distal information in
an appropriate manner. Thus, the concept of motor cognition was verified in
the model, in that it does not only visually recognize an observed action after
perspective-taking and feature binding, but also that action observations expose
attractors to the overall, dynamical and recurrent neural system to the effect
that unobservable action encodings are brought into resonance, simulating and
reenacting the observed actions in embodied terms. To obtain the results, it was
again important not only to avoid recoding, but also to fine-tune the learning of
spatial codes, and predictions and classifications thereof. Determining separate
learning rates for spatial and temporal training of each autoencoder, for the top-
down biasing of predictions, and for the intention classifier was a critical factor.
Although the proposed population coding already accounted for comparable
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levels of activity between the submodalities, the different variabilities and con-
figuration spaces of the submodal inputs still had an influence on the respective
learning performance. Given the proposed parameterization of the model, nei-
ther of the developing submodal encodings had an excessive influence on the
predictions, the biasing thereof, nor on the inference of kinematic intentions.
In fact, the model seemed to learn descriptive short-term action patterns for its
inferences, as specific as a hand gesture to detect a basketball action.
Furthermore, I have shown that the same principles of distributed predic-
tive coding are suitable for preserving consistent simulations of multiple
action classes also without any sensory stimulation, while the simulation can
indeed be primed by a preceded observation. Thus, multiple, stable, and
self-preserving attractor state sequences were formed by the model, while
the top-down kinematic intention bias was appropriate for modulating the
simulation and generating transitions between the simulated action classes.
The results confirm that embodied simulations can be linked to visual and
motor imagery, and that both might indeed be core mechanisms of action
understanding. To obtain stable attractors when activity in the model was com-
pletely self-preserving, it was most important to predict the absolute codes (not
the difference to the last prediction) from a time window of preceded codes,
and to use non-linear activation functions for the code layers. The absolute
prediction and non-linearities provided robustness to error accumulations in
the predictions, effectively avoiding divergence from the normal codomain of
the codes. Similarly important, the utilization of a logarithmic time window of
recently activated codes for the predictions was beneficial for noise robustness
and necessary for detecting more complex temporal dependencies.
At last, it was shown that the model learned general perceptual biases for bi-
ological motion recognition and action understanding, in that it was able to
determine the perspective and, to a certain degree, also the feature identity of
completely novel actions. The model also maintained the feature inference and
tracked the frame of reference over time when it changed. Moreover, the model
simulated corresponding proprioceptions when the observation corresponded
to a known self-perception, and it interpreted the observed kinematic intention
in terms of its learned action repertoire. Again, this result is reminiscent of mir-
ror neuron properties, in that they are as well assumed to interpret observed
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actions in terms of the own motor repertoire, and in that they are nonetheless
assumed to be involved in imitation learning. Thus, the results obtained in this
experiment set the stage for speculations about which role the proposed action
understanding mechanisms could possibly play in social learning.
Based on the successful verification of the hypothesis suggested in Chapter 3,
and based on the applied processing structures and methodologies that were
successful in obtaining the above results, I can provide an opinion on some of
the big open questions that result from the dilemmas of action understanding
as described in Section 2.1:
• Are mirror neurons a byproduct of mental development, or is there a ge-
netic predisposition? What is their purpose?
The actual role of mirror neurons – whether and how they take part in
mental development – can not be identified directly using this model.
Taking into account the apparent structural biases of cognition that were
considered for the proposed model, it seems likely that there is a genetic
predisposition for the development of mirror neurons which unfolds dur-
ing and contributes to mental development, rather than being a byproduct of
it without particular purpose. As shown in the results, the contribution to
mental development could indeed be to recognize already learned actions,
and ’understand’ visually unobservable characteristics of the actions (via
motor preparations and intention inferences) from a self-centered perspec-
tive on the basis of the own embodied experiences. Although the model
can be considered to be particularly build to support this claim, it shows
that it is indeed possible that mirror neurons facilitate action understand-
ing by this means. Embodied simulations, of course, should encompass
a greater variety of action-related encodings than shown in the model,
which might after all lead to the development of empathy and emotional
intelligence, as suggested by Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007.
It could be taken as counterevidence against this claim that infants are
able to attribute goals to observed actions that they are not yet able to
perform themselves (Kamewari et al., 2005). Not necessarily all forms of
action understanding may emerge from visuomotor couplings. Similarly,
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understanding goal states of observed actions may be possible also with-
out simulating motor activity, and without taking the perspective of an
observed actor. There are certainly several ways and forms of action un-
derstanding, but it is likely that one of the forms is motor preparation,
facilitated by encodings related to mirror neurons, which is a view also
shared by Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004 (see also Hickok, 2009). Hence,
the primary role of mirror neurons might be action understanding, but
action understanding is not facilitated solely by mirror neurons, as they
represent merely an aspect of it.
• Do mirror neurons facilitate imitation learning? Or is there an innate
mechanism?
The model did not directly investigate imitation, nor learning by imita-
tion. In the training procedure, the executed actions were provided, and
shown from an egocentric perspective, offering full visual, propriocep-
tive, and intention information for developing mirror-neuron-like tun-
ings. Thus, the approach followed the assumption that mirror neurons
only encode goal-directed actions that belong to the own motor repertoire
already, and thus develop after or while learning to execute the respective
actions.
Nonetheless, it can be assumed that cognitive processes involved in the
formation of mirror neurons help in learning by imitation. While mirror
neurons are apparently involved with action understanding rather than
learning by imitation, cognitive processes that activate mirror neurons
seem to be strongly entangled with visuo-spatial abilities, as extensively
supported in this thesis. The results in Section 6.7 have shown that visuo-
spatial perspective-taking is also possible if the observed model performs
an unknown movement. The observer may thus take the perspective of an
(either observed or memorized) actor who performs a novel movement,
and then minimize the difference between the observed (and mentally
adopted) posture of the actor and the own posture by applying motor
commands. This results in imitation, after which the observer is able to es-
tablish embodied visuomotor correspondences and also visuomotor goal
encodings for the observed action, resulting in learning by imitation. Af-
ter this, they will be able recognize the action when re-encountering it
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and to prepare motor programs, such that the developing neural codes
ultimately form mirror neurons for that action and its understanding by
means of embodied simulations. Thus, in a sense, imitation might precede
the development of mirror neurons, but similar perceptual mechanisms
might be involved.
Once again, this may be recognized as a bold assumption by some who
argue that perspective-taking develops later in life than imitative capa-
bilities. For example, studies indicate that children make mistakes in the
’three mountains problem’ up to an age of 9 or 10 years (Piaget, 2013),
where they are to select pictures of a model of mountains that correspond
to a specified vantage point. However, this task requires complex spatial
visualization abilities, and the results may also be influenced by context
and language understanding to a certain degree. More basic visuo-spatial
abilities develop indeed very early in life. For example, Moore and John-
son, 2008 show that (male) infants are capable of mental rotation as early
as 5 months of age, long before they seem to imitate simple actions (Jones,
2009) (other than facial expressions which is disputed but might be in-
nate).
Although with these words, I can neither endorse nor refuse the existence
of innate mechanisms for imitation, I argue that visuo-spatial abilities and
active inference may bootstrap learning by imitation, and that mirror neu-
rons may be the developmental result. Thus, multimodal action encodings
might be learned nearly in the same way from ideomotor and exploratory
learning, as they are learned from imitative behavior, the difference being
that visuo-spatial perspective-taking is involved in the latter as described.
Note that visual representations of actions (i.e. biological motion in STS)
are still not necessarily limited to egocentric reference frames. Canonical
views of actions (for example a view of the left side of a walking person)
may develop as a result of observation and learning by imitation, which
can nevertheless activate self-centered representations by means of spatial
transformations.
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• What comes first, learning by imitation, or learning how to imitate?
Under the assumptions just made, and given that the hypothesis of the
model is consistent, the answer is fairly both: Provided that visuo-spatial
abilities facilitate imitation to form embodied visuomotor experiences,
and provided that visuo-spatial abilities are driven by the very same de-
veloping action experiences, then clearly both processes are intertwined
and synergistic. Children, however, first learn about their own body
already in the womb, and then proceed to imitating others. Thus, it can
be assumed that self-observations and embodied encodings provide the
necessary perceptual biases that later drive the ability to imitate others, as
also suggested by the model results.
• Which mental processes equate action and perception? What es-
tablishes the correspondence between observations of others, and
self-representations?
The suggested principles of information processing provide a solution
to the correspondence problem: Given that an observed action activates
some embodied expectation in an egocentric reference frame – by means
of a broad and even fuzzy perceptual bias – the model can infer the per-
spective of the observed actor by minimizing the expectation error via
mental rotations and translations. If and to which degree such an em-
bodied, driving signal is activated might indeed be connected to social
cues like racial bias (Lamm, Batson, and Decety, 2007; Avenanti, Sirigu,
and Aglioti, 2010). The progress of perspective-taking then concretizes
the activated embodied expectations and thus synergistically improves its
own driving error signal until convergence of the perspective, as shown
in the experiments. Similarly, the model provides a solution to the bind-
ing problem: Submodal top-down expectations with multiple perceptual
invariances are utilized to establish the correspondence between observed
visual features and own bodily features. This, again, improves the expec-
tation by itself, such that the relevant features can eventually be selected,
ordered, and grouped into stable, embodied Gestalt percepts. Both pro-
cesses are closely related to spatial abilities and attention.
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• Is there even a mirror neuron system in humans?
The study of Lingnau, Gesierich, and Caramazza, 2009, which doubted
that there is a mirror neuron system in humans, resulted in thorough de-
bates. Although neglecting the existence of a mirror neuron system in
humans by not being able to replicate another study that finds direct evi-
dence for it (Chong et al., 2008) might be a false syllogism, the study and
the subsequent debates discussed several other possibilities how humans
can be able to understand actions, such as context-sensitive inferential
processes.
Relating to the model, there is as well no particular technical reason to in-
fer motor encodings solely from visual observations, and intentions solely
from motor encodings – unless the observed actions are going to be imi-
tated. Hence, although mirror neurons apparently do not directly enable
learning by imitation, they might very well be involved in imitation and
the processing of social cues. Nonetheless, in the model, intentions could
also be inferred solely from visual observations, and the proprioceptive
module is not necessary to do so. Thus, it can be said that motor prepara-
tion is not the only way how action understanding could be explained in
partial aspects. It has to be noted, however, that visual mirror neuron ar-
eas do not seem to directly communicate with the frontal areas (Rizzolatti
and Luppino, 2001).
The answer to the above question in my personal opinion is thus again
yes, but the human mirror neuron system is probably not the exclusive
cognitive mechanism for action understanding. Given that the activation
of mirror neurons is contingent upon perspective-taking, this becomes ob-
vious from the fact that in many cases, it is not necessary to fully adopt a
momentary perspective of someone else to understand their position and
feelings – abilities that have been mentioned in connection with the mir-
ror neuron system – but rather to adopt their situational context. Whilst
the term action understanding is often vaguely defined in the literature, also
vague definitions of the mirror neuron system’s role in it are immanent.
Still, it is beyond dispute that humans are capable of some form of action
understanding. Looking at the studies reviewed in this thesis, and the
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support by the model, motor simulation most likely offers one path to it,
and it is most likely linked to imitation of already known actions. This the-
sis furthermore suggests that the involvement of perspective-taking may
decide whether motor simulation takes part in action understanding, or
whether context-sensitive inferential processes are involved (or both).
• What is possible from a computational perspective? What functionality
can explain the observations and verify the made assumptions?
The computational model developed in this thesis provides support for
the addressed and unified hypotheses that center around action under-
standing and the mirror neuron system, as it substantiates their computa-
tional feasibility. The foundation for this feasibility was specifically found
in spatial perceptual inferences by means of perspective-taking and fea-
ture binding.
Taken together, the combined hypothesis in this work contributes to answering
the above questions, but certainly cannot answer them completely. Further in-
vestigations are needed to verify the model as well as its assumptions, some of
which I suggest in the following.
7.2 Prospects and Opportunities
First of all, the introduced model apparently is no model of low-level visual
processing, and thus basically abstracts most aspects of it: The model obtains
its data in the form of preprocessed coordinates that represent salient visual
cues. It does not approach the perception of raw visual, retinotopic, binocular
sensory inputs and the extraction of information from them, e.g. of contrast
and motion signal as observed in visual cortex (cf. Grossberg, 2007). Although
the proposed population encodings in the model are somewhat comparable to
retinotopic representations in the brain, in fact, they represent each visual fea-
ture independently, the neural plausibility of which can be questioned. Depth
perception is assumed to be provided instead of being inferred from binocu-
lar visual streams. While the binding of features into meaningful Gestalt per-
ceptions is basically solved by the model, the Gestalt law of good continuation
(Jäkel et al., 2016) is not considered: The model does neither resolve occluded
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visual features, nor does it actively track the visual features over time. How-
ever, it might be feasible to transfer the proposed processing structures into a
model of visual processing of image sequences. For example, convolutional
neural networks provide a suitable basis for extracting higher-level features
from high-dimensional topological inputs (e.g. LeCun et al., 1990). Visual fea-
tures could be detected and tracked based on bottom-up and top-down salience
cues, akin to the laws of Gestalt perception. Depth information can be detected
from binocular vision (e.g. Hayashi et al., 2004), temporal filters can be added
to extract motion information (e.g. Karpathy et al., 2014), and spatial transfor-
mations can be implemented to transform the retinotopic inputs by means of
gated connectivity (e.g. Memisevic, 2013). Validating the suggested theoretical
framework on low-level visual data could possibly reveal further insights about
the involved bottom-up as well a top-down processes and their functional de-
pendencies. Analogously, the format and processing of proprioceptive inputs is
consistent with the visual pathway, but rather abstracted, although the applica-
tion and processing of realistic sensory inputs would more problematic in this
case.
In the experiments, it was shown that the model is able to internally visual-
ize observations from different perspectives, and that it was able to imagine
actions also when no sensory input was present. However, it lacks the ability
to imagine actions from different perspectives, since the top-down, generative
processes do not involve the complete visual processing cascade: The model
can generate Gestalt expectations, but it cannot transform them internally via its
perspective-taking mechanisms. Future models should thus consider to trans-
form top-down generated expectations by means of Gestalt templates, instead
of adapting bottom-up perception. This may also be reasonable from a compu-
tational perspective, given that the model processes massive amounts of realis-
tic visual inputs, since the Gestalt expectations to be transformed should come
only with a fraction of the complexity in comparison to the whole visual per-
cept.
Along similar lines, although the perceptual inference methods introduced in
this thesis are related to spatial abilities and visual attention, they lack a real-
istic mechanism for fixating and tracking overall observations, besides the indi-
vidual features. Biological motion stimuli were adjusted for their locomotion
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on the ground, and the visual receptive field was just as large as the observed
actors. Thus, the adaptive visual translation bias in the model can be considered
the center of rotation for perspective-taking, or a mechanism for object center-
ing in foveal vision, rather than an information driven eye fixation mechanism.
Limiting the receptive field in this way was primarily done for reasons of com-
putational complexity. Further investigations are needed that also include the
processing of peripheral vision and object tracking.
Other opportunities concern the information propagation principles. After the
preprocessing of abstracted visual and proprioceptive stimuli as described in
Section 5.3, submodal spatial codes are learned with respect to their suitability
for reconstructing the Gestalt stimuli momentarily, that is, without a temporal
component. The spatial codes were not specifically optimized to foster tem-
poral predictions of the codes within and across modalities. Analogously, the
temporal code predictions were not particularly trained to optimize the Gestalt
reconstructions. Rather, the error signal relied on the reconstruction of the re-
spective codes. Although this separated learning approach worked well and is
technically sound and robust, additional mechanisms may further improve the
unsupervised learning of spatial expectations and temporal predictions. On the
one hand, the temporal code predictions in the autoencoders could backprop-
agate the code prediction errors (via the logarithmic history, inside and across
the modules) to the causative Gestalt codes in order to optimize them for better
predictions, which could however worsen the quality of the spatial reconstruc-
tions. On the other hand, stimulus reconstructions could be obtained given the
predicted instead of the observed codes to also optimize the code prediction for
better spatial reconstructions, which could however, worsen the quality of the
predicted codes. Thus, mixing both spatial and temporal predictions in this way
might result in complex interferences. Finding suitable and robust parameteri-
zations, learning and fusion procedures remains open for further investigations.
Also with respect to the distinction between spatial and temporal network com-
ponents, the mixture of predicted and perceived codes was set manually during
training and testing. The perception was considered completely reliable given
that sensory information was provided. Allowing a more fine-grained, adaptive
fusion of prediction and perception might also allow the development of more
robust codes: The network might simultaneously filter noise in the perceptions
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given its already learned predictions. Mechanisms are available to avoid that
the system falls into illusory loops (Kneissler et al., 2015). As well, adaptive
information fusion might result in better recognition performance: Given that
observed features are not sufficiently bound and the perspective is not suffi-
ciently derived, then the expected submodal patterns – which currently stem
from bottom-up activity solely – are typically distorted. Thus, allowing an in-
fluence of predicted codes will instantly provide a better expectation for the
stimulus, such that the perceptual inference is sped up. However, it might in-
deed not be trivial to avoid self-delusions, particularly when a high number of
different stimuli have been trained and are potentially available for interpreting
a current stimulus. Considering that humans learn a variety of stimuli that do
not solely refer to bodily actions, the perceptual bias should also be very broad
and not strongly pre-determined by class-specific simulations.
Another possibility to improve the segmentation of stimuli into meaningful
codes is to detect significant stimulus non-linearities, to construct a quasi-
discretized representation from the continuous inputs. A similar approach
was pursued in preliminary studies (e.g. Schrodt et al., 2015), where motion
patterns of sufficiently linear parts of the data were formed, which predicted
subsequent motion patterns. The event segmentation theory suggests that
streams of perceptions are segmented into event codes in a similar manner
(Zacks and Tversky, 2001; Zacks et al., 2007). Here, non-linearities in the
Gestalt perceptions could be compared to event boundaries, while sufficiently
linear parts between boundaries could be compared to events. By limiting
the number of transition points between well-defined events, the robustness
of the developing temporal attractors could be further improved. It remains
open, however, how multiple, interacting autoencoders and event coding can
be technically unified.
The presented model is able to consistently and robustly simulate different
types of actions by temporal predictions that form stable attractors when the
model is not driven by inputs. The model considers multiple time steps for
its predictions, and is thus able to learn and unfold high-dimensional dynam-
ics. Following the universal approximation theorem (Cybenko, 1989), it can
approximate any continuous function on a compact subset of Rn. Nonetheless,
the model is deterministic, and thus cannot predict multimodal distributions of
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possible successor codes based on the same subset of recently activated codes
and classified intentions. Thus, given that two actions that represent the same
intention are identical for a sufficient amount of time, the network is unable
to learn distinct predictive attractors for them. Accordingly, in case they are
similar, the distinction of attractors is problematic. It might thus be beneficial
to use probabilistic models (for example conditional variational autoencoders,
Kingma and Welling, 2013) to represent uncertainties in the predicted codes.
In a similar manner, although the model can generate high-dimensional imag-
inations, it cannot learn very prolonged time series of data, in that it is limited
to the length of its temporal horizon. For prolonged cyclic time series, that is,
superimposed oscillations, it could be advantageous to integrate reservoirs of
recurrently connected neurons into the model’s prediction mechanisms, akin to
Liquid State Machines (Maass, Natschläger, and Markram, 2002) or Echo State
Networks (Jaeger, 2007), which are, however, typically not trained or trainable
using backpropagation. For arbitrary, also non-cyclic time series, the usage
of Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM) networks (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997), which are in theory able to preserve both activity and backpropagation
signals internally for arbitrary time, could improve the prediction performance.
LSTMs unfold their recurrent connections through time, but as well only up
to a technically limited number of time steps. Thus, training algorithms for
LSTMs truncate the backpropagated error signals at some point, and they are
thus effectively similarly limited in the temporal horizon in which they can de-
tect functional dependencies. Further studies are encouraged to clarify possible
advantages of these methodologies and combinations thereof for simulations of
biological motion.
Other prospects for advancements affect the evaluated data. The model was
trained only on three short, cyclic actions, which served well as proof of the
introduced concept and hypothesis. Even so, it can be criticized that the model
was not able to classify the basketball action consistently. Note that it would
have been a simple matter to achieve optimal results also in this case just by
selecting a more extensive training set. However, this thesis did not aim at
setting up a benchmark for the classification performance on the selected data
set, but purposely focused on showing perceptual effects that result from the
proposed neurocomputational principles, and for this task, the choice of data
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was productive. Nonetheless, in follow-up studies, the model should be trained
and evaluated on a greater variety of actions, and possibly other appearances
as well.
In preliminary studies, the model was able to learn twelve canonical views of
actions: Three different movements each from four different vantage points
(Schrodt et al., 2015). The network developed motion pattern neurons that
individually encoded a snapshot-like representations of a submodal Gestalt
input from the respective view-point. These patterns were activated by a
winner-takes-all mechanism (cf. Grossberg, 1976), such that only one neuron
was actively predicting its input at a time. In the current autoencoder ap-
proach, the Gestalt representations are distributed over the whole code layer,
where neurons jointly predict Gestalt inputs, and are thus able to re-combine
already learned parts of observations. Consequently, exploratory studies have
shown that additional training stimuli result in a less than linear increase in
training time. Thus, considering the advantages of distributed encodings of
this character, the current model should potentially be able to encode a notably
larger variety of actions, which remains to be verified and tested.
Other databases are available for evaluating further aspects of cognition typi-
cally attributed to mirror neurons. For example, the network could be trained
to classify a subject’s identity, or emotional properties of actions. The Emotional
Body Motion Database1 could be used, which provides motion captures of ac-
tions performed in different, intended emotional states, as well as information
about the actor and classifications by human observers.
If it can be achieved to learn submodal encodings sufficiently abstracted from
low-level sensory inputs, which could for example be promoted by hierarchical
or deep autoencoders, the actions learned by the model could potentially cover
the complete sensorimotor contingencies of a human body. However, the bigger
the action manifold, the more important are components that select and distin-
guish subsets of it to produce particular trajectories that correspond to partic-
ular kinematic intentions, emotional states, or lead to particular goals states.
Thus, the top-down biasing of modal simulations is an aspect that becomes in-
creasingly important, and has to be increasingly elaborate for encoding more
1see http://ebmdb.tuebingen.mpg.de/index.php as of 08.01.2018
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actions, and also action goals. Further investigations are needed to evaluate the
suitability of the proposed top-down biasing, or find alternatives for it.
As a result of the cyclic nature of the considered actions, and the biasing by
constant, kinematic intentions, the model formed predictive state attractors that
were distributed evenly over several submodalities and time. In a similar manner,
to model also final goal states of actions, mechanisms should be integrated that
activate attractors selectively distant in time. Then, the submodal predictions
would be directed along overall consistent state trajectories towards a final goal
state attractor, akin to dynamic motion primitives (Schaal, 2006; Ijspeert et al.,
2013).
Action understanding is eventually about social intelligence, and social intelli-
gence is about interaction. In respect thereof, the model lacks several properties.
First of all, the model is a purely perceptual modal, and it does not act. Ide-
ally, the perceptual adaptations can be considered mental actions. To make the
model more of a complete model of action understanding, it should learn the
effects of force and motor-based dynamics in addition to proprioceptions and
kinematics, also taking account of kinematic and physical constraints like grav-
ity. As a first step towards a model of mental development of social intelligence,
sensorimotor encodings should develop simultaneously by exploration, obser-
vation, and imitation as suggested before, which is however an enormous task
for future studies. As it is now, the model gets idealized actions and the respec-
tive kinematic codes provided during training. As a second step, motivational
aspects could be implemented as driving force of action and interaction, and
in this context, considerations about when and if perspective-taking is initiated
could be integrated.
Despite possible technical improvements and investigations, the model also
opens up opportunities for behavioral and neuroimaging studies. Above all,
studies should investigate the involvement of perspective-taking on the acti-
vation of mirror neurons. This could substantiate the claim of this thesis and
generate new insights with further implications.
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Closing Remarks
The only certainty about human cognition probably is that it is a peculiar and
complex process that has evolved over millions of years. Not merely the several
leftovers of evolution found in our genome, which do not follow a practical use
anymore, indicate that also our brains do not apply only a single, homogeneous
principle for all of their work. Moreover, the topic of action understanding and
mirror neurons in particular is one of the most controversial today, as it is one of
the most meaningful for human culture, leaving plenty of scope for interpreta-
tion and speculation. Although the endeavour to formulate universal, unifying
principles of cognition is understandable and may indeed lead to a more gen-
eral view on how the brain works, one should thus take them with a grain of
salt. All of the theories and studies that provided the guideline for this the-
sis, just as the thesis itself and its framework, probably take their part in the
truth, but none of them can be complete and undisputed, universal and uni-
fying at the same time. All the more so, I personally hope that this thesis and
its approach will contribute to the debates on mirror neurons and action un-
derstanding reasonably and constructively, the achievement of which I hereby
leave to the interested readers to assess.
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